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Cambodia’s experience with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
(HPAI) since the disease was discovered on a farm outside Phnom 
Penh in January 2004 reveals important aspects of how a developing 
country with limited resources and capabilities has responded to a 
crisis that has global public health implications and, vice-versa, how 
this global response in turn affected Cambodia. Augmented by a 
survey sent to individuals deeply involved in HPAI work in Cambodia, 
this study uses a qualitative research methodology consisting of 
mostly one-on-one semi-structured interviews across government, 
the private sector, and the non-governmental sector. Measures 
have been taken to cope with AI such as public awareness campaign 
‘Super Moan’ and Pandemic Preparedness, border control over the 
movement of poultry with neighbouring countries, Vietnam and 
Thailand, culling of poultry, and case-based secret compensation. 
The study provides background to Cambodian political and modern 
history and sets the context of aid dependence and tourism, the 
livestock sector and poultry in particular. It then proceeds in three 
parts, from beginning, middle, to end on how HPAI evolved, 
providing a narrative timeline of the key policy moments/phases 
between the first outbreak and to date (December 2008). Three 
narratives are explored: (1) culling without compensation; (2) the 
shift to health; and (3) the role of poverty and livelihoods. The study 
then discusses three key themes that define the political economy 
of the policy process. These are: (a) Donors and NGOs; (b) Beyond 
Aid: Other Sources of Revenue and the Importance of Tourism; and 
(c) Media Spin. The overall analysis of the political economy of 
Avian Influenza in Cambodia reveals key challenges, obstacles and 
opportunities for responding to HPAI—and potentially other 
global epidemics. 
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the challenges of climate change? How do we address water and pollution problems in rapidly growing 
Asian cities? Who benefits from genetically-modified crops? Today‖s world is experiencing rapid social, 
technological and environmental change, yet poverty and inequality are growing. Linking environmental 
sustainability with poverty reduction and social justice, and making science and technology work for the 
poor, have become central challenges of our times. 
 
The STEPS Centre (Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) is a new 
interdisciplinary global research and policy engagement hub that unites development studies with 
science and technology studies. We aim to develop a new approach to understanding and action on 
sustainability and development in an era of unprecedented dynamic change. Our pathways approach 
aims to link new theory with practical solutions that create better livelihoods, health and social justice for 
poor and marginalised people. The STEPS Centre is based at the Institute of Development Studies and 
SPRU Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex, with partners in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. We are funded by the ESRC, the UK‖s largest funding agency for research and training 
relating to social and economic issues.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cambodia‖s experience with Avian Influenza (AI) since the disease was discovered on a farm outside 
Phnom Penh in January 2004 reveals important aspects of how a developing country with limited 
resources and capabilities has responded to a crisis that has global public health implications and, vice-
versa, how this global response in turn affected Cambodia. Unlike Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, the 
case of Cambodia offers a prime example of the influence of foreign aid on a weak state where average 
civil servant wages are equal to the garment workers‖ minimum wage, conflicting priorities in which the 
drive for tourism dollars and the need for public health can be at odds with one another, patronage 
politics, and the challenges of operating in a heavily NGO and donor-driven, projects-based environment 
in which each project can become its own silo.  
 
This paper examines a larger aspect of a particular problem faced by the international response, acting to 
swamp an already weak state administrative and policy capacity, and providing an unusually large scope 
for uncoordinated action, duplication and corruption (in the form of rent-seeking). Already awash in 
donor money,
1
 Cambodia played its role on a global policy stage in both clamouring for its share of the 
Avian Flu pie and becoming an incubator for donor trial-and-error experiments on how to achieve above 
all else one goal: minimising the risk of Avian Influenza‖s spread inside Cambodia and, more importantly, 
to reduce pandemic potential that could strike donor countries themselves.
2
 
 
A key turning point in shifting the focus from animal health to human health took place a year later in 
January 2005 with the discovery of Cambodia‖s first confirmed victim not in Cambodia, but in Vietnam. 
This led to the publication of news accounts critical of Cambodia‖s notoriously weak health 
infrastructure, or lack thereof. Indeed, a one page 18 February 2005 story in Science, the magazine of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, entitled ―First Human Case in Cambodia 
Highlights Surveillance Shortcomings‖ warned that ―The diagnosis was made not in Cambodia but in 
neighbouring Vietnam, where the 25-year-old woman had sought treatment and died on 30 January‖ 
adding that ―the woman‖s 14-year-old brother had died earlier of an apparent respiratory disease now 
suspected to be H5N1, but his remains were cremated before any samples were taken.‖ (Normile 2005: 
1027) Two weeks later, a 5 March Wall Street Journal article by Jaems Hookway entitled ―In rural 
Cambodia, dreaded avian influenza finds a weak spot‖ relates the valiant efforts of Cambodia‖s ―chief flu-
hunter at the cash-strapped Ministry of Health‖ whose ―emergency budget for educating [Cambodia‖s] 13 
million people about bird-flu dangers is just $2,500.‖ (Hookway 2005) 
 
Not only had Cambodia failed to detect its first human victim, crucial evidence of possible spread had 
been forever destroyed. Confirmed was an extant image of Cambodia as a hapless nation-state, so fragile 
                                                 
1
 In 2006, aid was 7.6 per cent of Gross National Income, a relative decline from previous years—which from 1993-
2006 averaged nearly 11 per cent. The total amount of official development assistance and official aid totalled 
nearly $6 billion in that same period, and per capita aid averaged a relatively generous $33 per capita per year, 
peaking at $48 per capita in 1995 and remaining above $35 per capita since 2002. 
2
 Indeed, as the STEPS Centre (undated) website notes, ―The potential of human-human transmission of virulent 
influenza derived from an avian flu viral strain has raised alarm bells across the world. The prospect of a major 
public health catastrophe on the scale of that experienced in 1918 – or worse - has meant considerable resources 
have been invested in developing surveillance and response systems. But how effective are these responses? And 
who are the likely winners and losers? Are such response systems robust, durable and resilient, in the face of 
unknown, and perhaps unknowable, shocks and stresses, and a complex and dynamic viral ecology?‖ 
9 
 
and incapable that it had failed to protect
3—indeed had murdered—its own citizens in the mid-1970s 
causing the death of nearly a quarter of its population in now infamous ―Killing Fields‖ where the fanatical 
Khmer Rouge regime had reset time itself to Year Zero. Now Cambodia risked being Ground Zero for the 
next global pandemic after more than a decade of donor intervention to ―develop‖ the country. Failing to 
―intervene‖ in Cambodia could lead not to the next Afghanistan, where Jihadist fighters trained and 
plotted against the West, but to the next epicentre, where Victim Zero of the next global pandemic could 
originate.
4
  
 
This study picks-up more than three years after articles similar to the one in Science and the Wall Street 
Journal exposed Cambodia‖s weak health system.5 Playing its part as an ―infected‖6 country, Cambodia 
asked donors for $32.5 million at the 17-18 January 2006 International Pledging Conference on Avian 
and Human Influenza in Beijing, (World Bank 2006c) which has since resulted in at least 15 implementing 
partners slated to execute $22 million for 2008-2009
7
 to combat Avian Influenza and promote 
Pandemic Preparedness across four areas: Animal Health, Human Health, Information, Education, and 
Communication (IEC), and Pandemic Preparedness itself.
8
 Indeed, so severe was the concern that the 
United States, which following the events of 5-6 July 1997
9
 to February 2007 had barred direct 
government-to-government support of Cambodia, while giving hundreds of millions of dollars to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), allowed an exception for the US Centers for Disease Control (US-
CDC) to work directly with the government of Cambodia. US-CDC has funded AI activities in Cambodia 
since 2005 to strengthen animal and human surveillance systems,
10
 to train animal and human health 
                                                 
3
 The responsibility to protect, an emerging concept of international law in the 1990s, is invoked for the right of 
humanitarian intervention, both when intervention has happened—as in the case of Kosovo or Georgia—and 
when it has failed to happen as in the case of Rwanda or Myanmar. 
4
 The media shape public perceptions and their collaboration in dealing with future animal health crises is essential. 
For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC 2006) aired a highly polished 90 minute drama called 
―Pandemic‖ at 9pm (primetime) 7 November 2006 on BBC Two, and rebroadcast on Australia‖s Special Broadcasting 
Service, watched by more than seven million Australians each week that involved a 16 minute scenario in which 
Cambodia is the origin of the next pandemic http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YeL3pM8L8DA. Of course, many 
factors contribute to the emergence and intensification of zoonotic diseases. These include economic factors (i.e. 
developing technologies, increased international travel and trade, novel agricultural and industrial applications) 
social and cultural factors (i.e. food habits, religious practices, lack of adequate health care, changes in human 
behaviour and farming practices), human and animal demographic factors (i.e. aging populations in developed 
countries, urbanisation, population growth, availability of new hosts, and movement of animals into new 
landscapes), environmental factors (i.e. global climate change, lack of adequate sanitation, and land use practices 
that result in human contact with previously remote habitats), and evolutionary factors (i.e. microbial adaptations, 
enhanced infectiveness and pathogen changes) to mention a few.  
5
 Time magazine‖s Bryan Walsh had a 28 February 2005 entitled ―Bird Flu Spreads Its Wings‖ quotes Dr. Guan Yi, an 
Avian Influenza expert at the University of Hong Kong: ―In countries like Cambodia they don‖t have a systematic 
surveillance program…‖ 
6
 World Bank (2006a: 19) includes Cambodia among ―infected countries‖ and defines the term as ―countries where 
initial outbreaks of HPAI were not contained, resulting in the further spread of HPAI to a large proportion of poultry 
sector and to other areas of the country. Infected countries where human cases have been recorded will require 
significant assistance to control and eradicate the disease progressively from the poultry sector and prevent 
further human cases.‖ 
7
 UNRC (2008) The total is $22,251,906 to be precise; a figure that includes ongoing programs started in 2006-
2007, but does not include in-kind contributions. A finance gap of $2,383,439 has been identified. 
8
 These categories of course are interrelated, and self-reinforcing. For example, animal health is not only for the 
benefit of animals, but for the benefits of humans too. 
9
 Fighting broke-out in Phnom Penh and the First Prime Minister was deposed. 
10
 Writing about FAO‖s support to the RGC to strengthen its capacity to diagnose, survey, and control AI, Desvaux et 
al. (2006: 211) note: ―Different surveillance tools are being tested, such as market monitoring and a sentinel 
10 
 
front-line workers to detect and respond to disease outbreaks and to support a successful national 
behaviour change communications program.
11
 
 
The objective of this research project is to investigate the politics of policy processes surrounding the 
response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Cambodia, identifying key actors, 
networks, associated narratives, and practices of policy.
12
 The aim of this study is to question the 
assumptions being made, and explore different framings in the debate, including those often not heard 
in mainstream policy circles. The overall analysis of the political economy of policy will reveal key 
challenges, obstacles and opportunities for responding to avian flu – and potentially other global 
epidemics.
13
 More specifically, within the context of Cambodian history and political economy, timelines, 
narratives, actors/networks, and politics/interests, this research project examines the following 
overarching questions: 
 
1. Timelines — which key policy moments/phases, spaces, actors define policy change? 
2. Narratives — what competing storylines exist—and what silences narratives? 
3. Actors/networks — who says what, to whom, and how? 
4. Politics/interests — how and why do certain versions dominate? 
 
The study has the following structure: following this introduction (Section 1), a brief discussion of 
methodology is laid out; Section 2 provides background to Cambodian political and modern history, sets 
the context of aid dependence and tourism, the livestock sector and poultry in particular. It then 
proceeds in three parts, from beginning, middle, to end on how HPAI evolved, providing a narrative 
timeline of the key policy moments/phases between the first outbreak and to date (December 2008). 
Using this established timeline of key moments, Section 3 examines three policy narratives: first, culling 
without compensation, second the shift to health, and third the looming question of what‖s poverty and 
livelihoods got to do with it? This is then followed by actors, networks, and interests mapping, offering a 
glimpse of how effective Government and donors were in intervening against AI across animal, human, 
livelihoods, pandemic preparation, or some other dimension of the respondent‖s choosing. It makes use 
of the results of an elite survey undertaken in May-June 2008 and sent to 300 individuals involved in AI in 
Cambodia. Section 4 hones-in on three key themes defining policy of particular interest arising from the 
previous sections. These are: (a) Donors and NGOs; (b) Beyond Aid: Other Sources of Revenue and the 
Importance of Tourism; and (c) Media Spin. Section 5 concludes the study by revisiting the triggers and 
stakeholders involved, linking their responses and actions towards a political economy of avian influenza 
in Cambodia. 
                                                                                                                                                             
villages' network, to offset the weakness of the national passive surveillance network. Several constraints were 
identified … such as a lack of motivation among provincial staff, the limited capacity of the central team to compile 
and analyse the data generated, the reluctance of farmers to have their animals sampled, and weak diagnostic 
capacities. The sustainability of such a surveillance system once international support ends remains to be seen. 
Participatory epidemiology (PE) may be an appropriate complementary tool to track diseases. PE works on the 
principle that livestock keepers often possess detailed knowledge of animal diseases and can provide valuable 
diagnostics that could help in identifying AI outbreaks, particularly in remote areas.‖ 
11
 http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/ai_briefing.html & http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/sp_051707a.html The 
United States Government is supporting the Royal Government of Cambodia to reduce human exposure to Avian 
Influenza through the technical expertise of several U.S. agencies. These agencies are USAID, the US-CDC, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No.2 (NAMRU-2). 
12
 ADI (2007: 2) examined the legislative context dating all the way back to the 1980s, during the People‖s Republic 
of Kampuchea; it ―is a literature review of the impact of HPAI on the Cambodian Poultry Sector. The fieldwork for 
the report was carried out in May 2007. The report involved the analysis of background data, field trips and key 
informant interviews with people involved in all sectors of the poultry sector in Cambodia.‖ 
13
 This aim is drawn from STEPS Centre (undated) www.steps-centre.org  
11 
 
 
 
A Few Words on Methodology 
 
This study uses a qualitative research methodology consisting of mostly one-on-one semi-structured 
interviews across government, the private sector, and the non-governmental sector. These include, but 
are not limited to: government officials, donor and NGO representatives, the private sector (including 
conglomerates, farmers and wet market stallholders), and civil society representatives. These interviews 
were conducted over the course of three visits to Cambodia in total.
14
 The first was a preliminary visit in 
February 2008 (one week), the second was in May 2008 (two weeks), and the third was in June 2008 (one 
week). The work overlapped with an assignment to write on the Political Economy of Growth in 
Cambodia, examining garments, rice, and livestock. Work was aided by the fact that the author had 
already examined livestock in 2004-2005 in Ear (2005), and had specifically studied it during the pre-
human influenza phase of the disease, when livelihoods was the primary concern in a pro-poor livestock 
policy setting. 
 
In addition, a survey was launched on 27 May 2008 and sent to 308 e-mail addresses of individuals 
known to be involved in Avian Influenza work in Cambodia. Of these, 44 visited the survey website, and 
17 completed responses were received. The survey contained 14 questions, requesting that the author 
rate performance on a Likert scale. It also allowed for written responses, which many respondents 
partook. 
 
2. TIMELINE—MOMENTS 
 
Background 
 
Political Structure and Modern History 
 
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with three branches of government (legislative, executive, and 
judicial) in which the King ―shall reign but shall not govern‖ according to Chapter 2, Article 7 of the 
Constitution.
15
 In the First Mandate (1993-1998) the legislative branch was unicameral with only a 
National Assembly but two Prime Ministers serving jointly. By the Second Mandate (1999-2003), it 
became bicameral, adding a Senate
16
 to the already existing National Assembly. The Senate is intended 
to review legislation, but is too often merely a rubberstamp, as is the National Assembly. With the 
formation of the Third Mandate in 2004, the Heritage Foundation (2005) called the coalition deal 
―patronage at its worst‖ with one Prime Minister, seven Deputy Prime Ministers, 15 Senior Ministers, 28 
Ministers, 135 Secretaries of State, and at least 146 Under-Secretaries of State. While the main political 
                                                 
14
 More than 40 face-to-face interviews were conducted in Khmer, French, and English primarily in Phnom Penh 
and the environs, but with one site visit to the province of Kampong Som. A visit to Psah Orussey‖s wet market was 
also made to gain an appreciation for conditions on the ground. The author was not well received when 
photographing the wet market and sternly warned ―not to spread false stories in newspapers‖ by wet market seller. 
Average interviews lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to hours (if over a meal typically). Information from 
informants used in this paper is coded numerically (1 through 40+) to protect identities and a complete list is 
shown in Table 1.1 of Annex 1. The number in parenthesis following that informant‖s title descriptor appears to the 
left in the list of informants and is randomly assigned. 
15
 http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/egov/english/organ.constitution.html 
16
 The Senate was created because the head of the National Assembly during the First Mandate had to cede his 
place to the Former First Prime Minister whose party lost the election. 
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parties are discussed in subsequent sections, the army is its own power centre and merits a brief 
examination here. Since the broad strokes of Cambodian contemporary history are well-known, this 
report will not delve into them to any great extent beyond Table 2.1 below, and in the subsequent pages. 
 
Table 2.1:   Transition of Legal, Political, and Economic Systems in Cambodia 
 
Period 
Legal 
System 
Political 
System 
Political Power 
Economic 
System 
Before 1953  
 
French-
based civil 
code and 
judiciary  
Under French 
protectorate 
Held by the French Colonial 
1953-1970 
(The 
Kingdom of 
Cambodia)  
French-
based civil 
code and 
judiciary  
Constitutional 
monarchy 
Held by King Norodom 
Sihanouk (until he abdicates 
in 1955) then as Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk 
alternately as Prime Minister 
or Head of State of an 
elected government known 
as the Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum or People‖s Socialist 
Community (1955-1970)  
Market and then 
nationalisation 
1970-1975 
(The Khmer 
Republic)  
French-
based civil 
code and 
judiciary 
Republic Held by Lon Nol and Sirik 
Matak with U.S. support 
Market, war 
economy 
1975-1979 
(Democratic 
Kampuchea) 
Legal 
system 
destroyed 
All previous 
systems 
abolished, 
extreme Maoist 
agro-
communism 
Held by Pol Pot and the 
Khmer Rouge with Chinese 
and North Korean support 
Agrarian, 
centrally 
planned 
1979-1989 
(The People‖s 
Republic of 
Kampuchea)  
Vietnamese 
communist 
model 
Communist 
party central 
committee and 
local 
committees 
Held by the Kampuchean 
People‖s Revolutionary 
Party which picks Hun Sen 
as Prime Minister beginning 
in 1985 (Vietnamese 
backed with 100,000 
troops; Soviet support) 
Soviet-style 
central planning 
1989-1993 
(The State of 
Cambodia) 
Greater 
economic 
rights 
Communist 
party central 
committee and 
local 
committees 
Held by Cambodian People‖s 
Party CPP (renamed from 
KPRP) with Hun Sen as P.M. 
(Vietnamese backed, all 
troops withdrawn) 
Liberalized 
central planning 
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Period 
Legal 
System 
Political 
System 
Political Power 
Economic 
System 
1993-1998 
(The 
Kingdom of 
Cambodia) 
First Mandate  
French-
based civil 
code 
combined 
with 
common 
law in 
certain 
sectors 
Constitutional 
monarchy in 
which the King 
reigns but does 
not rule 
Shared between Ranariddh 
(Funcinpec) and Hun Sen 
(CPP) in a unique 
arrangement of co-Prime 
Ministers with required 2/3 
supermajority for governing 
coalition 
Transition to a 
market 
economy 
1998-
present 
Second, 
Third and 
Fourth 
Mandates 
As above As above Held by Hun Sen as Prime 
Minister in a CPP-Funcinpec 
coalition government that 
required a 2/3 
supermajority until 2006 
when the Constitution was 
changed to allow 50% +1 
Market 
economy 
 
Notes: The 1993-1998 period is often seen as an Emergency Phase, while the 1998-present period is 
seen as a Development Phase. Pol Pot died in 1998, the Khmer Rouge (KR) disbanded completely in 
1999. 
Source: Adapted from Wescott (2001) based on Chandler (1991) and MLG and DFDL (1999). 
 
Further consolidation of CPP power occurred during the run-up to the second election held in 1998. 
Events leading up to it firmly entrenched the primacy of the military over the forces of democracy. On 5-
6 July 1997, Ranariddh was ousted by Hun Sen, resulting in more than 70 extrajudicial killings of mostly 
Funcinpec civilian loyalists. Although the precise details may never come to light, the general storyline is 
that in the lead-up to the events, a power struggle between Funcinpec and the CPP emerged in 
recruiting senior Khmer Rouge defectors. This led, for all intents and purposes, to a coup d‖etat.  
 
Forces loyal to the Second Prime Minister launched violent and sustained attacks against forces loyal to 
the First Prime Minister (claiming that the former was ready to take sole power) in Phnom Penh and the 
surrounding area. To preserve the semblance of normalcy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation, who belonged to Funcinpec, was named First Prime Minister. In the aftermath 
of 1997, there was no doubt who called the shots, and the entire military landscape shifted as a result. 
Seeing as much, the KR movement dissolved shortly after the death of Pol Pot in 1998 and the defection 
of Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, and other leaders shortly thereafter. A mixed UN-Cambodian Tribunal 
located on the outskirts of Phnom Penh has indicted Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, and three other KR 
leaders. All five sit in cells in the Tribunal compound awaiting trials which will start this year and could go 
on for several years.  
 
Politics in Cambodia is predicated on power and money; as the previous elections demonstrate, the CPP 
has both in ample supply. As it stands, Hun Sen—a man the Economist characterised on 6 August 2008 
as ―One of the last (we hope) Asian strongmen‖—is the longest serving Prime Minister in Southeast Asia. 
The CPP's political base is concentrated at the village level in the rural provinces, where it exerts greater 
influence on the people through its network of village, district, and commune chiefs (the latter were, 
until 2002, entirely appointed by the CPP).  
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A large part of the Khmer Rouge legacy shapes the current regime‖s thinking and the manner in which it 
behaves. Indeed, the current regime credits itself with having vanquished the Khmer Rouge threat and 
brought stability to Cambodia. In this context, what would become the CPP was a faction of the Khmer 
Rouge that defected to Vietnam after relentless purges of the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, 
where many of the original members of the faction first hailed, by the Pol Pot faction. The CPP top 
leadership comes from the lower echelons of the pre-1977 Khmer Rouge movement and has yet to 
reconcile itself with this chapter of its history.  
 
As the coup against Ranaridh exemplified, the role of the military in Cambodian politics should not be 
underestimated. Arguably, the military is the fundamental base of Hun Sen's power; most military forces 
near the capital are loyal to him. Loyalty in Cambodia, of course, is bought; a good chunk of the 
government budget is expended on defence and, in turn, partly used for illicit activities by senior 
members of the military. Because of non-transparent parallel budgets, no-one really knows how much is 
actually spent on feeding this machine. One estimate puts it close to $300 million or almost half the 
official government budget. A good chunk of this money disappears in a budgetary black hole; according 
to observers, most personnel are ―ghost soldiers‖ or not active, but their salaries are paid and their 
supplies provided (then resold or never delivered, but invoiced).  
 
Aid Dependence and Tourism 
 
Most recently, 1993-2006 saw nearly $6 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid 
in current dollars. This averaged a relatively generous $33 per capita per year, peaking at $48 per capita 
in 1995 and remaining above $35 per capita since 2002, making the country one of the most aid 
dependent in the world. In 2003, approximately $514 million of ODA was disbursed, equivalent to 11.5 
per cent of gross national income. While ODA has increased somewhat since then,
17
 GDP growth has also 
been dramatic. Thus, the country is less aid dependent now if measured as per cent GDP than it was four 
years ago. Unfortunately, such generous aid infusions have not been met with improved domestic tax 
revenue collection from 2002 to 2006 (years for which data is available). Indeed, tax revenues never 
exceeded 8.2 per cent of GDP during that period, an abysmal figure by world standards, and on par with 
Niger, Tanzania, and Togo.
18
 This is also reflected in anemic domestic revenue performance. 
 
Table 2.2 shows recent trends in aid, tax, and domestic revenues for Cambodia. The steady decline in Aid 
(per cent of GNI) from 2002 to 2006 is due to double-digit GDP growth rates which in turn expanded GNI, 
the denominator. Likewise, the drop in Aid (per cent of government expenditures) in 2006 is likely due to 
an expansion of central government expenditures from increased total domestic and tax revenues 
                                                 
17
 Pledges for 2009 amount to $951.5 million, including $257 million from China, followed by the European Union 
with $214 million, and Japan with $112 million. While the importance of China in Cambodian politics is undeniable, 
both as a reason for why Cambodia can exercise independence from Western donors and as a source of attention 
from the United States towards Cambodia, China itself is not a major donor to Cambodia for Avian Influenza-related 
activities and is not discussed in any detail in this study. 
18
 Data from prior to 2002 is as follows: From 1999 to 2000, domestic revenue grew by only 0.2 percentage point, 
though by 2001, it was reported to be 11.7 per cent of GDP (with tax revenue of 8.4 per cent of GDP, and direct 
taxes valued at 1per cent of GDP). Since then, however, performance has not kept-up, and projections of increases 
have failed to materialise. Neighbouring Vietnam fared much better (20.6 per cent, 15.6 per cent and 5.5 per cent, 
respectively), while Lao PDR was on par with Cambodia in terms of total revenue (11.4 per cent of GDP), but 
performed markedly better in the area of tax revenue (9.2 per cent) and direct taxes (2 per cent). Indeed, other 
comparable countries to Cambodia are sub-Saharan African: Niger (8.9, 8.3, and 1.5), Tanzania (11.8, 10.6, and 2.7), 
and Togo (13.8, 12.3, and 0.4). All revenue and tax figures come from International Monetary Fund staff country 
reports cited in World Bank and ADB (2003: ix). 
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collected even though tax revenue (per cent of GDP) itself hardly budged from 2005 to 2006. Indeed, 
while only indicative, patterns suggest that for each year in which ODA and official aid (current US$) 
increased, tax revenues (per cent of GDP) decreased, and vice-versa. The same pattern repeats for 
revenues, excluding grants (per cent of GDP). The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
rating for revenue mobilisation rated right in the middle of a Likert scale (1=low to 6=high) at 3, was 
unchanged for 2005 and 2006, the only two years for which the rating is available. 
 
Table 2.2:  Cambodia’s Aid, Tax, and Domestic Revenues 2002-2006 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Official development 
assistance and official aid 
(current US$) 
484,250,000 514,310,000 483,190,000 540,680,000 528,990,000 
Aid (% of central 
government expenditures) 
120.35 118.66 110.67 113.18 84.68 
Aid (% of GNI) 11.79 11.50 9.49 8.99 7.59 
Aid per capita (current US$) 36.52 38.13 35.22 38.74 37.26 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 8.19 7.55 8.15 7.91 8.19 
Revenue, excluding grants 
(% of GDP) 
10.31 9.41 9.86 9.68 9.81 
CPIA efficiency of revenue 
mobilisation rating (1=low 
to 6=high) 
N/A N/A N/A 3 3 
 
Source: WDI Online. Accessed: 25 August 2008. http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/  
 
Alongside aid dependence and the resulting aid economy, two sectors—garments and tourism account 
for around 14 per cent of GDP each—have clearly stood out in the past decade for their tremendous 
contribution to Cambodia‖s economic growth19. According to the Economic Institute of Cambodia, the 
garment sector has added an estimated 2 per cent annually to GDP since 1995, although this is tapering 
off (EIC 2007: 12). No equivalent contribution to GDP growth is available for tourism, but it has been the 
main contributor to growth in the services sector which had the largest sectoral (41 per cent) share of 
GDP in 2007. Threats to tourism include violence and the fear of pandemics such as Severe Accurate 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Even though SARS‖ direct impact was to scare away tourists from 
Cambodia in 2003, explaining in part the nearly 11 per cent drop in visitor arrivals as shown in Table 2.3, 
alongside anti-Thai riots that took place in late January 2003. Indeed, the only other time a drop in visitor 
arrivals took place since 1993 was in 1997, the year fighting broke out in Phnom Penh and the First 
Prime Minister was deposed.  
 
Table 2.3:   Visitor Arrivals in Cambodia 1993-2005 
 
 Visitor Arrivals Average  
Length  
of Stay 
 
Year Number Change (%) 
1993 118,183 00 N/A 
                                                 
19
 While oil and gas have been much ballyhooed in recent years, Cambodia does not yet have proven reserves, and 
may even have enjoyed an unwarranted spurt in growth on the basis of mere speculation that oil and gas were 
present in significant quantities in Cambodian waters off the Gulf of Thailand 
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 Visitor Arrivals Average  
Length  
of Stay 
 
Year Number Change (%) 
1994 176,617 49.44 N/A 
1995 219,680 24.38 8.00 
1996 260,489 18.58 7.50 
1997 218,843 -15.99 6.40 
1998 289,524 32.30 5.20 
1999 367,743 27.02 5.50 
2000 466,365 26.82 5.50 
2001 604,919 29.71 5.50 
2002 786,524 30.02 5.80 
2003 701,014 -10.87 5.50 
2004 1,055,202 50.53 6.30 
2005 1,421,615 34.72 6.30 
2006 1,700,041 19.59 6.50 
 
Source: Ministry of Tourism (2006), as cited in Chheang (2008: 292) 
 
Box 2.1 encapsulates some of the thoughts informants shared on tourism‖s importance, which suggest 
that the key governance problem for tourism is in general not corruption or concentration, but 
unaddressed market failures such as lack of services like training for guides, improved public 
infrastructure for tourists, and overcrowding or unplanned development for Siem Reap, the gateway to 
Angkor Wat, in a modern version of the tragedy of the commons.  
 
Box 2.1:   Perspectives on the Tourism Sector 
 
 
Tourism by all means is no accident. Tourism is always planned with a clear view and expectation. It's not 
like we say we can't work when it's raining or the conditions of the weather. It's not like growing crops or 
fishing during specific seasons. In tourism we have precise visions and clear goals. First off, we must have 
a master plan and how it is incorporated to the job and environment. If we are not careful in how we 
preserve our environment we may not have a business anymore. (Travel Agency Owner 44) 
 
I think that tourism seems a more solid driving force for the economy [than garments].
20
 However, 
several problems occur: any reliable infrastructure has been properly established, the temples are 
gradually damaged by the massive tourists and so on. Let‖s take the example of water sanitation: the 
water distribution system is not credible enough in some parts of the city; they blend clean and dirty 
water. Someone has told me that if any case of cholera will be found in Siem Reap, no one will dare to 
come to visit Cambodia at least for ten years. In sum, tourism is a potential sector and important driving 
force for the economy, but the Government has to cautiously overview the development in this sector. 
They have a lot to do in term of infrastructure development, such as road or highway construction, 
sanitation measures, temple protection and maintenance, creation of museums and so on. Another 
critical issue that the government has to pay attention is the pollution of Siem Reap city itself by the 
mass of the tourists. (Member of Parliament 45) 
                                                 
20
 Ambassador (9) concurred that both garments and tourism are big successes, but is more confident about 
tourism‖s long-term prospects. 
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Worse than that, those tourists mostly bought their tour package from Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, 
so that they spend very little in Cambodia. The rest of the money goes into the account of the foreign 
travel agencies and the foreign airline companies as well. (Sister of Member of Parliament 46) 
 
Tourism is good. The three cities important are where opportunity, Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and 
Sihanoukville. The government has many plans but doesn‖t have any idea of taking precious things like 
Angkor that will give you long-term revenue. This is happening in Sihanoukville and other parts of the 
country. If we don‖t manage it well, we will destroy it. It only takes a couple of incidents such as cholera or 
a plane crash in Siem Reap. I think they‖re doing it but as you know the government is slow in policy and 
action. It‖s not certain in how to do it. (Entrepreneur and former Secretary of State 47) 
 
[My uncle] won‖t register the massage parlour which makes more than the hotel in revenues because it 
would draw too much attention. [He] pays taxes of a few hundred dollars on gross hotel revenues of 
sometimes $100,000 per month. Just has to make sure tax officials are happy by giving them money and 
gifts (in any case much less than the $10k that would be paid per month were 10% VAT applied). 
Estimated tax regime makes discretionary decisions like this possible. (Civil servant employee 48) 
 
Source: Adapted from Ear (2008: 37-38). 
 
The Livestock Sector and Poultry in Particular 
 
In Cambodia, available sources have cited livestock as the most important source of 
cash income. In rural Cambodia, the livestock contributes to 19 percent of household 
income for the poorest 40 per cent of households, while 11 per cent for the wealthiest 
20 per cent of households … Two recent surveys have shown that 62 per cent of 
households hold bovines, 54-56 per cent hold pigs, and 74-75 per cent hold household 
poultry (Ifft 2005: 2) 
 
In 2006, agriculture held 34 per cent of GDP, a decreasing share due to continued growth in garments 
and tourism. However, 80 per cent of Cambodians live in rural areas and depend on agriculture. 
Livestock accounts for about a third of agricultural GDP in Cambodia. The population of cattle and 
buffaloes is approximately 2.5 million as is the number of farming families in the country (Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2007: 30), and Cambodia is one of the few countries in the region with 
excess supply of livestock: cattle, pigs, and poultry. The demand for meat is growing rapidly in Southeast 
Asia, with the majority of large ruminant livestock in Cambodia held by small village producers and up to 
25 per cent of cattle currently exported, an opportunity to increase production and address rural poverty 
exists.  
 
There is a consensus that the development of agriculture and agro-processing are key for Cambodia‖s 
survival in the global economy (Godfrey 2003; World Bank 2004; IMF 2004; RGC 2004; Sciaroni 2004; 
NGO Forum 2002) following the end of the preferential quotas for the export of garments to the United 
States and the European Union, which had made that industry Cambodia‖s largest foreign exchange 
earner. The livestock sector has considerable potential if tapped properly,
21
 as farming continues to shift 
                                                 
21
 In 2005, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries listed livestock as the No. 1 priority in four provinces 
(Svay Rieng, Preah Vihear, Kampot, and Kampong Thom), No. 2 priority in 10 provinces, and No. 3 in six provinces, 
livestock is not among the 19 priority exports for Cambodia. 
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from subsistence to commercial agriculture over the next decade. While food security was the basis of 
agricultural development in the past, both donors and the authorities now realise that marketing and 
processing agricultural surplus is the next frontier.  
 
Most of the 2.5 million farming families in Cambodia have some livestock: ―Poorer families, many of 
which are food insecure, only having a few breeding chickens and a fattening pig with no cattle or 
buffaloes. The overall average livestock per family is 1.6 cattle/buffaloes, 1.2 pigs, and about 10 
chickens‖ (FAO 2007: 30). Collective action is similarly difficult in a post-Khmer Rouge environment that 
still reels from anything cooperative, much less communal (Ear 2005).  
 
With the notable exception of Development Alternatives Inc., a grantee of USAID that helped pig farmers 
put their plight on paper, thumbprint the petition, and transmit it the Chair of the Agriculture and Agro 
Industry Working Group of the Government Private Sector Forum and brought the issue to attention of 
Chan Sarun, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, donors are not sufficiently engaged in 
realising the potential of the livestock sector—as it is currently grouped among products with potential 
for trade promotion that have limited or no technical assistance (Advisor: 49). Yet at the same time, state 
capacity in the sector is weak (and maybe the role of the public sector is little defined in relation to the 
sector). On balance, the state has been a hindrance rather than an enabler for the livestock sector, 
primarily because no single producer of livestock can yet be a market-maker. Officials have made the 
transport and official export of cattle so onerous as to be impossible for Cambodia‖s only exporter of 
livestock, shuttering its doors. Interaction between external factors—the international regime and the 
competitive power of neighbouring countries—and domestic factors—have conspired to stunt the 
livestock sector. 
 
There are circa 16 million poultry in Cambodia, more than 90 per cent of which are backyard chickens 
and ducks, making the structure of the industry overwhelmingly Type 4: backyard holders. Around 2 
million village households raise backyard chickens numbering around 15 million heads. According the 
last poultry census (November 2004) by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), there 
were (Sorn 2005): 
 
- 52 layer commercial farms (total of 206,000 heads) 
- 92 broiler commercial farms (total of 422,000 heads) 
- 331 ducks commercial farms (total of 300,000 heads) / closely depending on the season. 
 
Cambodia does not export poultry or poultry products. According to the World Bank‖s 2006 Poverty 
Assessment for Cambodia: 
 
Within the livestock sub-sector, poultry and swine production have each grown at just 
over 2 per cent per annum, slightly higher than the rate of large ruminant production 
(1.7 per cent). In value terms, poultry is still the smallest of these three livestock 
activities, and an outbreak of avian influenza is unlikely to exert a large negative impact 
on overall growth of the sub-sector, although a pandemic could exert a very negative 
impact on tourism. (World Bank 2006b: 59) 
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SARS: A Wake-up Call 
 
Any timeline must have a starting point, and while this one begins with Cambodia‖s first Avian Influenza 
outbreak detected in January 2004, a proper historical narrative would have to include at the very least 
the emergence of SARS as a precursor to the global policy response to HPAI H5N1. The SARS 
coronavirus caused a near pandemic between November 2002 and July 2003, with 8,273 known 
infected cases and 775 deaths (a case-fatality rate of 9.6 per cent) worldwide (WHO 2004). Twenty-eight 
countries and territories were affected within 10 months. This included most of Southeast Asia with the 
notable exception of Cambodia,
22
 Brunei, Myanmar, Laos, and Timor-Leste which had by then become 
independent (see Table 2.1 in Annex 1), and went well beyond Asia, involving the United States, Canada, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Sweden, among countries in the developed world.  
 
As travellers were fearful that travel by plane would risk contagion, SARS and HPAI framed the downside 
of globalisation, worldwide travel, and the developing world‖s relationship to the developed world in a 
new context. Indeed, the only other time a drop in visitor arrivals took place since 1993 was in 1997, the 
year fighting broke out in Phnom Penh and the First Prime Minister was deposed.  
 
SARS became a rallying call for what to do about places like Cambodia, where the health infrastructure 
system, destroyed by decades of war and plagued by corruption, could barely function. SARS was only a 
test, a test of Cambodia‖s emergency response system, while HPAI became the real emergency.  
Enter Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
 
By December 2003, HPAI had already infected both Thailand and Vietnam. It was a matter of time that, 
through cross-border trade (much of which remains unofficial), the disease would reach Cambodia. As 
explained in Ear (2005), the policy process in Cambodia is opaque and not based on a rational-legal 
framework. Some policies are the result of direct foreign intervention, where donors play an important 
role. However, there are limits - as in the 15 year-old case of the draft anti-corruption law. No matter how 
many promises have been made, none has been kept concerning passage of that law. For the most part, 
policies are achieved through a complex network of governing party officials and patron-client relations.  
 
Aside from the standard concerns for its own image as a tourist Mecca and overall public health 
concerns which affect not only the poor but the rich, one of Cambodia‖s motivations to work on HPAI 
control, despite the relatively small number of cases in animals and humans, was to capture a slice of 
donor contributions to the region, and because of the country‖s historical aid-dependence, international 
organisations and agencies were able to partly influence policy and agenda setting — but only up to a 
certain point. It was at compensation that Cambodia drew the line. Typically, the driving force can be 
direct benefits of some sort to important ministries,
23
 such as the Ministry of Interior which controls the 
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 While SARS was not detected, it was not for want of looking. ―New SARS-like Mystery illness in Cambodia‖ 
announced Associated Press (2003). 
23
 Reacting to a more recent ban of pig, chicken, and duck imports from neighbouring countries in July 2007, an 
anonymous commentator had the following provocative reaction (edited for spelling errors and with identifiers 
removed) to a Senior official: ―When [he] is saying ―Ban Ban‖ there are more monies coming to him. This is how 
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police, and in particular the economic police, as well as other ministries like Commerce, and, of course, 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry. 
 
 
Middle 
 
HPAI Control Activities 
 
Anticipating as much, the Cambodian government temporarily banned the import of birds and poultry 
eggs from neighbouring Thailand and Vietnam on 13 January 2004. Within 10 days, Cambodia detected 
its first outbreak of Avian Influenza on a farm outside Phnom Penh. At least 3,000 chickens were 
reported to have died in at least three farms near Phnom Penh; two days later, 10,000 chickens were 
culled. On 22 January 2004 – the Prime Minister issued a Prakas (Ministerial Declaration) on the creation 
of a national inter-ministerial committee on AI. It would be this committee that would deliberate 
important issues such as compensation and vaccination. While it is unclear how or when the decision 
was made — no record of a decision actually exists — Government Official (33) claimed that the Prime 
Minister decided that Cambodia would not adopt a compensation policy in what can only be called a 
―non-decision decision‖, and this is reflected by a letter from one minister to another stating that the 
Government had, as a matter of practice, no policy of compensation.  
 
Thus was framed the first important narrative in Cambodia‖s HPAI policy process, one that is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 3.1. A rational-legal framework would have called upon a decision to 
compensate given difficulties in working only with a stick (culling) and no carrot (compensation). As 
Scoones and Forster (2008) explain in a regional context: 
 
For those framing the problem as an emergency – and focusing on pandemic threat to 
humans – mass culling of chickens is seen as a necessary evil, which if compensated for, 
offers a substantial public good benefit. But looked at from the perspective of those 
whose livelihoods at least in part depend on these poultry, such an intervention can be 
catastrophic. Clearly the impacts will depend on where it happens and the alternative 
sources of income which might be available. Banning backyard birds in Thailand, say, has 
less of an impact, and causes less of an uproar than it does in Vietnam or Cambodia 
where economic and livelihood contexts are different. (Scoones and Forster 2008: 41) 
 
It was not for want of international pressure on Cambodia to adopt a compensation policy. As will be 
detailed in Section 3.1, David Nabarro, the Senior UN System Coordinator for Avian and Human Influenza 
at United Nations Headquarters in New York (on secondment from the World Health Organization), 
Douglas Gardner, the UN Resident Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme Resident 
Representative to Cambodia, and Michael O‖Leary, the WHO Representative to Cambodia, among others 
all raised the issue. Minutes of AI Partnership Meetings show a recurring refrain through much of 2006, 
but by then it was too late. The non-decision decision was justified as pre-existing government policy not 
to compensate for culling because no such policy existed. Authorities‖ experience with guns for cash, a 
disarmament program, had taught them that to give money as an inducement would be corrupting. The 
guns were recycled for more cash. The fear was of false reporting, cheating, or sick birds from Vietnam 
brought across the border to obtain compensation in Cambodia (Government Official 41). Because 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cambodia has been operated since 1993 under [him]. [He] is indeed needing monies every day to pay his 4000 
bodyguards … But in Cambodia under [him], all ministers have to be dummy if not [he] will remove within 24 hours.‖ 
(Anonymous 2007) 
21 
 
compensation is such a convoluted issue at least three reasons summarise its avoidance: i) heavy fiscal 
burden, ii) sour past experiences, and iii) logistically complex to implement. 
 
From Animal to Human Health 
 
It would not be until a year later, in January 2005, that the focus would shift from animal health to human 
health when Cambodia‖s first victim was discovered by a Vietnamese hospital on 30 January 2005. The 
woman had sought medical help in Vietnam on January 27. The following month, Cambodia once again 
banned the import of live birds and eggs from neighbouring Vietnam and Thailand. This cycle of 
outbreaks,
24
 victims, and bans, would continue on for another two years. In total, 22 outbreaks (see Table 
2.4 and Map 2.1) were confirmed from January 2004 until June 2007, without any having been found 
since then. Annex 2 content analyses nearly 160 Avian Influenza Bulletins published from 10 May 2005 
until 18 July 2008. Coincidentally, it is in May 2005 that the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
issued a Prakas to establish multi-sectoral committees in every province for the control of AI. 
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 Although not discussed except here, the role of intensive poultry production is often suspected as a source of AI 
outbreaks. Charoen Pokphand (CP) Cambodia, a unit of Thailand‖s largest agricultural conglomerate Charoen 
Pokphand Group denied in September 2004 that it was involved in any way, although its breeders were vaccinated 
against AI. The company‖s president Sakol Cheewakoseg said ―C.P. Cambodia didn't cause the deadly virus spread in 
Cambodia since it has taken strict preventive measures in its farm‖ (as quoted in Yahoo Finance, 2004). His 
comment came after media reports that C.P. Cambodia may have caused the spread. A farm near the Cambodian 
capital was closed after about 2,300 chickens died of bird flu.  
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Table 2.4:  H5N1 Animal Outbreaks in Cambodia 2004-2007 
No. Outbreak Village Commune District Pro 
Number of Poultry Died 
  Cull  Total Measure Result Prakas 
  Date         Chick Duck Geese Turkey 
Guinea 
Fowl 
Wild 
Bird           
1 12.01.04 Pong Peay PP Thmei Russeikeo PP 3300 0 0 0 0 0 0 3300 23.01.04 23.01.04 23.01.04/19 
2 14.01.04 Tamao Zoo** Bati TK 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 86 06.02.04 06.02.04 11.02.04/67 
3 16.01.04 Beng Chhuk Kilometer 6 Russeikeo PP 10 13 11 0 0 0 9 43 03.02.04 31.01.04 11.02.04/67 
4 25.01.04 Prek Tom Kbal Koh Kien Svay KD 50 18 9 70 65 0 53 265 27.01.04 05.02.04 26.02.04/79 
5 28.01.04 Beng Don Pa Slor Kram Siem Reap SR 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 27.01.04 05.02.04 26.02.04/79 
6 06.02.04 Snor Roka Knong Don Keo TK 1690 0 0 0 0 0 1510 3200 06.02.04 03.03.04 12.03.04/102 
7 09.02.04 Prek Samrong Takhmao Takhmao KD 1700 0 0 0 0 0 800 2500 11.02.04 18.02.04 05.03.04/94 
8 11.02.04 Wat Bo Sala Kamrek Siem Reap SR 3 0 0 0 0 0 620 623 26.20.04 03.03.04 05.03.04/94 
  11.02.04 Chong Kaosu Slor Kram Siem Reap SR 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 26.20.05 03.03.04   
  11.02.04 Trang Slor Kram Siem Reap SR 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 26.20.06 03.03.04   
9 13.02.04 Robos Angkagn Prek Thmey Kien Svay KD 167 0 0 0 0 0 2533 2700 13.02.04 03.03.04 12.03.04/102 
10 21.02.04 Trapang Lbem Sre Rornong Tram Kak TK 0 900 0 0 0 0 600 1500 23.20.04 03.03.04 12.03.04/102 
11 24.03.04 Kab Nim Chhumrah Pen Samrong TK 17 0 0 0 0 0 3 20 25.03.04 02.04.04 09.04.04/136 
12 27.03.04 Village 6 Koh Samrong Kampong Siem KC 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 27.03.04 02.04.04 09.02.04/136 
13 19.09.04 Veal Sbov Veal Sbov Kien Svay KD 4200 0 0 0 0 0 360 4560 27.03.04 21.09.04 21.09.04/302 
14 01.02.05 Kapue Ha Prek Russey Takhmao KD 70 0 0 0 0 0 35 105 02.02.05 04.02.05 04.02.05/620 
15 23.03.05 Keatha Vong Lue 
Trapang Sala 
Khanglech BanTeay Meas KP 19 0 0 0 0 0 139 158 23.03.05 25.03.05 
25.03.05/155
0 
16 22.03,06 Kamakor Samlagn Ankor Chheay KP 36 40 0 0 0 0 171 247 29.03.06 28.03.06 28.03.06/126 
17 23.03.06 Toul Prich Moha Russey Kong Pisey KSp 335 72 0 0 0 0 200 607 23.03.06 29.03.06 30.03.06/132 
18 02.08.06 Toka Chhour Timouy Bateay Chakrey Phreah Sdach PV 0 1202 0 0 0 0 398 1600 09.08.06 11.08.06 11.08.06/337 
19 13.08.06 Tang Krang Chealea Batheay KC 0 1390 0 0 0 0 698 2088 14.08.06 17.08.06 17.08.06/349 
20 12.08.06 Chong Ankrang Soung Tbong Khmom KC 0 2295 0 0 0 0 115 2410 12.08.06 17.08.06 17.08.06/349 
21 25.08.06 Balang Sambo Batheay KC 0 484 0 0 0 0 331 815 28.08.06 17.08.06 01.09.06/359 
22 06.04.07 Lhork Krek Pogneakrek KC 292 10 0 0 0 0 938 1240 07.04.07 10.04.07 11.04.07/114 
    TOTAL  11904 6424 20 70 65 88 9513 28084    
Note: PP = Phnom Penh, TK = Takeo, KD = Kandal, SR = Siem Reap, KC = Kampong Cham, KP = Kampot, KSp = Kampong Speu, PV = Prey Veng 
  18 25.01.06* 
Beoung Thom 
Lake     KC   xxx        
 Note: Martin Gilbert, WCS also reported H5N1 isolated by IPC from several duck flocks in Beoung Thom lake on Jan 25, 2006 but with no associated mortality/morbidity. 
 ** Phnom Tamao zoo - the birds involved were actually captive birds, not wild birds.         
Source: FAO Cambodia (2007). 
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Map 2.1: H5N1 Animal Outbreaks 2004-2007 
 
 
Source: Burgos et al. (2008). 
 
 
Seven Cambodian victims in total would die of H5N1. As can be seen from the earlier HPAI 
Table 2.4, the animal outbreak is discovered after the victim herself, causing the Ministry of 
Health to embarrass MAFF for its inability to detect the infection first. Although this was a 
minor spat that only bruised feelings, it frames the bureaucratic politics of a second 
narrative discussed in Section 3.2 about the intra-governmental rivalries and jealousies 
that would arise due to competition (which ministry got how much money), roles and 
responsibilities (which ministry was not invited at the national level in a provincial 
pandemic preparedness simulation). While it should be recognized that social wellbeing 
(human health) partly drives animal health issues and funding, Cambodia‖s AI experience 
laid bare the difficulty of inter-ministerial collaboration, especially between MoH and MAFF. 
Quarrels, rivalries and competition between political parties, ministries and departments 
are not uncommon, but this invariably hampers collaboration and success. This constitutes 
a major component of institutional failure coupled with the lack of in-country qualified 
human resources.  
 
 
End 
 
Enter ―Super Moan‖ and Pandemic Preparedness 
 
Because the response to AI is mainly human-led, Behaviour Change Communication (BCC) came 
into increasing focus. At the 4-6 November 2006 Water Festival in Cambodia, the USAID-funded 
American NGO, Academy for Educational Development (AED), introduced a ―SuperHero‖ to 
increase public awareness of the ―hows‖ to prevent AI from appearing and spreading. Developed 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
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during an AED workshop with Cambodian government officials, ―Super Moan‖ is a ―broad-breasted 
rooster with a familiar red cape and strong opinions about healthy behaviours‖ (AED 2007). The 
emphasis BCC is with messages like fencing-in poultry and quarantine of new poultry to prevent 
transmission. ―The rooster first appeared in public service announcements, on posters, and in 
booklets‖ (ibid); later he becomes animated in costumes for community theatre performances 
throughout the country and even is even introduced by the US Ambassador to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (see Figure 2.1) and later meets the Prime Minister.  
 
Figure 2.1:   Super Moan 
 
 
 
Note: From Left to Right, Super Moan (Chicken), H.E. Excellency Meas Kimsuwaro (Under 
Secretary of State, MAFF), H.E. Dr. Chan Sarun (MAFF Minister), Dr. Kimiko Uno (FAO 
Representative) and Ambassador Mussomeli pose for a photo with Super Chicken and a 
decontamination suit model during the USAID donation of Personnel protective equipments 
hand-over ceremony in Phnom Penh, 17 May 2007. USAID donated 4,500 set of bird flu 
protection equipment to MAFF. 
 
Source: US Embassy (2007) 
 
Strongly associated with the United States because of USAID funding, Super Moan is 
simultaneously exported to Laos as ―Super Kai‖ and becomes part of the global AI landscape. 
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As has become apparent, while the line ministries fight over who should have discovered what 
first, the issue of Pandemic Preparedness builds momentum. This is driven primarily by the fact 
that up until this point, Cambodia does not have a plan for Avian and Human Influenza, although 
it has separate plans for animal health and human health, these are not coordinated with one 
another.
25
 In July 2007, the ―National Comprehensive Avian and Human Influenza Plan‖ is 
released with a foreword dated 5 July 2007 by the Prime Minister. In it, he writes ―A human 
influenza pandemic is inevitable.‖ (Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) 2007: 1). He ends as 
follows: ―Strong leadership, organisation and co-ordination, and clear lines of accountability and 
communication will be key in pandemic preparedness and response‖ adding ―The Royal 
Government of Cambodia respectfully calls upon all relevant national and international partners 
to play their part in together overcoming the threats of the influenza Pandemic.‖ (ibid)  
 
It is at this time that three taskforces were created by the authorities: (1) Investigation; (2) 
Information; and (3) Culling and Disposal. Taskforces (1) and (3) are not detailed to any extent in 
this study, however (2) Information is believed to be the Information, Education, and 
Communication committee that met twice as of May 2008, and nominally controlled the 
―message‖ that would be transmitted. In fact, WHO, FAO, and UNICEF had held an ―ad hoc 
meeting‖ on 14-16 March 2006, 16 months prior to the release of the government‖s AHI Plan to 
identify priority behaviours (see Figure 1 in Annex 2) to control AI. The timing serves to 
underscore the international community‖s deep involvement in Cambodia, another important 
theme that will emerge in Cambodia‖s AI narrative. 
Last Act: How Avian Influenza Helped Domestic Pig Producers … for Seven Months 
 
Returning to government-led HPAI control activities, it is known that the last ban on pigs, 
chickens and ducks from neighbouring countries was announced by the Prime Minister on 1 July 
2007 during celebrations for Fisheries Day. According to a news account, the Prime Minister‖s 
reasoning was as follows: 
 
(1) to prevent the safety threat on people from bird flu contagion which is 
spreading in several countries in the area, as well as in the world; and (2) if such 
import is allowed into Cambodia, our people can no longer raise domestic 
animals [due to foreign competition], and that it is impossible to know what kind 
of other diseases will be imported and spread to our population, because, now, 
our people no longer eat to just fill their stomach, they also want good and 
healthy food. (Everyday.com.kh 2007) 
 
The pretext of the ban was control of Avian Influenza, but in reality, it had more to do with rents. 
The announcement came shortly after a Government-Private Sector Forum meeting at which a 
group of domestic pig producers had stamped their thumbs to a petition requesting a ban (see 
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 Desvaux (2005: 20) noted ―Cambodia did not have a strategy paper for AI, but the DAHP planned to 
pursue the activities related to AI surveillance and the poultry movement control … Consultation for 
preparation of a new AI national strategy. Within the DAHP, the director Mr Kao Phal, the deputy directors 
Mr. Sen Sovann and Soun Sothoeun and the AI project coordinator, Mr. Sorn San, were consulted before a 
draft was submitted to the Secretary of State in charge of Animal Health and Production HE Yim 
Voeunthan. The draft strategy was also based on the outputs of the last inter-ministerial committee hold 
at the MAFF on the 10 May 2005. This committee, hold for the first time on the 23 February 2004, is 
chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture, co-chaired by Ministry of Health and is composed of representatives 
of Ministry of Finance and Interior, Governors, Directors of provincial agriculture offices.‖ 
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Box 2.2). The ban was put to paper on 13 August and fairly effective (banning anything in 
Cambodia is a matter of degrees, not absolutes) because pig producers in Cambodia were 
actually able to make money whereas before they could not prior to the ban.  
 
Box 2.2: Cambodia’s Last Ban: How the Threat of AI Helped Domestic Pig Producers for 
Seven Months 
 
 
Because of disease problems in Vietnam, pigs were coming over at way below cost. Over a period 
of several months, a team working with an NGO...did a meeting and took notes, listened to what 
they said and wrote a paper and stamped their thumbs. They took it to [Neak Oknha] Mong 
Reththy, he takes it to [MAFF Minister] Chan Sarun who says wow, this is hot issue, he takes it to 
[Prime Minister] Hun Sen. During the seven months, he worked out the deals to stop pig imports 
and allow domestic production to flourish. (NGO representatives 42 & 43) 
 
The development of a livestock sector in Cambodia presents a big opportunity in the agriculture 
sector. Livestock including cattle and pig attract large domestic and international markets. The 
pig raising sector is one sector in particular that can grow rapidly in Cambodia. However, despite 
domestic demand, the pig sector has been undermined by the smuggling of pigs across the 
borders. This issue has to be discussed in the Agriculture & Agro Industry Working Group [of the 
GPSF] and has received a lot of support from the Minister, H.E. Chan Sarun. H.E. Chan Sarun 
acknowledged that there were problems with smuggling and recognized that the illegal imports 
of pigs to Cambodia were a threat to the health of the population. In responding to this issue the 
Government recently issued an ―Instruction Number 001 August 13th 2007 On the Prevention 
of Importing Meat and Live Pig from Other Countries.‖ The private sector appreciates the Prime 
Minister‖s response and support for this issue. If the smuggling can be stopped the private sector 
will be able to develop a viable livestock industry that would include farms and world standard 
slaughterhouse facilities that will also contribute to the health and well being of Cambodians. 
(Neak Oknha Mong Reththy) (Mong 2007) 
 
Cambodian pig farming is increasingly changing from a family-owned business to big agricultural 
business. This has led some to worry about the health of eating pork, but now farmers in this 
emerging sector are facing a new problem: the lifting of a government ban on the import of pigs. 
Most farmers say that if they provide food they make themselves, it takes a lot of time to grow a 
pig, and even then the pig won't be that big, after eight months. If, however, a pig is raised with 
food additives in a pig yard, farmers see large, 100-kilogram pigs in just five or six months. Until 
the government lifted the import ban last week [late March 2008], these farmers were enjoying a 
boon in prices, and in pig size, two months sooner than they were used to. Now, many farmers 
say they are exasperated and may leave the trade altogether. (Ros 2008) 
 
Source: Author‖s interview except when footnoted. 
 
As the above stylized chronology reveals, the role of donors; the economy and the risks to 
tourism; and the role of media in framing risks and scares, were all important in shaping how 
Cambodia and the world reacted to HPAI. It does leave several critical questions unanswered, for 
example: How did Cambodia react to the threat of HPAI given its economy and the importance 
of its tourism industry? What was the role of donors and what did they do with respect to HPAI, 
given media risk framings of HPAI? How did poverty and livelihoods fit into the grand scheme of 
things? These are questions which the next section, on Policy Narratives, attempts to elucidate. 
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3. POLICY NARRATIVES 
 
In any telling of a story, different versions can emerge. Telling a story is what narrative is about, 
and forces us to ask what competing storylines exist and what silences narratives? Thus, while 
Section 2 drew a picture of a country grappling with Avian Influenza from animal health in 2004 
to human health in 2005, Information, Education, and Communication messages in 2006, and a 
―plan‖ in 2007, offering a rough timeline of events, those in the thick of the action and present in 
the weeks and months prior to the first outbreak, during, and afterwards remember with perfect 
recall those tumultuous times. As a Government Official (41) reminisced: 
 
Oh yeah, at that time Vietnam was facing problem about this bird flu. And I heard 
about this issue in Thailand in November 2003. At that time we didn‖t hear yet 
from Hong Kong. In Cambodia, I found a case and reported to the Minister of 
Agriculture on 6 January 2004. There was a problem importing chicken from 
Thailand, from a farm that had problems with bird flu. The farm tried to hide this 
information. We then postponed importation of birds from Thailand. In Vietnam, 
they announced this since early January (9
th
). For us, we announced this quite 
late, late January (23
rd
). Then we followed up the case: chicken had already been 
imported from Thailand. In 20
th
 February, I ate chicken. The problem with bird flu 
is about market. We made owners who raise chickens lose money, so we lost 
market. If the government had a policy on this, this information would have 
been spread faster. I made a presentation during roundtable meeting. I have all 
the documents. We found the issue even before Thailand and Vietnam, but 
because we had a poor broadcasting system, this information spread more 
slowly. [Emphasis added]  
 
Although this informant‖s account cannot be independently verified, he has been personally 
known to the author since 2004 and is deeply engaged in livestock policy in Cambodia. The 
account—one man‖s personal testimony—is probably as close to a ringside seat in the early 
days of the first outbreak of AI in Cambodia as one can hope to find. While there can be any 
multitude of narratives, three rose to particularly prominence because of their recurrence in 
discussions with informants and as result of findings in the survey administered for this study: (1) 
culling without compensation; (2) the shift to health; and (3) the role of poverty and livelihoods.  
 
 
Narrative 1: Cull without Compensation 
 
From the onset of the first AI outbreak in poultry on 23 January 2004, no decision regarding 
compensation for culling poultry surfaced as was apparent in a 2005 report by Vétérinaires Sans 
Frontières for FAO entitled ―Review of the poultry production and assessment of the socio-
economic impact of the highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in Cambodia‖ which noted 
that ―providing financial compensation to producers officially HPAI-infected (to compensate for 
their losses and to encourage disease reporting by producers in the future)‖ (VSF 2005: 2) was 
urgently needed. More to the point, in the 10
th
 weekly (currently in its 160+ issue) ―Bulletin on 
Avian Influenza in Cambodia‖ published by FAO and WHO Representations in Cambodia on 12 
July 2005, under ―Country situation: Animal Health‖ a short paragraph appears that would 
otherwise be forgotten by mere perusal: 
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H.E. Chan Sarun, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, sent a letter on 
Monday 4 July [2005] to H.E. Lu Lay Sreng, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Rural Development, in response to his request in exploring the possibility of 
funding compensation for poultry culling in Kampot Province. H.E. Chan Sarun 
clearly explained that MAFF/RGC‖s policy does not allow to pay [sic] 
compensation to the farmers. [Emphasis added] (FAO and WHO 2005: 1) 
 
This laid bare the curious non-decision decision by the RGC to disallow compensation for culling 
of poultry.
26
 Its mention in the Bulletin is important for two reasons: (1) it reports an exchange 
between two ministers of a government, one of whom belongs to Cambodian People‖s Party 
(Chan Sarun) responding to another belonging to the royalist Funcinpec Party (Lu Lay Sreng); (2) 
it is a minister (in rank) replying to a more senior (in rank) Deputy Prime Minister informing him of 
his Ministry‖s policy as well as, curiously, the Royal Government of Cambodia‖s policy. Moreover, 
it confirms that discussion regarding compensation had reached the highest levels of 
government, the Ministerial level and the Deputy Prime Ministerial level, and came to nothing. 
Recall that at this point, at least three confirmed deaths had taken place in Kampot, a fourth 
one—the first possible victim of AI—had been cremated by the time authorities discovered his 
sister who is speculated to have caught the disease while crying over her brother‖s body, thanks 
to the Vietnamese medical system. 
 
In the Second ―Partnership Meeting on Avian and Pandemic Influenza‖ on 20 February 2006 
hosted in United Nations Main Conference Room by then UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP 
Resident Representative to Cambodia, Douglas Gardner, the minutes under ―4. The Beijing 
Pledging Conference - outcomes and next steps‖ suggest that donors had evolved from merely 
reporting the RGC‖s internal deliberations about compensation to demanding clarification on the 
issue of compensation to those authorities present at the meeting: 
 
Mr. Gardner said … compensation to farmers is key to containing the virus at the 
sites. A clarification of compensation policy is required.  
 
Mr. Kao Phal, Director of Department of Animal Health and Production at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said the Ministry has no 
compensation policy but is providing incentives to farmers with support from 
FAO. These include technical support to farmers to improve bio-security in the 
farm, provision of protective gear and equipment for culling, disposal of affected 
poultry and disinfection of poultry premises. To strengthen surveillance and 
early response, MAFF buys ducks from farmers to be studied. Communication 
materials have been distributed to farmers so they understand more about the 
disease. Training for village animal health workers is continuing providing some 
                                                 
26
 Health Expert (25): ―With the decisions from above that there should be no compensation, we do not 
know where it is from… is it from Hun Sen or the National Assembly? We do not know… there is no sub-
decree or anything…‖ Donor Staff (32): ―Right, there is no compensation policy. Regarding AI issue, the 
Ministry of Agriculture was only in charge of spreading the Minister Council‖s announcement and has 
accordingly worked with the village and commune chiefs in order to help them to mobilize the opinion 
and Government decision. Consequently, the Ministry staffs jointly with the local authority explain to the 
concerned birds risers the huge impact and large scale effect of the epidemic. The ultimate solution is to 
eliminate all contaminated birds. Some villagers even tried to hide their poultries or killed them for food.‖ 
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1,900 with protective equipment, pump spray, disinfectant, gloves, masks, 
posters and small calendars with hotline numbers.
27
 
 
According to Ek (2006), Cambodia asked donors at that Beijing Pledging Conference earlier in 
January 2006 for $32.5 million over three years in bird flu aid, but according to Megge Miller of 
the World Health Organisation office in Phnom Penh, the sum was too small to enable 
compensation for culling. Miller said that ―The recent cases have really highlighted that because 
there is no compensation, people are being ostracised from their communities and so we get no 
reports any more.‖ (Ek 2006) Around the same time, Yim Voeunthan, Secretary of State at the 
MAFF, said: ―Just recently, I heard the WHO plans to provide a budget to the government for 
paying compensation … However, we cannot consider it official yet until the money is handed to 
us.‖ (Sam 2006) Miller responded that the budget for paying compensation, if any, would not 
come from WHO, but from international donors. Miller‖s boss WHO Representative, Michael 
O‖Leary, announced that talks were on again to establish a compensation program, and added 
―There is no new [compensation] policy, but I think there is an awareness that to not compensate 
farmers whose flocks were culled makes it difficult for them to come forward.‖28 Unfortunately, 
this ―awareness‖ did not materialise into a compensation policy.  
 
Although not necessarily obvious from these accounts, from the very beginning, Cambodian 
authorities decided that there would be no compensation policy and therefore no 
compensation. This was the essence of the non-decision decision, and indeed, even researchers 
following the virus in Cambodia held out hope for a possible change in course for the 
government‖s ―no-compensation policy‖ when they published an article in January 2007‖s US-
CDC‖s Emerging Infectious Diseases that concluded, rather critically, as follows: 
 
We observed difficulties and frustrations among farmers whose flocks 
underwent culling after identification of H5N1 viruses in their flocks because 
compensation has not yet been approved by the government of Cambodia. In 
contrast, Thailand and Vietnam have introduced compensation along with the 
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 UNRC (2006: 3). Although the hotlines are not discussed to any extent in this report, they are a narrative 
unto themselves. While hotlines generally imply toll-free (costless calling), which donors wanted, 
authorities argued that this represented (a) an unfunded liability which they could not absorb going into 
the future and (b) was no longer allowed according to Cambodia‖s main mobile carrier, Mobitel (carrier 
012, 092, etc.). Mobitel had made one exception in the past for an AIDS hotline, but it could not be 
induced to do it again, ever for reasons unclear. The toll-free ―workaround‖ is well-known in Cambodia. A 
caller initiates a call and hangs-up before the calls is picked-up. Known in Khmer as ―signo‖, it is a signal to 
the party called to call back using their phone‖s Caller ID feature. This relies on both parties understanding 
the system and is obviously not equivalent to toll-free calling as it requires persistence from the caller and 
a willingness to call back from the party called. Perhaps testing the system would be instructive. AI Expert 
(12): ―X said in several meetings that having the free hotline will be costly…donors willing to support it but 
he says what would happen once donor leaves, the government cannot support it. UNICEF has project on 
HIV/AIDS that has hotline, supported by MOBITEL. And MOBITEL is not willing to support this hotline by 
giving it a reduced rate on AI hotline.‖ Donor Staff (26b): ―I asked them as well. They said that was because 
of Mobitel, they didn‖t allow that free line.‖ Government Official (33): ―Mobitel does not collaborate. FAO, 
UNICEF, Ministry of Agriculture, we would like to have a single hotline, but Mobitel could not help us in this. 
And we need some online staff, such as village vets, health staff … to do so, we need a lot of money. So, 
nowadays, we only give the staff US$ 50 cellcard, we have two staff from Ministry of Agriculture, and two 
from Ministry of Health. This is not a hotline. We ask people to give call and hang-up after a ring or two 
(which costs them nothing), and then we call them back.‖ 
28
 As quoted in Agence France Press (AFP) 2006. Rushton et al. (2005: 511) had concluded that Cambodia 
―has made it very clear that compensation is not and will not be an option.‖ 
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introduction of poultry vaccination in Vietnam and the reduction of backyard 
poultry ownership in Thailand in an effort to protect the commercial poultry 
industry. Thus, it is difficult to envision effective control strategies in Cambodia 
based exclusively on culling. Coincidentally, Vietnam has reported far fewer 
H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and humans since the introduction of the 
vaccination program, while Cambodia detected 4 outbreak sites in domestic 
poultry and 2 unrelated human cases in 2006. The real effect of a no-
compensation policy on willingness to report poultry deaths needs to be 
assessed. (Ly et al. 2007: 131) 
 
What explains the reason for why the RGC chose not to compensate for culled birds (nor to 
vaccinate live ones
29
)? Based on interviews with informants, it appears that the RGC did not wish 
to spend (and did not have) its own resources
30
 nor to borrow or use donor resources for this 
purpose because: (1) it did not wish to repeat a costly mistake with a guns for cash program that 
had allegedly been abused;
31
 (2) it did not want an unfunded liability; and (3) it had concluded 
(whether credibly or not) that such compensation policies were ineffective elsewhere and would 
not work in Cambodia because of the logistical difficulties in implementing them. Box 3.1 details 
seven informant views on compensation and highlights just how much confusion still exists on 
the matter. Clearly, neighbouring countries‖ policies have not been made clear. Some thought 
Laos had a compensation policy, others did not. More clarity on what has been done elsewhere 
would be a first, useful step. 
 
Box 3.1:   Culling, Compensation, and Confusion 
 
 
The Council of Ministers was consulting with relevant ministries. Majority went for 
compensation. The Minister of Agriculture called me in to ask about that as well and he asked 
me to call a meeting with donors. When I was about to call a meeting, I got an order from him 
that they changed their mind, now there will be no compensation. It was from the Prime Minister 
… There are pros and cons. Advantage of this is that people will inform the case of bird flu on 
time, and people will get some money back to restart their business. But the disadvantages are 
more than advantage. When we compensate, people will put chickens with diseases into a group 
of chickens with no diseases. When we found a case of disease, we do not allow chicken flow in 
and out, we do not allow people to buy or sell chickens. So to get compensation, they make all 
the chicken sick and they will get the money. This is what happened in Thailand. Second reason 
                                                 
29
 AI Expert (12): ―Vaccination needs close monitor which cost lots of money.‖  
30
 Donor Staff (16): ―The government doesn‖t have any budget for that.‖ Veterinarian and Consultant (1): 
―The big problem is animal health point of view. The problems come with: what is the problem with 
disease, what is bio-conclusive, and how do you define management? How are you going to find the 
answers? How often does this disease strike for AI? Everyone looked at this immediately from the point of 
view of the developed countries where they‖ve got money. They‖ve got money in bank legislation. Here 
because there is NO money and there is no monetary compensation. Without compensations people will 
not be rid of the disease … The money that has been put towards the country should have been put away 
for compensation fund. That would have helped the market with a telephone card so they can report it...in 
hopes.... People capitalized their losses when the prices kept going down. No one wanted to report dead 
birds. So nothing really changed. No safety issues resolved. No compensation.‖ 
31
 AI Expert (14): ―The immediate kneejerk reaction with regards to firearms for cash. So that predicament 
was the reason for this problem. It was that incident where that went wrong. Need proper quarantine to be 
put in place. There is commitment to compensation but no commitment to monitor or police. Examples: 
Nigeria and Vietnam.‖ 
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is that, the compensation is not 100 per cent, and people could not get money immediately, so 
report will also be late. Compensation could not help improve report. I would like to share about 
compensation in Japan. They covered almost everything including 100 per cent chicken cost, 
transportation, and so on. That still, people did not report. When they found the case, they kill 
those chickens themselves. In Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, compensation does not help 
much. Yes, Laos has compensation. Not much compensation, takes time to get money, people 
are also late in reporting. Mass killing- like investigate within 10 kilometer square- what they 
called radius, to prevent transmission. We can‖t do this in Cambodia. In Cambodia we have 
selected killing, and now they all follow us. Because farmers said they are so poor, and their 
chickens are not sick, why kill them? So, you see, no one can do it, it work only in theory. And 
another issue about compensation in Vietnam is corruption. It was in the news. Village vets that 
got compensations, transported ducks to Cambodia and get money again. So, I think our 
government does the right thing. But it doesn‖t mean that we do not compensate, for example, 
in Kampong Trach, Kampot, that farmer borrowed money from ACLEDA, 2,000,000 Riel to raise 
ducks. When those ducks got sick, we asked them to kill those ducks. They claimed for 500,000 
Riel for compensation. We had money and we didn‖t want to take risk giving them. Anonymous 
Organization gave me money to buy those ducks. But I didn‖t do so. At that time, if we gave 
money to that farmer, there were many other farmers nearby who would ask for compensation 
as well when their ducks die. No, we can‖t [buy as a way to compensate]. If it happens when we 
investigate, we can do that. But when the case is disclosed, we can‖t. Our staff felt so pity about 
that farmer, but we could not give them money. I took his picture crying. When I return, I met the 
Minister. When he saw the picture, he said he will work that out. I heard he asked the Chief of 
Department of Agriculture in Kampot to visit that farmer and gave him money quietly. This is 
how we compensate. Government Official (33) 
 
I read a document, I‖m not sure who said that, but they said ―At some points, some people are 
compensated.‖ There is no compensation scheme at all. Our expert told us last year that we need 
to develop a compensation scheme otherwise people will not report. When half of my chickens 
died, what should be the reason to report you, so that you will come and kill the rest? And I got 
not a single cent in return? Also, the village vets won‖t go to visit people, to advise or give them 
any information, flyer about AI. They only visit household when people ask them to give 
vaccination for their animals, then they will get paid. We all have many ideas about that but not 
sure if it works. …So far, we find out the case of AI only after a person died. In the future we will 
face a pandemic if we can‖t control this. We need an incentive scheme. AI Expert (7) 
 
I heard about that story. When the officials visited, and the farmer cried for losing all their birds. 
They could not do anything, so that they talked to the Minister and they came back to give 
money to that farmer silently. AI Expert (6) 
 
I used to work with animal vets and Mr. X, and I asked them this question, he responded that the 
government doesn‖t want to spend money on this. I also asked them why the government did 
not use vaccination. He responded that in Indonesia, they have policies, the compensation and 
vaccination, and they still not able to control the pandemic. I think what he mean was that if the 
policy does not work, why do we need to spend money on that. But I think the government does 
not need to use their money, there are plenty of donors who are interested in this and we can 
use that money from donors. Donor Staff (26b) 
 
Corruption should not be the only issue to blame in this matter. Market should be the issue that 
we need to deal with. Even if we compensate, without solving market issue, we can‖t have 
success. Chicken is not like other products. When we stop chicken from being sold at the 
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market, the owners need to feed chicken everyday, looking forward to selling those chicken one 
day. To avoid losing profit, owners would choose to sell chicken early before the official ban. Also, 
to compensate, owners need to pay to burn all those chicken. The owners would not take risk in 
this, if they don‖t get compensated, then they will lose. And there are so many other reasons 
including commercial policy. …. FAO accepted my initiative about “restock” … this is win/win 
solution. The solution is to take good species from other areas and to train people to raise that 
species. This project no matter how much money we spend, ten or a hundred million dollar, it 
doesn‖t matter, because this contributes to poverty reduction in Cambodia. We win in a matter of 
diseases (animal diseases) control and we also win in a matter of poverty reduction. But the RGC 
doesn‖t want to do it. Things only happen if they wish to. This is politics. The solution we suggest 
should not only be a theory, but we need to prove it. Money from World Bank which totals about 
$10 million, this money also goes to the Council of Ministers. I don‖t think this will benefit much. I 
saw plan from the Department and Ministry of Health about emergency preparedness. They 
talked about re-stock, and rehabilitation. We have never done any rehabilitation, but bird flu 
ended by itself. We didn‖t do anything about it. But the thing is that, even bird flu ended, it is 
always possible that it happens again. So we have to be well-prepared. If we can do so, we will 
save lots of money, from the fact that market is not being ruined, people have good awareness 
of the issues, and we can manage food supply well. Government Official (41) 
 
Gov. says they have no budget to compensate people. They say to me, you have to go around 
and check. People don‖t want to report, because if they report, it destroys them. Private Sector 
(8) 
 
People were happy with culling. They were not unhappy about being uncompensated. All they 
want is honesty from the government that there will be no compensation for culling. 
Government was not clear and not official. No vaccination has been done in Cambodia nor any 
compensation. They never reach the villagers because of corruption. Lots of donors want to help 
with compensation but the government doesn‖t want money. One reason could be that people 
would report more so that they can get the money. AI Expert (12) 
 
Source: Author‖s interviews, see Table 1.1 in Annex 1.  
 
Indeed, an FAO (2007b) evaluation of activities in Cambodia from 2002-2007 recommended, as 
had Government Official (41), that ―restocking of culled farms and compensation‖ (FAO 2007b: 
31) be done. Yet until January 2006, ―the government was not ready to consider compensation 
for farmers whose poultry were culled, and there had been no progress on legislative support for 
disease control. The government had no plans to develop a vaccination programme.‖ (FAO 
2007b: 32). Ek (2006) suggests that authorities were in fact practicing some restocking, 
although this clearly was not systematically instituted. He quotes Animal Health Department 
director Kao Phal as saying ―Compensation is not there, but we are trying to replace their sick 
chickens with healthy ones for new breeding. If we keeping [sic] paying out compensation, what 
will we do if big farms have all their poultry die?‖32 In the same story, after a mass culling in Toul 
Prek, a village 30 miles west of Phnom Penh, 28-year-old Duch Yoeum, who lost 50 birds in the 
cull said, ―Next time, they won't be able to just come and cull my chickens if compensation is not 
settled first.‖ Indeed, as of 2008, when asked about restocking, Government Official (33) said ―We 
talked about that as well, but we don‖t have money for that. No [NGOs are not interested in this]. 
But I saw farmers re-stocking themselves.‖ 
                                                 
32
 As quoted in Ek (2006). NGO Doctor (15): ―Yes, that‖s a lot of money. If they suppose to kill chickens in 
the whole commune where AI outbreak, the government would not able to afford that compensation.‖  
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Noting the difficulties in administering a compensation scheme—a third reason for not 
compensating—David Nabarro said that for Cambodia, ―It‖s a question of ensuring that the 
government is comfortable about some of the challenges of administering a cash compensation 
scheme. These are not easy to administer, and governments need to feel confident they've got 
the right mechanisms to do so.‖ (Associated Press 2006) 
 
Adding to the confusion of whether there was, in fact compensation, an AI outbreak in ducks in 
Kampong Cham was reported by Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) (2006) to have led to 
compensation for culling: ―Chief of the Agricultural Department in Choeung Prey district, Son 
Sivon, … said the government had paid farmers compensation for each bird before slaughtering 
the remainder of the flock and burying them.‖ (DPA 2006). Government Official (33), AI Experts 
(6) and (7) certainly echoed this with what they had heard happened in the case of secret 
compensation through the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry. 
 
Beyond the fog of AI compensation policy (or lack thereof) lays a realm of possible AI control 
activities. True to his background, a Health Expert (25) proposed experimenting with 
compensation in a controlled group versus intervention (compensated) group to see differences 
in reporting and effectiveness as detailed in Box 3.2. 
 
Box 3.2:   Compensation and Beyond 
 
 
At rural area, if there is no compensation, people will not inform about their dead birds to the 
provincial or higher level. Now, the national and sub-national levels have not received enough 
information, unless the community is willing to provide it. In most cases, the communities do 
not want to inform [about dead chickens] as their income depends on their chickens and ducks. 
Plus, if some are sick, they just think it is a normal thing as since long time ago, chickens die 
when such season comes. But they forget that now there is bird flu thing. So when I go to 
community, I learn there are lots of birds die, and I ask why they don‖t report. They say, if they do, 
they will get their birds killed. But as with the government and donor policies, I am not very 
familiar with that… Such regulations [as compensation] have a much wider scope beyond the 
authority of a province or a ministry. Even the ministry is still too small for this matter. And the 
ministry is not the decision maker on where and how to allocate resources to solve the problem. 
Such a decision should be done at, say, the National Assembly… If there is no decision from such 
higher level, it cannot be implemented… Because in Cambodia, it is a tradition that there needs 
to be approval from the above first and then those at the lower level will follow… For example, 
when we developed ―Pandemic Planning,‖ we proposed a detailed plan from the lower level, 
submit it to the higher level, and when we get approval from the higher level, we can implement 
it effectively… So with the compensation issues, there need to be approval from the higher level, 
with of course some discussions with the lower. I think there needs to be a national law passed 
by the National Assembly… but before we can get to the National Assembly, someone needs to 
propose it… But on the bird flu issue, I think it should be the Ministry of Health, with some helps 
from CSO, who should propose. I think a pandemic might happen some time if the current 
situation still continues in Cambodia. If Cambodia has good surveillance system, we will find 
more cases of the AI, but we don‖t have such system. If we have enough information from 
communities, we might find more than seven cases of death... but unfortunately, we don‖t have 
reliable information… for instance, there are more deaths in rural areas especially among tribal 
people, but we can‖t make any conclusions because our information is not adequate as we do 
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not pay compensation… Another thing, when I go to meet communities, people say that there 
are 20-30 chickens die, they report to the districts, sometimes using the hot line, but they did 
not get any replies… I think we should conduct a pilot project. We might use compensation by 
government in some areas and not in some others and where NGOs can provide compensation. 
We then can see which areas produce better information. And if areas with compensation 
produce better information, then we can make suggestions to the government…. The 
compensation of course needs not be 100 per cent. It might just be 25-50 per cent. Because we 
know dead chickens, not all of them need to be abandoned; some of them still can be cooked for 
their meals…. Also, there should be survey on people habits of cooking dead chickens and ducks 
so that we can provide appropriate compensation. Health Expert (25) 
 
Can the donors do a pilot about compensation? No, I don‖t think this is a good way to do. It 
undermines the sovereignty of the partner state. Donor Management (26a) 
 
We need to have regional measures. We need to look at security policy. We can‖t do this because 
our poor people are dependent on this resource. If we do so, we can‖t cope with disease, but this 
is not practical, because people need this to live. ASEAN stopped talking about this and then 
they began to talk about bio-security which is about fencing (organic, farming system), cleaning 
(hands and environment surrounding), using mask… all about protection. We covered almost 90 
per cent. We have standard, legislative (sub decree 26). These are two lessons learned about 
responses to AI. This is appropriate for Cambodia since we have sufficient livestock. In VN, they 
talked about vaccination. Vaccination is good but accessing vaccination is a problem. 
Government Official (41) 
 
For us, no, but for them they will profit, because in Vietnam, they didn‖t compensate. The issue 
with AI is serious; I tried to convince everyone including FAO to support in this. But the problem 
is with our community. They are not ready. We educate them about sanitation to prevent AI 
while none of them have even see AI, this is difficult to convince them. The only way to convince 
them is to talk about economic, for example, suggesting them that if do so, you will get profit 
from it. Donors are interested in AI but communities don‖t. They only think their chicken, and not 
disease. Only economic could attract them to be ready to tackle AI. NGO Management (29)  
 
In Cambodia income is low, so without compensation, people will not report outbreaks. We have 
raised this a few times with the government, but there was no response. In Thailand, they 
compensate. Nowadays, there is only one message that we use for scaring people. We asked 
people: do you want to survive or kill your sick chickens? People have low education and low 
income, so, no matter how hard work we put on to raise awareness of people on this, people will 
not follow. I‖m not sure. But I think they want to scare people because our people do not think 
much about the future, they only care about present. That‖s why we are very careful when giving 
message to communities. NGO Staff (37) 
 
I think they should pay a certain percentage. I think policy makers within the Ministry of 
Agriculture should think about this. We are NGOs; we also have this question, because this will 
affect socio-economic income. I think our government does not care about the loss of the 
people. For example, building road, the Asian Development Bank always has a budget line for 
compensating the impact of that road construction on the livelihoods of the people. If the 
government built that road, the people would not get any compensation … Who cheated the 
system? I don‖t think the people do, I think the government officials themselves. NGO and IO 
doctor (18) Source: Author‖s interviews 
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Narrative 2: It’s Health Now 
 
As soon as a human victim was confirmed, the focus shifted to human health and the MoH. This 
had the effect of bringing into focus inevitable comparison and contrast between the Ministries 
(MoH and MAFF), and as earlier discussed set off a competition for resources as would be 
predicted in bureaucratic politics. Because animal surveillance was intended to warn of risks to 
humans, the discovery of the seventh human victim without any animal outbreaks detected 
created immediate tension between the ministries.
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 On 12 December 2008, an eighth victim, 
19 year-old Seng Sopheak of Kandal Province was confirmed to have H5N1 when an unrelated 
systematic multi-size hospital-based study of the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2‖s 
(NAMRU-2) happened to find the virus in his blood. Kandal adjoins Phnom Penh and is home to a 
large live animal way station/processing area in Ta Kmao. The infection is suspected to have 
taken place when Sopheak ate dead chicken during the Water Festival (Bonn Oum Touk) which 
took place on 11-13 November 2008. Once again, MAFF did not find the birds before MoH found 
the human victim, and this is likely to be perceived as a failure of animal surveillance. Moreover, 
with the July 2008 elections long passed, it may be safe to ―discover‖ Avian Influenza without 
political recriminations. 
 
When the focus shifted to pandemic preparedness,
34
 the National Committee for Disaster 
Management (NCDM)
35
 entered the picture. Two themes emerge: (1) the more experienced MoH 
was seen as a viable implementer of donor funds while the MAFF was perceived as having less 
capacity and an unknown quantity at managing large donor resources; (2) NCDM—as the new 
kid on the block for AI—was only too happy to get any money at all, but it has had to tread 
carefully—a May 2008 pandemic simulation failed to involve MAFF at the national level, creating 
a storm in a teacup. 
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 AI Expert (12): ―There is no rivalry between FAO and WHO. Rivalry is between MOH and Ministry of 
Agriculture. They blame each other for something. For ex: last outbreak of the 7th death, MOH calls MOA 
and blames them for not knowing.‖ Government Official (33): ―Yes, because of that, the Minister of 
Agriculture blamed me. I don‖t think Ministry of Health or WHO work better than Ministry of Agriculture; 
they only found the case when people got to hospital. Usually, when a few chicken died, people never 
report, only when they ate and die, then they suspected. I think there could be more people have died of 
bird flue but the Ministry of Health doesn‖t know. The Ministry of Health didn‖t know this in advance, only 
after people died and we did the test, that we got to know that. Other countries, they were clear, they 
know for example, there are 90 people sick and 40 of them died. The Minister blamed me, that animals vet 
should got the information before human‖s doctor. How can we do that when human‖s doctor also don‖t 
know, only after people died. Village vets will report only when many chickens died. We tried to strengthen 
surveillance system, but the Ministry of Health should also strengthen this as well.‖ 
34
 As an Embassy Staff (21) noted, ―AI is moving to respiratory disorders‖. 
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 According to Khun (2002: 27-28), NCDM‖s Mission is to lead disaster management in the Kingdom of 
Cambodia. Its functions and responsibilities are: (1) To coordinate with the Ministries of the Royal 
Government, UN agencies, IOs, NGOs, International Communities, National Associations, and Local Donors 
in order to appeal for aid for Emergency Response and Rehabilitation; (2) To make recommendations to 
the Royal Government and issue principles, main policies and warnings on Disaster Preparedness and 
Management cum the measures for Emergency Response and interventions in evacuating people to 
haven; (3) To disseminate Disaster Management work to Communities and strengthen the line from the 
National level (Ministries / Institutions concerned) to the provincial/ Municipal/ District/ Precinct level 
along with human resource development aiming to manage Disaster works firmly and effectively; and (4) 
To put forward a proposal to the Royal Government on reserves, funds, fuel, means of working, equipment 
and human resources for Disaster Prevention and intervention in Emergency Response and Rehabilitation 
before, during, and after disaster. 
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In fact, the nexus between scientific risk and uncertainty in Cambodia is complicated by the fact 
that while awareness of AI and personal protection measures is high, according to Ly et al. (2007) 
―most rural Cambodians still often practice at-risk poultry handling‖ and that ―Anecdotally … family 
members of H5N1-infected patients, who knew about AI risks, still prepared dead or sick poultry 
for household consumption during massive die-offs, because they observed that neighbours 
with the same behaviour did not become sick‖ (Ly et al. 2007: 131). This gives a new dimension 
to ―neighbourhood effects‖.36 As CEDAC (2007: para. 10) notes, ―Particularly with the experiences 
of partial culling and involvement of children in the campaign, it is doubted that whether HPAI is 
really serious or not. Thus, not many rural people and poultry producers believe about the 
seriousness of HPAI‖ adding that ―It seems that they are not willing to collaborate with the 
technical departments and authorities to prevent HPAI outbreaks.‖ Not surprisingly, what Ly et al. 
conclude is that: 
 
Behaviour change involves comprehensive and multidisciplinary intervention, 
which combines risk perception communication and feasible and practical 
recommendations, including economic considerations. We speculate that it is 
hardly feasible to sustain good poultry-handling practices if access to personal 
protective equipment is cost prohibitive, particularly when disease occurrence 
poultry die-offs are common. (Ly et al. 2007: 131)  
 
Indeed, subsequent research by anthropologist Ben Hickler revealed that the indigenous 
taxonomy of poultry disease in Cambodia needs further consideration. Cambodians have long 
been aware of dan kor kach, the technical name for Newcastle disease, ―a seasonal sickness with 
heavy mortality, generally regarded as natural and harmless to humans (though harmful to 
livelihood)‖ (as summarised by Dy 2008). Indeed, the economic loss to farmers from Newcastle is 
only one of many diseases, ―not only HPAI, but other disease like cholera, fowl-pox also have 
similar economic impacts‖ (CENTDOR 2008: 56). 
 
Dan kor kach ―is seen as impossible to prevent and difficult to treat. Pdash sai back sey (Avian 
Influenza) is a new term that is confused with dan kor kach‖ (Dy 2008). Hickler‖s report concludes 
that in order to be effective in terms of behavior change, HPAI communication strategies must 
monitor and manage both terms, dan kor kach and pdash sai back sey even if these ―may not be 
concordant with bio-scientific categories‖ (Hickler 2007: 30). One informant (Farmer 40) recalled 
raising poultry that would perennially suffer from dan kor kach, and was resigned to heavy losses, 
but never thought much of it. He attributes current difficulties in convincing farmers of the risk 
of HPAI as inextricably linked to Newcastle Disease. 
 
On the one hand, AI‖s emergence has only confounded Cambodians used to dealing with dan 
kor kach in an environment in which they received little to no attention from donors, much less 
their own government. On the other hand, donors‖ ―overzealous‖ response to AI in comparison to 
an unprecedented dengue outbreak in 2007 caused outrage for Swiss pediatrician Beat Richner, 
the founder of several hospitals in Cambodia. Dengue claimed 407 lives (Khoun 2008) out of 
some 4,000 dengue fever cases, a death rate of 10 per cent, (Xinhua 2008) in comparison to AI‖s 
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 According to Dietz (2002: 539): ―Neighbourhood effects are community influences on individual social 
or economic outcomes. Examples include labour force activity, child outcomes, criminal behaviour, and 
other socioeconomic phenomena.‖ 
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single casualty in 2007, two casualties in 2006 (158 Dengue deaths), (Chinaview 2007) and four 
casualties in 2005 (at least 68 Dengue deaths). See Map 3.1 for year-by-year human casualties of 
AI. According to Richner, the additional cost for his Kantha Bopha Hospitals Foundation caused 
by the Dengue epidemic in 2006 was $7 million (Richner 2007: 15) yet ―Neither a member of the 
International Community, not the WHO responsible on the Dengue Program, nor the Cambodian 
Government have made any gesture of financial contributions.‖ (ibid) 
 
Map 3.1: Locations of Seven Human Avian Influenza Deaths in Cambodia 
 
 
Source: Burgos et al. (2008). 
 
According to Ek (2007), ―raising cash is becoming harder because of Western preoccupation with 
diseases like bird flu‖, quoting Richner: ―Bird flu is a threat to the Western world, so they pour 
money and commitment into that … But dengue? There's no threat to the United States or 
Europe so nobody's interested.‖ Box 3.3 is an extract of a full page ad Richner placed in the 
Cambodia Daily, Cambodia‖s largest English-daily newspaper, on 26 July 2006. He does this with 
some regularity, but this was his only known ad specifically raising AI. Other ads have 
consistently criticised what he characterises as the WHO‖s and other international organisations‖ 
policy and strategy for ―poor medicine for poor people in poor countries'. 
 
Box 3.3:  The Dengue Disaster: A Mirror of the Hypocrisy of the Health Policy for the Poor 
World 
 
 
This year already 17 243 severe cases of Dengue were hospitalized in the four Kantha Bopha 
Hospitals, up to July 24
th
. (In 2006: 12 000 cases). 164 Dengue cases have died. 
… 
For Kantha Bopha the additional cost caused by this year‖s Dengue Epidemic will be 7 Million 
USD. The average costs per case are 300 USD. Neither a member of the International 
2007 
2006 
2005 
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Community, not the WHO responsible on the Dengue Program, nor the Cambodian Government 
have made any gesture of financial contributions. 
… 
A night in February 2007 a severely sick child arrived in Kantha Bopha from Kampong Cham 
Province, having been treated as typhus there three days in a so called private clinic. (Not in a 
health center as it was reported). Arrived in Kantha Bopha, the same night the clinical diagnosis 
Bird Flu was made thanks to the sophisticated facilities, thanks to the fact, that Kantha Bopha is 
free. The family was poor, it has lost all their poor money in the so called private clinic. If they 
should pay, they would nol have been traveled to Kantha Bopha.....and nobody would be aware of 
the Bird Flu at the Vietnamese Border in Kampong Cham Province. The child has died the same 
night. The next day WHO, experts and others were traveling to the child's home next to the 
Vietnamese border in order to neutralize the area from Bird Flu. That is ok! But to the homes of 
the Dengue cases nobody is traveling to. Since ever we give the addresses of the homes of all 
Dengue cases to the Ministry of Health, so we did it in November 2006, when the Epidemic 
started in Kampong Tom Province, Stung District.  
 
But nobody was traveling to the place. Why this difference? The Bird Flu is a threat for the 
western world, so there is money and commitment. The Dengue is “onIy” a most severe threat 
for the local poor children. That is the hypocrisy of the health policy for the poor world by the 
International Community especially the WHO in Geneva. 
 
Dr. Beat Richner, PC 80 60699-1 
 
Note: Edited only for brevity (“…”), emphasis original. 
 
Source: Richner (2007: 15). 
 
 
Narrative 3: What about Poverty and Livelihoods? 
 
Risks and their social distribution represent a third thematic narrative that merits consideration. 
Given Cambodia‖s history and least developed country status with an overwhelming backyard 
poultry sector, poverty and livelihoods should figure prominently in policy. Oddly, poverty and 
livelihoods have been subsumed into (and perhaps assumed in) HPAI policy without having been 
made explicitly part of policy goals. Why this is the case has much to do with who drives policy 
and their motivations. Box 3.4 details a typology of risks at stake in pro-poor HPAI risk reduction 
across national and international public goods.  
 
Box 3.4:   Risks at stake in ‘pro-poor HPAI risk reduction’ 
 
 
This term could indeed refer to various, quite distinct risks: (I) the risk HPAI poses to poor-
peoples‖ poultry; (II) the risk HPAI (in poor people‖s poultry poses) to the poor themselves; (III) the 
risk HPAI in poor people‖s poultry poses to not-so-poor people‖s poultry and related business 
interest, and (IV) the risk HPAI-affected poor people represent to humanity as initiators of a 
global pandemic. 
 
Let‖s face it – ―Risk IV‖ is driving the international response while ―Risk III‖ is driving national 
responses where they occur to any significant measure. On the other hand we also have to 
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admit that ―Risk I‖ is nothing that poor poultry producers would rate very high – the likelihood of 
their poultry dying from HPAI is much lower than that of dying from a plethora of other causes. 
Likewise, ―Risk II‖ is also not something we can expect to be very high on the priority list of poor 
poultry keepers as they, like their chicken, are much more vulnerable to other disease risks. We 
thus have the problem of non-aligned interests between important ―parties‖ in the endeavour to 
manage ―risks III and IV‖. (If the global community really cared about ―Risk I‖, it would have done 
much more about Newcastle disease, while if ―Risk II‖ were our main concern, some simple water 
sanitation measures would have gone a long long way.) 
 
This non-alignment of interests has important implications for the effectiveness and livelihoods 
impacts of “First Generation” HPAI risk reduction strategies. In particular, initial efforts 
implemented by national authorities and facilitated by the international community could be 
seen as ―overzealous‖. The result of this for the poor is that the ―cure becomes worse than the 
disease‖ giving rise to a ―Risk V‖, namely that keeping and marketing poultry is constrained and 
thereby, at least partially, removed as an activity from the livelihoods and (more ominously) 
subsistence food portfolios of poor people. This may be the most serious risk poor poultry 
keepers face from the current HPAI ―crisis‖. On a larger scale, therefore (i.e beyond specific bio-
security measures, compensation scales etc), I would say that, first and foremost, ―pro-poor HPAI 
risk reduction‖ means preserving poultry keeping as an economic activity that remains within the 
reach of people with low initial endowments. To be credible in local eyes, a 'Second Generation' 
of HPAI strategies needs to provide the means and incentives for these people to attain safety 
standards that are ―acceptable‖ with explicit reference to comparable food safety risks and 
livelihood requirements. 
 
Source: Otte and Roland-Holst (2008). 
 
Indeed, Otte‖s and Roland-Holst‖s typology of risks at the national and international levels serve 
to highlight the difficulties found in Cambodia. Risk III, the risk HPAI in poor people‖s poultry 
poses to not-so-poor people‖s poultry and related business interest, is relatively small given the 
nature of Cambodia‖s poultry industry (overwhelmingly backyard-based). While a single 
infectious dose from afar is enough to trigger a small marketplace epidemic with potential 
infections to market visitors and retailers, this risk does exist. However, watching wet market 
activities at Psah Orussey, one wonders what wet market bio-security measures exist given that 
workers wore no gloves, and except for one seller, wore no face masks of any kind. It should be 
understood that the more precautions taken by market sellers, the more fearful buyers could 
become. Moreover, since no Cambodian poultry is officially exported, safeguarding domestic 
production should have been a political economy driver for the Government‖s response to HPAI. 
Unfortunately, livelihood protection did not score high for either the Government or Donors as 
the results of an elite survey in Section 3.4 reveal.
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 CEDAC (2007: ¶11) makes this clear: ―Actually, it is difficult for those experienced with HPAI and loss of 
poultry from other factors to escape from raising poultry as part of their rural livelihood. Job opportunity is 
a main factor to determine their choice of livelihood options. Since experiencing HPAI, only a relatively 
small proportion of farmers do not want to be involved in poultry raising any more; other community 
members even reinvest more than before in poultry raising due to market price incentives.‖ Suon (2007: 5) 
adds ―During that time [HPAI outbreak], they had to find alternative livelihood strategies, such as selling 
rice cakes in the village, rather than waiting to sell labor.‖ McKenney and Prom (2002) and Hun (2003) 
make clear that livelihoods have been both on donors and government radar screens for several years 
already. 
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As the authorities provide neither compensation nor vaccines, risks I and II have been 
thoroughly ignored at the national level with strenuous objections and pressure from the 
international community, to no avail. The political economy of Avian Influenza in Cambodia 
represents the exercise of that doctrine of risk in its purest form. At the international level, the 
focus has indeed been on risk IV (as affirmed by the BBC Two docu-drama ―Pandemic‖ described 
in an extensive footnote in the introduction and the focus on IEC and surveillance) leading to the 
emergence of a cure that is indeed worse than the disease itself in risk V. This raises the 
additional element of uncertainty and scientific risk. Quoting Winston Churchill‖s ―science should 
be on tap, not on top‖, Andrew Stirling has written that ―Policy making must obviously be based 
on the available scientific information, but science on its own is not enough … scientific risk 
analysis is unavoidably and inextricably intertwined with subjective framing assumptions, values, 
trade-offs and expectations of surprise.‖ (Stirling 1999: 2) 
 
Beyond risks and their social distribution, who is making the case for poor people? In the 
Cambodian context, this would typically be the donors (when they are not making their own 
case), but with respect to HPAI, donors had dual motives. Not simply to combat poverty, but to 
protect their own countries. Moreover, the culling debate is not about industrial production and 
exports – as in other countries – but about poor people in the villages and towns. What voice do 
they have? To answer this question requires an understanding of contemporary Cambodian 
politics, in particular rural politics, which is the preserve of the ruling Cambodian People‖s Party. 
Rural votes are needed to return the CPP to power, yet the CPP uses both gifts and intimidation 
in what can only be described as patron-client relations that mix the CPP‖s communist roots with 
Cambodian feudal society. Thus, while poverty is seen as a problem of the individual—perhaps 
even the individual‖s merits in the Buddhist sense—it is possible that pre-National Election 
cullings would have been discouraged by the CPP for the simple reason that being 
uncompensated, they were costing too much in negative public relations and political capital. At 
the same time, the donor community‖s role in Cambodia cannot be overstated, as will be seen in 
a closer examination of the actors, networks, and interests involved in the Political Economy of 
AI in Cambodia. 
 
 
 Actors, Networks, and Interests 
 
What is immediately apparent in Cambodia‖s political economy of Avian Influenza is the 
numerous external actors involved in a country of only 14 million people. Since the UN-managed 
elections in 1993 which brought with it a plethora of NGOs, Cambodia‖s political terrain has been 
transformed. Most obviously, the international community provided billions in development aid. 
At least in part, aid was utilized by the governing Cambodian People‖s Party to consolidate its 
control over the rural provinces. Equally important, international intervention provided new 
space in which non-state actors could contest state authority. Invoking democracy and human 
rights, activists in Cambodia were able to bypass the State and appeal directly to the 
international community.  
 
Moreover, as detailed in Annex 1, using a Geographic Information Systems database created by 
MEDiCAM and funded by USAID, more than 160 non-governmental organisations were identified 
as having AI-related activities in Cambodia. While it is not possible to map the 160+ NGOs, Figure 
3.1—shows the Node Degree (defined as the number of physical links per node) ranking of 
different actors involved in AI interventions. The blue dots (black in grayscale) represent country 
governments, while the red dots (dark in grayscale) represent local NGOs. Most notably, while 
dozens of local NGOs were engaged in AI activities at some point, only two remain in this map, 
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and one, MEDiCAM, actually had received no commitment of funding as of the matrix‖s creation 
and as determined by an interview with a representative of the organisation in early June 2008. It 
is immediately apparent that the US government has taken a very active role in funding AI 
activities using USAID and US-CDC. Both organisations enjoy six links or node degrees, more 
than any other entity mapped. 
 
Figure 3.1:   Interest Mapping Ranked by Node Degree 2008-2009 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from data originating from Avian Influenza and Pandemic Preparedness 
Funding Matrix Cambodia 2008-2009, see Table 1.5 in Annex 1. 
 
As this Interest Map is based on funds and official flows of partners officially recognised by the 
United Nations Resident Coordinator‖s Office, it cannot reveal informal arrangements and 
interests, an important aspect of the political economy of AI. The private sector, as represented 
by companies like CP Cambodia, is also not represented because of the opacity of its operations 
in Cambodia. While such companies were interviewed, the powerpoint the researcher was 
shown—some 100 slides—was not shared. The primary concern seemed theft of proprietary 
knowledge/intellectual capital by a competitor. 
 
A network diagram in which a huge barrage of government mediated access to aid, which oiled 
the wheels, for others involved, had been hypothesised at the Political Economy of HPAI in 
Southeast Asia workshop at IDS, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 23-25 April 2008. Figure 3.2 
shows this phenomenon with donors encircling various government entities ranging from 
MAFF‖s DAHP and NaVRI to MoH‖s CDC. 
 
Figure 3.2: Network diagram on the relationship between donors and the government 
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This actor network and its implications for Cambodia‖s political economy are revealing. In terms 
of donor involvement, resources, and who is considered to ―formally‖ have a seat at the table.  
 
Conducting interviews across this vast array of actors was impossible, but to increase the 
likelihood that a larger number of informants could be reached, a confidential elite survey was 
launched on 27 May 2008 and sent to 308 e-mail addresses
38
 of individuals known to be 
involved in Avian Influenza work in Cambodia.
39
 The results offer a glimpse of how effective 
Government and donors were in intervening against AI across animal, human, livelihoods, 
pandemic preparation, or some other dimension of the respondent‖s choosing.40  
                                                 
38
 The e-mail sent asked recipients to respond, or to refer the author to individuals who worked on Avian 
Influenza in Cambodia. Responses online were completely anonymous save for an optional question 
towards the end of the survey requesting an e-mail address if follow-up was desired. 
39
 The online portion of the survey was open for informants for a period of 10 days. Of these, 44 visited the 
survey website, and 17 completed responses were received. The survey contained 14 questions, 
requesting that respondents rate the effectiveness of government and donors, respectively, on a Likert 
scale, as well as provide written responses where appropriate. 
40
 Of the respondents, 59 per cent (10) had 1-3 years experience, 24 per cent (4) had 4-6 months 
experience, and 18 per cent (3) had less than three months experience working on AI in Cambodia. The 
capacity in which these individuals worked on AI ranged widely because cross-listing was permitted: 
human health (24 per cent); animal health (16 per cent); disaster management (24 per cent); livelihoods (4 
per cent); wildlife (8 per cent); and ―Other‖ (24 per cent). This other category included six written responses: 
(1) Risk reduction and capacity building at the village level (animal and human health); (2) combining 
animal health and livelihoods impacts; (3) UN agency; (4) Communication for transmission risk reduction; 
(5) Communication; and (6) AHI Coordination incorporating all of the above. Respondents worked in a wide 
variety of areas related to AI control activities, including wildlife. Overwhelmingly, respondents were 
―Donor Agency or Foreign Government (Bilat/Multi/UN, etc.)‖ (65 per cent), to a much lesser extent the 
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Respondents were then asked to rate a series of statements and to add written comments to 
their ratings.  
 
Table 3.1:   “With respect to Avian Influenza, the Royal Government of Cambodia has 
intervened effectively and appropriately, given resource allocations.” 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
N/A 
(a) Among humans: 6% 50% 25% 6% 0% 13% 
 1 8 4 1 0 2 
(b) Among animals: 7% 47% 40% 0% 0% 7% 
 1 7 6 0 0 1 
(c) Protecting livelihoods: 8% 25% 25% 17% 0% 25% 
 1 3 3 2 0 3 
(d) Pandemic preparation: 13% 47% 13% 13% 0% 13% 
 2 7 2 2 0 2 
(e) Other (please name) and rate 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 83% 
 1 0 0 0 0 5 
 
Note: The top percentage indicates total informant ratio; the bottom number represents actual 
number of informants selecting the rating. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey launched on 27 May 2008 and sent to 308 e-mail addresses 
 
A majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the RGC intervened effectively and 
appropriately, given resource allocations, in humans, animals, and pandemic preparedness (56 
per cent, 54 per cent, and 60 per cent, respectively). Protecting livelihoods, in contrast, only saw 
33 per cent of respondents agreeing or mostly agreeing. Clearly, protecting livelihoods was rated 
by those deeply involved in Avian Influenza interventions to have been shaky at best. While one 
respondent (1) felt the damage to livelihoods was limited because of the short duration of 
outbreaks, others were left totally unimpressed: ―Nothing is done to take of the livelihoods of the 
smallholders‖ (6) and ―No specific livelihoods intervention that I am aware of. In fact, there is no 
record of any discussions on compensation for loss of poultry in the event of outbreak.‖ This was 
not the only criticism. Among humans, one informant claimed that ―Instances of suspected 
[cases were] not being investigated‖ (17). Indeed, some of the written comments (see Table 3.2) 
in the area of protecting livelihoods were among the harshest.
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international NGO community (24 per cent), For-Profit Private Corporation (6 per cent), and ―Other, Please 
specify‖ (12 per cent). The survey focused on perceptions of effectiveness of the AI response. 
41
 ―Nothing is done to take [care] of the livelihoods of the smallholders‖ (6); ―I am one of the population in 
Cambodia and I do not hear about the Govt. strategy for responding to AI‖ (10); and 'No specific livelihoods 
intervention that I am aware of. In fact, there is no record of any discussions on compensation for loss of 
poultry in the event of outbreak.‖ (17) 
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Table 3.2:   Written Comments Associated with AI Government Effectiveness 
 
Dimension Selected Written Comments Quoted Verbatim 
Among 
humans 
Royal goverment has appropriately resource allocation (only donor resources). 
The gogerment has less national budget with respect to Avian Influenza (2) 
Instances of suspected not being investigated (3) 
The human resource are very low in Cambodia (4) 
Have strong surveillence team at national and provincial levels. Currently this 
team very active. Cambodia right now is implementing ILI survey under 
management of CDC of MoH (5) 
Government has worked with UN agencies to prepare to response to Pandamic 
Avian Influenza. (7) 
While there is response by ministiries such as MoH and MoEYS, the quality of the 
response is highly variable. Capacity of the government in the key ministries is 
typically weak. (8) 
With the support from the Government,AI working groups, Technical working 
groups have been established, and response on time. (11) 
The RGC doesn't put all efforts to prevent, control and eradication of Avian 
Influenza, such as doesn't want to compensate to Poultry Raisers in AI outbreak 
areas, does not want to share the information, does not want to conduct a trial 
on the use of AI vaccines... etc. (13) 
Among 
animals 
Regarding the disease control the interventions seems appropriate (no 
outbreaks reported since April 2007). (1) 
The law for animal movement (local and/or international) not realy existing (4) 
Virtually no resources allocations have been available for wildlife surveillance. 
The Royal government has worked with the US Government to allow us to train 
their forestry and agricultural personnel on wildlife surveillance. However, the 
Royal government has not allocated any funds for this effort. (9) 
The Department of Animal Health and Production partners with FAO for training 
of staff. (17) 
Protecting 
livelihoods 
Not being very agressiv in controlling the disease, livelihoods of most people in 
the country were only little affected for a short period of time. (1) 
Nothing is done to take of the livelihoods of the smallholders (6) 
I am one of the population in Cambodia and I do not hear about the Govt. 
strategy for responding to AI. (10) 
The IEC work on behaviour change is well recognised for its quality and 
application. Other countries in teh region and further afield have used this 
material and process. Good strong coordination between Govt, NGOs and UN 
agencies have ensurred consistency in messages to the local level. (12) 
No specific livelihoods intervention that I am aware of. In fact, there is no record 
of any discussions on compensation for loss of poultry in the event of outbreak. 
(17) 
Pandemic 
preparation 
In-principal support is strong, but operational support a bit weak (3) 
In my point of view is link with the lower and power human resource (4) 
With the technical support from WHO National Committee for Disaster 
Management has now untaken the organization a pilot of provincial pandemic 
planning in Siem Reap. This provincial pandemic planning is participated from 
diverse departments: public and private sectors. This plan will be decentralized 
to the district level and will be a model to other provinces-then consulidate as a 
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national pandemic plans (5) 
Spot on TV how to prevent in case where it happen. (7) 
The provincial lead process is unconventional and globally a first. An excellent 
model that will support very strongly central pandemic planning that will start 
soon. (12) 
THE NCDM partners with WHO on pandemic planning, and an increase in activity 
within the last year. (17) 
Other Cambodia has good model of partnership among stakeholders in Avian 
Influenza response. (2) 
 
Note: To preserve the integrity and authenticity of respondent answers, no copy-editing 
(spelling/grammar correction) was performed on the above quotations. Number in parenthesis 
represents informant‖s unique ID. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey. 
 
In contrast, donors were somewhat more positively viewed in terms of effectiveness in AI 
interventions than the Royal Government of Cambodia among humans and animals (77 per cent 
and 67 per cent, respectively rated as agree or strongly agree). Not surprisingly, donors were also 
dismally rated on protecting livelihoods, with only 38 per cent of respondents agreeing, and 
none strongly agreeing that donors had effectively and appropriately intervened, given resource 
allocations. More surprisingly, only 43 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
donors were effective in pandemic preparedness interventions.  
 
Table 3.3:   “With respect to Avian Influenza, Donors (including all non-Royal Government 
of Cambodia entities whether local or international) have intervened effectively and 
appropriately, given resource allocations.” 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
N/A 
(a) Among humans: 18% 59% 12% 0% 0% 12% 
 3 10 2 0 0 2 
(b) Among animals:  7% 60% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
 1 9 5 0 0 0 
(c) Protecting livelihoods:  0% 38% 31% 15% 0% 15% 
 0 5 4 2 0 2 
(d) Pandemic preparation:  7% 36% 29% 7% 0% 21% 
 1 5 4 1 0 3 
(e) Other (please name) and rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note: The top percentage indicates total informant ratio; the bottom number represents actual 
number of informants selecting the rating. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey. 
 
The written comments in Table 3.4 reveal differing viewpoints. The primary take-away message 
seems to have been positive. Donors were praised for paying ―attention to allocate budget for 
Avian Influenza‖ among humans (2), for their ―good funding support‖ among animals and 
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pandemic preparation, and across the various dimensions. Highlighting donor constraints, 
another respondent wrote that ―Donors wish to help the RGC to control AI, but can't put any 
presure on the RGC‖ (10).  
 
Table 3.4:   Written Comments Associated with AI Donor Effectiveness 
 
Dimension Selected Unedited Written Comments Quoted Verbatim 
Among 
humans 
All donors paid attention to allocate budget for Avian Influenza (2) 
Very good funding support (3) 
I wont to sad yes and no. YES because the organizations are working in IA are 
doing there best; and NO because I afraid the donors strat to forget the problem 
and I think we still have to work on it and to becarfull (4) 
fairly good collaboration at implementation level. (6) 
I see many Int'l NGOs have set up the AI projects or activities and spent a lot of 
money on advocacy and mobilization. (7) 
Donors was strongly support and response quickly to any human outbreak and 
all kind of communication. (8) 
Donor support to human health is noted. Consistency beyond the percieved 
emergency period will be more of a challenge but is necessary particularly with 
regard to pandemic planning. (9) 
Among 
animals 
As long as my Organisation is concerned, the Donor intervention is ok. I have no 
overview of other agencies. (1) 
Good funding support (3) 
When we have no enough resource (financial and human) it's difficult (4) 
Donors wish to help the RGC to control AI, but can't put any presure on the RGC 
(10) 
Protecting 
livelihoods 
donor support has been strong but is now coming to a close in IEC work. (9) 
Pandemic 
preparation 
Cambodia has multisectral responce/stakeholders. (2) 
Good funding support (3) 
The process of funding is a bit late. (8) 
I haven't seen any Int'l NGO has activities on the Pandemic preparation. (7) 
donor support has been good however veyr strong and longer term support is 
needed for multi sectoral planning. Particular attention is needed to understand 
the parallel process of both central level pandemic planning and provincial level. 
The central level work will soon recieve support but will need capacity 
developmetn support, and the provincial process will soon run out of financial 
supprot. The pilot will be complete but the roll out needs support to truly inform 
central level planning. and increase resilience to shocks at teh local level. (9) 
Other N/A 
 
Note: To preserve the integrity and authenticity of respondent answers, no copy-editing 
(spelling/grammar correction) was performed on the above quotations. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey. 
 
Ownership is a serious problem not just in Cambodia but in the developing world, and a donor-
driven agenda can sometimes result in wag the dog effects where the government nominally 
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leads by nominally ―chairing‖ a committee or thematic working group, but donors are in fact 
calling the shots. 
 
It is also notable that protecting livelihoods had almost no feedback on donor effectiveness, 
except for one respondent‖s view that ―donor support has been strong but is now coming to a 
close in IEC work‖ (9), a response given to all other areas (human, animal, etc.) and not worth 
repeating verbatim for all other areas. It seems apparent that if donor interventions reflect 
government performance, the absence of a compensation policy is not seen as a failing of the 
donor community‖s response in protecting livelihoods. This may represent a silenced narrative 
for the lack of willingness by respondents (again, mostly self-selected from the donor 
community) to take a hard look at themselves in the mirror. 
 
Drilling further down into naming actors, respondents were asked about which organisations, 
both in government and among donors were ―successful‖ and which were ―unsuccessful‖.42 For 
successful entities, the Ministry of Health and its Communicable Disease Control (CDC) 
Department of the MoH received two mentions each for a total of four mentions out of 16 
successful entities named, twice as many as the next highest (USAID and MAFF). This certainly 
suggests that among actors, both the Ministry of Health and its CDC Department stood out as 
―successful‖ in the eyes of respondent. What, precisely, this success means included for example: 
―Very strong commitment [sic] from leaders of CDC of MoH- with support from WHO, USAID and 
others‖ (4) and ―MoH and their partners successful in AI intervention. AI intervention went to all 
areas in Cambodia. As evident [sic] Cambodia has no new confirmed case since April 2007.‖ (1) 
Another written entry named the head of the MoH‖s CDC specifically (17). This highlights the 
second key theme explored in Section 3.2 that suggests how different ministries delegated in 
the wake of AI, specifically MAFF versus MoH. 
 
For unsuccessful entities, respondents were much more reticent to name organisations. Indeed, 
only four organisations were named (see Table 3.5), each receiving one mention. Again, while 
not representative and vulnerable to settling scores, the exercise is not intended to be 
representative, merely indicative.  
 
Table 3.5:   Comments of all ‘Unsuccessful’ Entities Quoted Verbatim 
 
MoH has question of 
sustainability. Because of now 
depending on dornor funds. 
Inddition AI message at 
community level are limited. 
(1) 
FAO 
Can not work closely with the NaVRI 
Can not get the real results 
- Does not want to cooperate and collaborate with other 
International Agencies ...etc. 
Does not want to involve other International Agencies in AI 
activities. (8) 
                                                 
42
 One respondent pointed to the ―current AHI funding matrix for detailed overview of funding across 
national priorities‖ which lists the 15 implementing partners (both government and donors) for the $22 
million in 2008-09 allocated to AI and Pandemic Preparedness, to name names, but added that ―Questions 
using language such as ―unsuccessful' and 'successful' can lead to misunderstanding and inaccurate [sic] 
reporting of the issues as everyone comes with their bias and different levels of knowledge. such [sic] 
findings can inaccurately represent the real issues if you are not careful.‖ Certainly there is a risk in 
misunderstanding and misinterpreting words such as unsuccessful and successful, but the exercise was 
useful in revealing patterns through the use of content analysis. Namely, the number of times an 
organisation was named counted as an instance, permitting frequency analysis to be used. 
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USAID: Good big fudning giving 
to many NGOs, but some 
activties seem not clear, some 
are overlaping. (7) 
Wildlife Conservation Society - This organization does not work 
with the government veterinary and wildlife professionals. 
Instead, they conduct surveillance on their own, often 
providing little information to the veterinary and wildlife 
officials. The organization should focus on training and 
empowering Royal Government wildife and veterinary 
professionals to establish a wildlife surveillance system within 
Cambodia. Through well designed and coordinated training 
efforts, the government will develop the capacity to continue 
surveillance after NGO expertise leaves Cambodia. (4) 
 
Note: To preserve the integrity and authenticity of respondent answers, no copy-editing 
(spelling/grammar correction) was performed on the above quotations. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey. 
 
Returning to the results of the elite survey, the final question that allowed respondents to 
maintain anonymity (following which respondents who chose to reveal identifying information 
could do so in questions 9-14), asked about Cambodia‖s preparedness and surveillance (both 
active and passive) for an Avian Influenza-like disease today. Respondents were in agreement 
that Cambodia‖s preparedness and surveillance (both active and passive) was better today than 
when they had started to work on Cambodia. Indeed, the difference between the two is only one 
person‖s selection of ―neutral‖ in the surveillance portion of the question over ―Strongly Agree‖ in 
the preparedness portion. 
 
Table 3.6:   “Cambodia’s preparedness and surveillance (both active and passive) for an 
Avian Influenza-like disease today has improved significantly since I started working on 
Cambodia.” 
 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly  
Disagree 
N/A 
Cambodia's 
preparedness for an 
Avian Influenza-like 
disease: 
25% 31% 25% 6% 0% 13% 
 4 5 4 1 0 2 
Cambodia's surveillance 
(both active and passive) 
for an Avian Influenza-
like disease: 
19% 31% 31% 6% 0% 13% 
 3 5 5 1 0 2 
 
Note: The top percentage indicates total informant ratio; the bottom number represents actual 
number of informants selecting the rating. 
 
Source: Results of author‖s survey. 
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Despite a macro picture in which greater readiness for future AI-like threats appears to have 
been achieved, and both the government and donors have been rated (broadly) positively (at 
least by themselves), the road ahead is still fraught with risks and challenges.  
 
A number of lessons emerge from this analysis. First, greater government-donor coordination is 
needed to align national and international interests. Second, protecting livelihoods cannot be 
assumed. Responses suggest neither government nor donors were particularly effective in this 
area. Third, respondents conveyed differences in effectiveness both within government and 
among donors and NGOs. There was remarkable contrast between MAFF and MoH. Finally, the 
progress made to date by Cambodia is precarious. While it is generally positive, it is only 
marginally so. Clearly, more work needs to be done. In the next section, the stylized outline of a 
political economy of the policy process is drawn, beginning the role of Aid and NGOs. 
 
 
4. UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE POLICY 
PROCESS 
 
 
As was detailed in the first three parts of Section II, on Cambodia‖s political structure and modern 
history, the role of aid dependence and tourism, and the livestock sector and poultry in 
particular, Cambodia‖s political economy context is predicated on power and money in what can 
only be described as a vast patron-client network of relationships. As a result, the policy process 
itself is opaque, as elsewhere, and one may even wonder what policy means in Cambodia. As 
explored in Ear (2005), that process has changed very little and can be summarised as follows: 
 
There are at least three types of policy pronouncements in Cambodia. (1) The ―policy‖ speech; (2) 
The Strategy and/or Plan (of which technically there are two sub-types, funded or unfunded), 
and (3) an actual Prakas (ministerial declaration), Sarachor (circular), Anukret (sub-decree) issued 
by the Council of Minister, or Chhbab (law) passed by the National Assembly. One would think 
that the order of importance might be (3), (2), and (1), but this is not entirely clear. The policy 
speech has the least significance in terms of the long run. It can stop Karaoke bars for a few 
weeks or months or even make illegal checkpoints disappear temporarily, but they invariably 
come back. The Strategy/Plan is more significant admittedly, but it is often times more like a 
wish list, and certainly the unfunded wish list has much less influence than the funded one.
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Finally, while actual legislation should mean something, it is not necessarily the case. These are 
regularly violated or ignored the further one moves from Phnom Penh, as earlier explained. If 
and when these policies become law, their enforcement is an entirely different matter.  
 
                                                 
43
 The 2004 CG produced the following Pipeline-High Priority Projects on Agricultural Productivity: 
(1) Artificial insemination cattle breeding station (MAFF) Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2005-
2006 $91,000 requested; (2) Hemorrhagic septicaemia vaccine production (MAFF) Donors Sought; 
Feasibility Study Required 2005-2007 $400, 000 requested; (3) Reduce Mortality and Morbidity of 
Livestock through strengthening veterinary services and disease prevention programs (MAFF) Donors 
Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2005-2007 $480,000 requested. Only (3) is new, while (1) and (2) 
appeared in the 2002 CG and were left unfunded. The 2002 CG also included a Vaccines, Medicines & 
Equipment Donors Sought; Feasibility Study Required 2002-2003 $221,000 requested. 
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In theory, the general policy process originates in the department of a concerned ministry and 
moves-up via the Under-Secretary of State in charge (policy maker), then the Secretary of State 
(policy maker), then the Minister (decision maker), whereupon it can become a Prakas 
(regulation). If the policy is nationwide and/or impacts policies beyond the Ministry‖s control, 
then it must go to the Council of Ministers where it is reviewed and signed by the Prime Minister 
and countersigned by the relevant line Minister (Oberndorf 2004: 9).  
 
How livestock policies come about in Cambodia has already been the subject of considerable 
scrutiny by Sen (2003). Based on his workflow diagrams, pro-poor livestock policy is highly 
centralized and top-down. While the conclusion by Sen, who was at the time a Deputy Director in 
the Department of Animal Health and Production in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry, is that pro-poor stakeholders need to interact at a level beyond the DAHP, say at the 
policymaker level which would start with an Undersecretary of State, this is an indication of the 
political reality of his own department and the lack of power he exerts beyond it—meaning 
while he no doubt supports the policies, he cannot make the necessary changes as a 
technocrat.
44
 As such, it speaks to the impotence of the current policy process and, to some 
extent, of policies themselves.
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Given this reality, three themes are apparent. First, donors and NGOs — who number at least in 
the hundreds — play an important role in influencing policy by pressuring the authorities into 
making certain policy pronouncements even if these are not, ultimately, respected. HPAI-related 
aid has emerged as yet another line-item in the revenue stream for the authorities. Beyond aid, 
the importance of tourism is apparent, as is the role of bureaucratic politics in divvying-up — 
through patronage — the aid deluge described in the previous section. Without official 
revenues, the state and its functionaries rely on aid. This then reflects particular interests in and 
outside the state, forming alliances (of ideas, practices, bound by funds) formed by those in the 
state and the aid community, with benefits accruing to both sides. The CPP‖s control of rural 
areas ensures its electoral survival for the foreseeable future; the bankrolling of its activities 
requires agile footwork with patronage and corruption. Thirdly, the role of the media‖s 
interactions with the state and the limitations placed on the media whether covertly or overtly. 
 
All of these themes link to a core storyline of a weak state in an aid-dependent environment, 
albeit despite rapid double-digit growth. 
 
 
Donors and NGOs 
 
The role of donors and NGOs in Cambodia cannot be overstated as shown in the case of Super 
Moan—even if donors are careful to note that it was created in workshop with government 
officials. While they are a diffuse group with as many interests as organisations, their numbers 
are simply staggering. As Scoones and Forster (2008: 55) quote of one informant: ―In Cambodia 
there are 22 donors active in the health sector. There are over 200 NGOs also and 109 projects. 
You can imagine how useful it would be if everyone could work in a co-ordinated way.
46
 Indeed, 
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 And as we have seen already, even if the changes were made, it would not guarantee any outcomes. 
45
 The fact that he has chosen to take an advisor position (one of dozens, perhaps even hundreds) with a 
particularly powerful Deputy Prime Minister, which will take him outside the department while he 
concurrently but only nominally holds his job as Deputy Director, shows the constraints (inside) and 
opportunities (outside) he faces. 
46
 ―Interview, Washington DC, 11 June 2008‖. 
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while AHI funding stands at $22 million for 2008-2009, one informant mentioned, in passing, a 
current health project funded by the World Bank and other donors that will total $100 million. As 
of the Sixth International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza which took 
place in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 24-26 October 2008, Cambodia ranked seventh among the 
top 10 ―main recipients‖ in terms of country assistance with $35 million in ―Commitments‖ as 
shown in Table 1.3 of Annex 1. In terms of commitments per capita and commitments per 
outbreaks, Cambodia ranked only second to Lao PDR. In terms of commitments per human 
cases and commitments per human deaths, it ranked fourth. 
 
Annex 1 shows a partial listing of just the NGOs involved in the control of Avian Influenza, as 
collected by MEDiCAM, an umbrella organisation of 120 health-related NGOs, for its database 
showing which organisations in what provinces work on AI. International support, both 
economic and technical, results from the perceived threat of disease dispersion to the West and 
its potentially devastating effects. Indeed, the outcome of donor and NGO activities, with their 
aid resources, is the third narrative explored in Section 4.1 It examines issues of cross-cutting aid 
effectiveness and donor involvement, and asks, among other questions, what happens to large 
amounts of uncoordinated donor aid in an emergency mode and how this works when 
absorptive capacity of the state is low (or high in the wrong ways). With no predicted human 
pandemic there is concern that ―flu fatigue‖ may be the ―biggest threat that we have now‖ 
according to Dr. Julie Hall, deputy regional adviser on communicable disease surveillance and 
response with the WHO‖s Western Pacific region (Bennett and Gale 2008). Indeed, flu fatigue 
could spell disaster in more ways than one to the constellation of interests built around the $2.7 
billion ―pledged‖ worldwide AI ―sector‖ (of which $2 billion has been ―committed‖ and $1.5 billion 
―has already been disbursed47). 
 
As the example of the World Bank‖s AI project—on hold for two years as it swung back and forth 
between UN and government implementation—shows, the question of what happens to large 
amounts of uncoordinated donor aid in an emergency mode invariably arises. (1) How does 
donor intervention work when absorptive capacity of the state is low (or high in the wrong ways)? 
(2) Where did the initial money for AI come from and where is it now going? The reason for why 
the initial plans had been for government implementation of the World Bank project was moved 
to the UN came from concerns, at about the same time, concerning the very absorptive capacity 
of the state in the wrong ways. The Bank had just declared misprocurement in 2003 on the 
demobilisation project and by June 2006 more financial malfeasance was uncovered with seven 
additional World Bank projects.
48
 Indeed, there was even talk from then World Bank President 
Paul Wolfowitz of cutting-off Cambodia completely because of corruption in Bank projects. 
 
As Cambodia reaches the fifth anniversary of its first confirmed AI outbreak in poultry, the global 
AI funding picture looks less certain. Dr. Hall of the WHO told reporters in Sydney on 15 
September 2008: ―The threat of a pandemic, of a virus jumping from animals into humans, is still 
there, but the biggest threat that we have now is “flu fatigue”.‖ (Bennett and Gale 2008) Indeed, 
as the Bloomberg story that reported her statement notes: ―Misconceptions that the pandemic 
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 As quoted in Jonas (2008: 6) which characterised the figures as ―Impressive performance in first 3 years 
of operation of the flexible financing framework‖. 
48
 The projects were Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project; Flood Emergency and 
Rehabilitation; Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project; Forestry Concession Management and 
Control Pilot Project; Land Management and Administration Project; Provincial and Rural Infrastructure 
Project; and Provincial and Peri-Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project. 
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threat is “a storm in a teacup” may sap investment in surveillance for bird flu as well as other 
infectious diseases, particularly in parts of Asia, where systems are “very weak” Hall said.‖  
 
More than $2 billion has been pledged over the past three years to help poorer nations stem AI‖s 
spread and for pandemic preparedness, and for most donor governments, three years can seem 
an eternity. As Hall notes, ―These systems are useful for many different things—from naturally 
occurring diseases through to manmade and bioterrorism threats … It should be seen as a long-
term investment for multiple purposes that one day will most definitely be needed.‖ (ibid) The ―flu 
fatigue‖ observation is already apparent in Cambodia. As an AI Expert (14), noted ―Some of the 
donor concerns is donor fatigue, to maintaining, planning, monitor, etc. Immediate emergency 
is gone so it‖s now more difficult to get the funding line.‖ 
 
Moreover, the role of the media, both nationally and internationally, has served to amplify or 
silence messages. According to Donor Staff (16), ―During the first AI outbreak, the Prime minister 
obligated all TV channels to broadcast it for free. It goes without saying that all Cambodian TV 
channels, while not all owned by the government, know better than to defy government orders. 
As the saying goes in the press, ―If it bleeds, it leads‖, Cambodia is no exception. This is what sells 
airtime and newspapers and the media are far too negative and need to be in order to remain 
profitable.
49
 In contrast, a Veterinarian and Consultant (1) reported watching a January 2008 
satellite broadcast in Cambodia and saw an exchange Bernard Vallat, head of the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), had with reporters in which he noted that ―The risk was 
overestimated … We have never seen such a stable strain … It was just nonscientific supposition.‖ 
(MSNBC 2008)  
 
Just as quickly, an OIE press release dated 16 January 2008 following Vallat‖s exchange 
attempted to do damage control: 
 
In line with the organisation‖s position and that of its international partners, Dr 
Vallat reinforced the need to strengthen the infrastructure capable of early 
detection and rapid response for any emerging disease at animal level, 
especially those with a zoonotic potential. He regretted that such capacities 
were not in place at the very beginning of the H5N1 avian influenza crisis, which 
delayed the reaction of countries, especially the poorest ones, first hit in South 
East Asia. He welcomed today‖s much better preparedness of countries to 
detect and control the disease. Dr Vallat repeated the need to strengthen the 
governance of veterinary services and to improve the collaboration between 
disciplines, as well as between private and public sectors. 
 
Ultimately what better preparedness has been achieved for Cambodia to detect and control AI? 
From one AI Expert‖s (14) perspective ―What we have … in Cambodia is not only commitment in 
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 As Burgos (2008) notes: ―In recent years there have been ongoing commentaries, narratives and 
debates about the origins of emerging zoonotic diseases, and these were more pronounced after the 
advent of SARS and HPAI in Asia, whose worldwide notoriety swelled due to intense media coverage. 
Mounting public concern coupled with ignorance-fuelled anxiety, prompted many journalists and so-
called pundits to find someone to blame. They glibly ascertained that these diseases come as a result of 
close interactions between humans and animals in conditions with minimal sanitary regulations in 
overcrowded marketplaces in Asia. As a consequence, international audiences started to label these 
nations as dangerous and unsafe, which resulted in negative economic impacts due to reduced tourist 
influx and diminished trade.‖ 
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government but also our commitment that things are aligned to government priorities … In 
other countries the plans are written purely by donors.‖ As can be seen from Box 4.1, a variety of 
issues illustrate the manner in which donors operated in Cambodia—from the usual three year 
focus that shifts to the usual lack of coordination that reduces the effectiveness of 
interventions. 
 
Box 4.1:   Aiding What? 
 
 
They work on people's fears...There will always be a maybe. Anyway, there are all these people 
coming in with money dripping out of their ears … We couldn't get anything done.50 Everyone 
wanted to do general health group and then within three years everyone gets stuck in their way. 
All the money would switch off from one place into another. Veterinarian and Consultant (1) 
 
If you are looking to policies to assist poor countries, as opposed to poor people, then one key 
must be to persuade the developed world to find ways allowing freer trade and movement of 
livestock and products, and finding other ways of protecting their home producers. If we take F-
M-D as an example, this is the most widely used animal health barrier raised against importation 
of cheaper products from outside. Misguided aid programmes are spending hundreds of millions 
trying to create systems of control in countries where, to the majority of owners, the disease is of 
only minor importance but its associated movement controls are a major hindrance to their 
effective pursuit of their livelihood systems. It might be much more productive if this money was 
invested in developing cheap effective vaccines with which farmers in the developed economies 
could dependably protect their stock.
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Yes it is interesting how donors put an emphasis on things. If you ask farmers which one they 
prefer to buy, a net for human or build fence for animals? I‖m sure they would say net for human. 
If the awareness of people is not achieved, how can we control the pandemic? But still awareness 
does not guarantee that people are ready to manage pandemic. For example in Vietnam, we 
successfully promote awareness to people, everyone can tell about prevention methods. But are 
they going to do so, no. …I know I should burn the dead chicken but it is food. AI expert (7) 
 
Of course, that‖s a lot of money, but at the same time they have to be honest, money only is not 
enough … We also need to show the world that rural development cannot be done in a few years; 
to get concrete results we need more time and action … Some partners don‖t want to admit this 
aspect, because they have limited funds and time. For example, the AI project has been 
implemented since … about 2005, so it is not yet three years, and … any rural development 
activity can have tangible result only after three years. It is the reality.
52
 AI Expert (24)  
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 According to Veterinarian and Consultant (1): ―What you should do is take the money and create a 
process site and not bring in live birds. About a million live birds coming in from the wild flock. And about 
the same number coming from the industrial flock. Everything is being done on a least-cost basis. There's 
no control. There is no management. No one knows what a sick bird is and what isn‖t a sick bird. And I said 
while everybody is frightened of this you should start banning birds and kill them outside then bring them 
inside dead. I haven't done a survey that would allow people to buy dead birds or dead meat in packaged 
form. If the price is right people will do anything, but can you still get passed this religious thing? To the 
ancestors you had to have a live bird.‖ 
51
 As relayed via e-mail by AI Expert (5). 
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 AI Expert (24) added: ―However, it is usual that the donors worry about where the moneys go and how 
they are used, but development issue cannot be as obvious as constructing a building.... For example, in 
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One thing you should ask is that they contracted so much money with NGOs, some NGOs got so 
much money, more than the money I have for the whole country project … Now, they have 
donor coordination meeting, but that was only donors‖ agenda, it was not so much about the 
country. ..We need more transparency from donors as well. One of the things we should do is to 
coordinate among donors, make sure our supports are not duplicated. So far, they had never 
contacted me. As a result, most of the time we saw the government staff went busy with 
trainings supported by donors and didn‖t have time to implement their actual work. Donor 
Management (26a) 
 
Source: Author‖s interviews except where noted. 
 
 
Ultimately, AI interventions are only a small part of a much bigger aid system that has not served 
Cambodia particularly well in terms of building local capacity for ownership and fiscal 
independence. Have AI interventions been more or less successful than other activities in 
Cambodia? In some ways, functioning in emergency mode, expectations will be lower than those 
of longer-term development activities, not unlike what Cambodia saw in the early period of post-
conflict when reconstruction and rehabilitation were job one. In other ways, an entire aid system 
has been built in Cambodia and local capacity has improved considerably since 1993. It is 
unlikely, however, that the performance of emergency aid to control AI would be superior to 
normal development aid. 
 
 
Beyond Aid: Other Sources of Revenue and the Importance of Tourism 
 
As examined earlier, tourism accounts for around 14 per cent of Cambodia‖s GDP and has clearly 
stood out in the past decade for its tremendous contribution to growth. Tourism has been the 
main contributor to growth in the services sector which held the largest sectoral (41 per cent) 
share of GDP in 2007 and is increasingly important given concerns that garments (which is of 
equal share) will be on the decline due to the coming global recession. Cambodia‖s Angkor Wat, 
located in the tourist Mecca town of Siem Reap, was one of 13 finalists for the New Seven 
Wonders of the World list which took in more than 100 million votes. The fear of tourists being 
scared affected the political economy of the policy process for HPAI by disincentivising the need 
for active surveillance. Many of Cambodia‖s senior leadership have huge financial stakes in luxury 
hotels and the tourism industry through joint ventures in which they invested little or nothing 
but brought political connections (kse) or backing (knorng). Lower revenues would hit their 
pocketbooks directly. Given that concerns over HPAI and possible pandemic would scare 
tourists away given Cambodia‖s strictly limited medical facilities (aside from SOS International, 
which specialises in medical evacuations, there are no hospitals of true international standard), 
this made the country particularly vulnerable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
term of AI project, the result can be revealed by increasing numbers of survivors, supervisors… Well, they 
are donors, it is their role to think so … It is completely understandable that when they give money, they 
need to know exactly how many people have been trained. Training someone does not mean providing 
the course, but to see what they will able to do later. I think that most training providers, including us, 
always neglect this aspect due to the lack of time and funds. They think that the practice and follow up 
must be core value of any training: we cannot exclusively focus on the theory.‖ 
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While it is not clear who specifically got involved in the process, it is known that one of 
Cambodia‖s most powerful politicians (who dabbles in cockfighting and agribusiness on the side 
and has interests in numerous highly profitable enterprises, including hotels) did not believe that 
the threat of HPAI was severe. Far from it, he realised early on that it was a donor-driven concern 
(Veterinarian X). This official would have been deeply engaged in any decision concerning 
compensation, surveillance, and funding of any sort towards HPAI control and intervention. 
Luckily for Cambodia HPAI did not jump from animals to humans en masse with only eight 
victims detected, and there was no discernable drop in visitor arrivals.  
 
Thus, news of HPAI alone could scare away valuable tourist dollars. The culling would satisfy 
international standards of bio-security 
 
Bureaucratic Politics and Patronage  
 
Bureaucratic politics of Cambodia belies underlying patronage struggles in the face of an 
increasing number of cabinet appointees (the most anywhere in the world) and how donor 
resources in the form of aid can be divvied-up. The turf wars between ministries are as much 
about the ability to extract from discretionary power (taxation, licensing fees, etc.) as they are 
about obtaining vehicles and salary supplements. 
 
A project director—in government—bemoaned having to leave one donor for another because 
he would not be permitted to receive pay from both. He weighed the pros and cons of each 
carefully. Of course, at the end of the day, this would not be his only revenue stream. Staff in the 
ministry must pay up the pyramid, a normal feature of working the ―system‖. Trips within country 
or abroad are ―taxed‖. Decisions to extend contracts are ―taxed‖. But the story is all too common in 
aid dependent countries: without its own resources (because of an unwillingness to raise official 
revenues) the state and its functionaries rely on aid. In turn, the functionaries then reflect the 
particular interests inside and outside the state, thus alliances of ideas and practices are bound 
by funds and are formed by those in the state and the aid community, with benefits accruing to 
both sides. 
 
Quarrels, rivalries and competition between political parties, ministries and departments are 
commonplace in any country — and Cambodia is no exception. When the issue arose with one 
informant, he pointed to France‖s legendary quarrelling bureaucracy. This constitutes one of the 
major components of institutional failures coupled with the lack of in-country qualified human 
resources in the particular case of Cambodia that can help explain some of the challenges faced 
by Cambodia. As the fight against AI began with animal health, the MAFF was the key Ministry 
involved and the Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP) its focal point.  
 
Because the MAFF oversees forestry and good governance of the forests (among other natural 
resources) has long been a contested area for donors and the RGC, the MAFF has not had a 
particularly good image in the eyes of donors to begin with (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Expert: 
56). Exploitation of the forestry sector began early and happened often.
53
 The Khmer Rouge and 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces fought by day and worked with the Thai military to trade timber 
and gemstones by night (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Expert: 56). The segment of the Khmer 
Rouge (Y Chhean) in Pailin area financed their efforts at self-demobilisation and reintegration 
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 ―When Hun Sen started with his first mandate, he had one rein with Forestry, so he maintained two 
hands, and in the second mandate, he maintained only one hand…so [now] these people just go around 
[doing anything] and that he is not controlling them anymore.‖ (Donor representative 16) 
56 
 
mainly through gemstones and timber, while the Anlong Veng group (Pol Pot, Ta Mok et al.) were 
mainly in the timber trade (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Expert: 56). Thus, it is with the legacy of 
forestry exploitation that donors often regard the MAFF, and the record at DAHP, while not nearly 
as exploitative, has its own legacy of trade impediments (Ear, 2005). 
 
The competition for resources first between the MAFF and the MoH, and then among the MAFF, 
MoH, and NCDM could be apparent if only one examined how money had, prior to AI, flowed. As 
animal health had not been a high priority for donors given that human health was already so 
weak, the MoH had a long established record of receiving and processing significant donor 
resources. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the health sector, including funding for population 
projects, received almost 10 per cent of bilateral resources in 2005-2006.  
 
Figure 4.1:   Official Development Assistance to Cambodia 2004-2006 
 
  
 
While the situation had been quite skewed towards human health, the World Bank‖s recent AI 
project notably allocated $5.8 million to animal health, $3.5 million to human health, and $1.7 
million to pandemic preparedness. (AI Expert: 6). As with any pendulum, there will be swings back 
and forth as different interests coalesce and divide the funding pie. Figure 4.2 shows the current 
breakdown of committed funds for Animal Health, Human Health, IEC, and Pandemic 
Preparedness. 
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Figure 4.2:   Cambodia’s Avian Influenza and Pandemic Preparedness Pie in 2008-2009 
 
$8,944,457, 40%
$6,198,512, 28%
$5,031,076, 23%
$2,077,861, 9%
Animal health
Human health
Information, education,
communication (IEC) 
Pandemic preparedness
 
Source: Adapted from data originating from Avian Influenza and Pandemic Preparedness 
Funding Matrix Cambodia 2008-2009, see Table 1.5 in Annex 1. 
 
The themes that emerge from Box 4.2 suggest that MoH‖s track record in managing funds gave 
it an edge over other entities in the initial years (precise data for which is unfortunately not 
available) and that MAFF‖s large share thanks to the World Bank project is already seen as a 
pretext to return to human health once again. 
 
Box 4.2:   MAFF, MoH, and NCDM 
 
 
They thought that we don‖t have capacity to cope with animal health, and they don‖t want to 
invest in capacity building. The thing is the World Bank sees that MoH has the capacity in 
managing finance, where the MAFF doesn‖t, so they need more money to actually strengthen 
that financial system. Also they see that the MoH is way ahead of the MAFF. The MAFF doesn‖t 
even have any budget on that. AI Expert (6) 
 
It should be noted that health system has been stronger for quite some time already, while the 
agriculture has not. More attention has been paid to strengthen the health system, which is not 
the case with agriculture. With the fact that authority over resource been given [to health 
projects], it is about ownership. Health people think it is their project, while the agriculture does 
not see it the same way. NGO and IO doctor (18) 
 
From my experience in the last year, the MoH has delegated more authority to deputy chief who 
is committed and effective in responding to problems at provincial level, with helps from NGOs. 
In agriculture, however, its sub-national level structure is still limited and not smooth, plus, there 
is no clear delegation on who should do what, and people seem to wait for other to act, making it 
less responsive to any events reported through the hotline. But with medical doctors, when they 
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know about people infected with AI, they go down quickly and diagnose. With the animal health 
workers, the response has been slower when hundred of chicken die. Sometime, animal health 
workers get the information from human doctors. Actually, the animal people should know first, 
because the animals die first before the disease gets transmitted to people… So the 
communication/information sharing of the animal health workers is still problematic… Health 
Expert (25) 
 
I think from the FAO perspective, the guideline should be how much money do they have, how 
much accountability, and how much benefit to the MoH? Now that the MAFF/DAHP‖s NaVri got 
money only from World Bank, some international donors are shifting their funding towards 
health sector since it has better coordination system. Some donors just wanted to advertise 
their logo on the IEC materials. Donor Management (26a) 
 
In fact, MoH and MAFF can barely collaborate, though with AI issue, they have to work jointly, but 
tension still occurs. For example, regarding World Bank‖s funds for AI, MoH seems unsatisfied due 
to strictness of the Bank funds‖ administration and procedure, while MAFF welcomes the grant as 
they have never had such grant. NCDM also strongly satisfied its role of coordinator. I noticed 
that NCDM does not really play its role well, as it is a huge structure which includes all kind of 
disasters so that they don‖t know how to effectively integrate and handle AI within their program. 
However, some improvements have been done recently with the pilot provincial pandemic plan 
in Siem Reap province which makes all the ministries involve… Donor Staff (32) 
 
When there is an outbreak, there is one man team X is only one in Ministry that‖s active in AI … 
The MoH is better than MAFF because they allow [the deputy director of CDC] to be 
spokesperson. [The head of NaVri] knows everything about the law. But problem is that he 
doesn‖t have power. For example: the higher authority in the MAFF blames them for discovering 
AI and not keeping it quiet. Authorities do not want to have it publicized because it looks bad. 
How can you care about animal welfare when they don‖t even look after people‖s welfare? AI 
Expert (12) 
 
I observed so too. This is a problem in Cambodia. When the Chief is not at the office, the Vice 
Chief cannot do anything because the Chief take official stamp with him. They have to wait till 
the Chief back to office so that they can decide on matters. I think the MoH is better because 
they have exposed to NGOs work. NGO and IO doctor (18) 
 
I think MoH they have all the policies and systems in place, but the challenge is how they 
coordinate and how they get the systems work. For example, if no donor, they will not do 
anything. AI in Cambodia we are dealing mainly with two main institutions. One is the Ministry of 
Health and another one is NCDM. The last institution has multi-sectoral ministries include 
agriculture, and many other ministries concerning AI. Coordination is still an issue. For funding I 
think it is balanced. Since it is an issue of disease so, people see this more as health issue. NGO 
Doctor (15) 
 
Source: Author‖s interviews. 
 
More recently, a 20-21 May 2008 ―Step 4 supplementary workshops in Siem Reap Multi-Sectoral 
Pandemic Planning Process (pilot)‖ (UN System 2008: 2) is a case-in-point about bureaucratic 
politics. The organizers did not invite MAFF at the national level, but involved provincial level 
participation. As one official asked ―I wonder why they developed preparedness plan without 
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participation from the MAFF? I will call them for a meeting to clarify this.‖ One of the organisers 
reported that ―They complained that we did not include their ministry‖ and the reason was that 
―this is a multi-sectoral response project; so, out of all the 24 sectors, we selected eight … We will 
invite MAFF after we draft operational goals and objectives for the project‖ adding ―If we invited 
the ministry to participate all the times, we will not able to get information from the field. There 
are many other ministries that we didn‖t invite to the meeting.‖54 Indeed, the reaction was not 
merely a complaint but according to Donor Staff (16) ―MAFF agued that animal health is the most 
important issue, and MAFF is the only institution which has authority is this sector. MAFF 
definitely refuses to cooperate with other institutions if the next outbreak cases occur.‖ As a 
Donor Staff and Doctor (32) summed it up, ―MAFF has to understand too, in the ―pandemic‖ stage, 
animal health doesn‖t matter anymore, but food security, human health, prevention, behaviour 
modification, etc…‖ 
 
That recent incident highlights the growing involvement of NCDM in activities that are shifting 
from an AI-only to a pandemic preparedness emphasis, whatever the origin of the pandemic. As 
a Health Expert (25) explained: 
 
Although it sounds like we just started with this ―pandemic‖ business, we actually 
thought about forming the project for three years already. Actually, people 
talked about it for some time already, but when they talked about AI, they talked 
about pandemic together… For instance, HE Nhim Vanda, the head of NCDM and 
the vice-chair of the working group on AI, and I, see that the ministerial level pay 
attention on this AI issue. At the provincial level, now when we have meetings on 
AI, key people from the 24 line departments also attend and pay more 
attention… However, understanding of these people has still been limited. They 
still think: what is AI? What is pandemic? 
 
The World Bank‖s $11 million (of which the Bank funded $6 million and other donors funded the 
remainder) Avian and Human Influenza Control and Preparedness Emergency Project involving 
MAFF, MoH, and NCDM, formulated in 2006, took two years to eventually be signed. It was 
envisaged as government-implemented in a June 2006 draft of the project document, then 
shifted to implementation by FAO, WHO, and UNDP in a 20 April 2007 draft only grind to a halt 
because of disagreement between the World Bank and the United Nations (of which, the Bank is 
a fully independent specialised agency thereof) over who would have the final say over audits. 
Unable to come to an agreement, a 14 February 2008 version the project reverted to 
government implementation.
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 Box 4.3 describes the recent struggles of the project, following 
passage by the Bank‖s Board. These underscore the human resources constraints and 
bureaucratic politics of project control and implementation. 
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 Not identified to protect informant. 
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 Paragraph 10, to be precise, was added to World Bank (2007) from World Bank (2006d) and then deleted 
in World Bank (2008b): ―10. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), as Recipient of the grant financing, 
has decided to delegate the implementation of the project activities to three specialised agencies of the 
UN System, FAO, UNDP and WHO. [sic] which will be acting as Implementing Agencies (IAs) on behalf of the 
RGC. These institutional implementation arrangements would contribute to fast and cost-effective 
implementation, providing assurances that the surveillance and response systems are fully operational in 
a short period, therefore, able to produce an effective response in the even [sic] of an outbreak in poultry 
or a large number of human cases. At the same time, it would help avoid increasing risks derived from the 
limited financial management capacity of government agencies and the concerns about misuse of funds.‖ 
(World Bank 2007: 10). 
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Box 4.3:   The Curious Case of the World Bank’s AI Project: Capacity Development and 
Bureaucratic Politics 
 
 
At a technical level, they have no problem. But at political level, I‖m not sure. NCDM and HE Nhim 
Vanda got order from Prime Minister to coordinate between the two ministries. But the 
condition was that NCDM is there only to coordinate, not to manage. They can call for a meeting 
because they use the name of the Prime Minister. At that time, NCDM was not yet strong, until 
person X came in. UNDP would like to support NCDM as well but they are concerned that X will 
leave soon, so they decided not to. I told them that capacity building should not focus on an 
individual alone, to which they agreed. But what they told NCDM was that if they were to support 
the project, they need to spend a lot of money on recruiting new staff, while project activities are 
very few. Sok An signed agreement between the government and UN system. Nhim Vanda said 
even though the budget is small, the UN should not drop this project. UNDP told me that they 
are concerned that X will leave, and if he leaves, NCDM will collapse; they feel more comfortable 
to collaborate with the two ministries when there is NCDM. I said it is not right to support 
individuals, because individuals do not stand still, they will move from one place to another. We 
should better look at system. Donor Staff (31) 
 
FAO is difficult, but working with government is even more difficult. Now, it is just beginning of 
the process and NCDM would like to take control over this project. The other day, I heard they 
put HE Pov Samy as the head of World Bank‖s bird flu project. I said no, I never heard about this. 
Then they responded that they were confused, he is the head of NCDM‖s portion of the project. 
But from what I know, they didn‖t mean to make any mistake, they did so for real and they wish 
to submit that to the Prime Minister. Now I heard that for those who used to attend meeting like 
me and person Y, they send our names to Prime Minister. When we had a meeting at World Bank 
office, when Ministry of Finance and WB visited Ministry of Health, HE Nuth Sokhom (from 
Funcinpec), he asked person Z to come to the meeting without giving him any information 
about the meeting. Then person Y was also there, so a dispute occurred with all present 
ministries there and including World Bank. They are always like this, always asked people who 
never know about the project to come to meetings, and they could not give any answer. Now 
Pov Samy said that all those who have attended the meetings, will be part of the project. Until 
now we have no idea who is responsible for the project. Those who have political positions 
cannot be part of the project. Person Y is afraid that they ask him to be responsible for that 
project, and me too. Government Official (33) 
 
Source: Author‖s interviews. 
 
 
Media Spin 
 
A third and final theme can be considered in the domestic and international interactions of the 
media. On the one hand, the national press has been increasingly constrained in newspapers 
and radio, and completely monopolised by authorities in television (Ear and Hall, 2008). Thus, 
informant X explained that the Prime Minister had ordered all TV and radio stations to broadcast 
messages about the dangers of HPAI. 
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Recall that according to Ly et al. (2007), despite media reports in Cambodia about HPAI through 
radio and television broadcasts, which created high awareness and widespread knowledge about 
HPAI, rural Cambodians continued to practice risky poultry handling. Building on these findings, 
Burgos et al. (2008) argue that: 
 
Improvement in risky practices can only be achieved through repetitive 
behaviour modification messages. Effective intervention programs must include 
feasible options for resource poor households that have limited materials for 
personal protection (water, soap, rubber gloves, and masks) and must offer 
farmers alternative methods to safely work with poultry on a daily basis. (Burgos 
et al. 2008: 21) 
 
Moreover, the free press self-censors in Cambodia due to fears of recrimination (i.e. journalist 
murders) and this may slow down the time it takes for issues to rise to the surface and therefore 
hampers progressive policymaking in the long run. 
 
On the other hand, the international press is remarkably fickle when it comes to reporting 
progress, but is too often fixated on the negative. It moves from crisis to crisis, and maintains a 
level of alertness known as the 24 hour news cycle pioneered by CNN. Burgos et al. (2008) sum-
up the drawback this way: 
 
Since its re-emergence, HPAI H5N1 has attracted considerable public and media 
attention because the viruses involved have been shown to be capable of 
producing fatal disease in humans. While there is fear that the virus may mutate 
into a strain capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, the greatest 
impact to date has been on the highly diverse poultry industries in affected 
countries. In response to this, HPAI control measures have so far focused on 
implementing prevention and eradication measures in poultry populations, with 
more than 175 million birds culled in Southeast Asia alone … Until now, 
significantly less emphasis has been placed on assessing the efficacy of risk 
reduction measures, including their effects on the livelihoods of smallholder 
farmers and their families. (Burgos et al. 2008: iii) 
 
Indeed, there can be no doubt but that the emphasis on HPAI placed by the international media 
has been on the fatality of the disease and not on the efficacy of risk reduction measures. 
Ignored has been the allocationally redistributive nature of these interventions on those who 
have the least capital—both human and financial. The media shape public perceptions and their 
collaboration in dealing with future animal health crises is essential. As was alluded to earlier, the 
BBC‖s Pandemic56 aired a 16 minute scenario (one of three potential scenarios)57 on 7 November 
                                                 
56
 Based on the professional-grade acting and production of the docu-drama, the author believes that a 
unit established in Cambodia by the BBC World Trust, the BBC's international charity which uses ―media 
and communications to reduce poverty and promote human rights, thereby enabling people to build 
better lives‖ and is ―funded by external grants and voluntary contributions, mainly from the UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union, UN agencies and charitable 
foundations through DfID‖ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/aboutus/) produced the drama. The 
acting, the lack of dubbing which is still somewhat unusual in Cambodia, and the cinematography are 
consistent with ―Taste of Life‖ a BBC WST produced television drama ―set in a Cambodian nursing college 
and the affiliated hospital … part of a three-year multi-format media project addressing issues related to 
HIV/AIDS, sexual and reproductive health, and maternal and child health. The drama, which is fully 
researched, scripted, acted and produced by a Khmer team, employs a range of dramatic devices to 
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2006 on BBC Two, and rebroadcast on Australia‖s Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) Television, 
watched by more than seven million Australians each week.
58
 It was likely made with the consent 
or help of the World Health Organization, which plays an important role in the storyline. Over an 
increasingly rapid piano score, a narrator with a British accent begins: ―Scientists are worried that 
the H5N1 virus will soon acquire the ability to infect larger groups of people. They‖re confident 
that when it does, it will do so somewhere in Southeast Asia.‖ The camera then pans to Phnom 
Penh‖s unmistakable urban landscape and the words ―Phnom Penh, Cambodia‖ and ―next week‖ 
appear on the screen.
59
  
 
The narrator continues: ―24-year-old laborer Eav Chhun could be anyone of millions of migrant 
workers scattered across the region. He is making a long journey home to visit his family in the 
north of the country. Although he doesn‖t know it yet, Eav Chhun is about to become a vital part 
of H5N1‖s next step on the road to world domination… It will be the last time that Chhun makes 
the journey north.‖ It features not just actors, but Dr. Gregory Poland of the Mayo Vaccine 
Research Group, who explains how ―Right now this H5N1 virus is causing a pandemic in birds but 
very little disease in humans … but the reason it hasn‖t been millions of people is because this H 
protein right now cannot attach very easily to human cells and cannot spread from one human 
to another‖ adding ―the best scientific estimate is that one or two mutations will be enough to 
allow this virus to attach easily to human cells, and thereby spread from one human to another.‖ 
 
The drama later shows a Caucasian female doctor, also with a British accent, running a health 
clinic in the Cambodian countryside,
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 alarmed when she hears from one of her patients of the 
spread of influenza-like symptoms in a small village. A concerned bureaucrat at the World Health 
Organization‖s office in Phnom Penh jots down notes and prepares to leave for the village in a 
convoy of shiny Toyota Land Cruisers filled with personal protective equipment.  
 
Meanwhile Eav Chhun, who has already contracted H5N1, literally crosses paths with the convoy 
at high speed unbeknown to himself or the WHO. Chhun returns to Phnom Penh whereupon he 
spreads the disease to unknown thousands.
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 A satellite image of Phnom Penh, then Southeast 
                                                                                                                                                 
deliver health information to its audience in Cambodia.‖ (http://www.comminit.com/es/node/214600). 
According to the show‖s website: ―In Cambodia we are funded by the UK Government's Department for 
International Development to run a three year campaign on HIV and Maternal and Child Health … Taste of 
Life is a TV drama series of 100 half-hour episodes. We have started shooting from April 2004 and went on 
air in December 2004.” (http://www.tasteoflifecambodia.com/abouteng.asp) 
57
 One is on a young Cambodian man, the second is about a British businessman, and the last scenario is 
on a young British girl. One reaction to the video from ―jnnycliff‖ dated 6 months ago: ―What the hell. This is 
not true at all. They don't even know where the bird flue came from and where it start first. Why have to be 
in Cambodia? Well, just be sure this is the true story, and I will research about it.‖ A reply to that comment 
by ―12connor213‖ (3 months ago): ―The WHO is making an educated guess it will start in SE asia cause thats 
where the H5N1 virus has been located in birds the most.‖ 
58
 The video (split into two parts) has also been posted on YouTube and has been watched 2,831 times as 
of 22 August 2008: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YeL3pM8L8DA  
59
 It is not known if the RGC cooperated, allowed, or had any idea that the drama would frame Cambodia‖s 
image in this manner. The video are uploaded to YouTube stripped it of the credits at the end. 
60
 ―starwriter‖ (4 months ago) writes: ―notice the "whites" have to figure it out and rescue 
everyone...hhmmm??‖ 
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 ―Sulyaman‖ (1 year ago) comments: ―This is exactly what i mean...That guy should have been shot and 
sprayed with chemicals, but no, they just let him walk by coughing-this is what i mean by humans can get 
lazy. He is one of the best examples of what i mean of a bastard who has to spread it and then it spreads on 
and on, that will kill us. Its people just like him. Shame on the cambodian officials for letting this happen. IF 
someone coughs and sweats etc. in a country that has the birdflu you'd be a moron to go close to them.‖ 
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Asia, and finally the West Coast of the United States fills-up in a cloud of red as the virus spreads. 
Scenes from fictitious newscasts around the world show the virus‖ deadly global impact. The 
narrator warns: ―Within eight weeks of Eav Chhun‖s fateful journey, pandemic flu has spread from 
a tiny village in a remote part of Southeast Asia to much of the planet… Every nation is 
affected.‖62 He concludes: ―The virus is no respecter of wealth, religion, or location. As the 
infection relentlessly overcomes any government efforts to keep it out, nations around the 
world start to mourn their first dead.‖ The docu-drama closes with a framed portrait of Eav 
Chhun, now deceased, on a small stand in a darkened room. His mother holds incense in clasped 
hands, praying for his soul. 
 
While the reach of newspaper-based media is slowly eroding, the power of television-based 
media has grown. The show Pandemic succeeds where news print has failed, but the risks of 
portraying Cambodia as the originator of victim zero in the next pandemic risks making 
Cambodians victim zero in the international hunt against HPAI H5N1. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has investigated the politics of policy processes surrounding the response to HPAI in 
Cambodia, identifying key actors, networks, associated narratives, and practices of policy. It has 
questioned the assumptions being made and explored different framings in the debate, 
including those often not heard in mainstream policy circles.  
 
Section 2 provided a background to Cambodian politics and modern history, set the context of 
aid dependence and tourism, the livestock sector and poultry in particular. It raised the spectre 
of SARS as a wake-up call for HPAI H5N1 turning into a pandemic, with Cambodia as its most 
vulnerable target and potential originator of victim zero. Cambodia‖s HPAI control activities 
shifted from animal to human health, and finally evolved into innovations such as ―Super Moan‖, 
transforming into pandemic preparedness and creative uses of bans on livestock import—under 
the pretext of boundary disease control—to benefit domestic pig producers. The timeline of key 
moments from start, middle, to end, was examined further in Section 3 for three policy 
narratives: first, culling without compensation, second the shift to health, and third the looming 
question of what‖s poverty and livelihoods got to do with it? This is then followed by actors, 
networks, and interests mapping, offering a glimpse of how effective Government and donors 
were in intervening against AI across animal, human, livelihoods, pandemic preparation, or some 
other dimension of the respondent‖s choosing. It makes use of the results of an elite survey 
undertaken in May-June 2008 and sent to 300 individuals involved in AI in Cambodia. Section 4 
honed-in on key themes defining policy of particular interest arising from the previous sections. 
Three narratives—by no means exclusive—were detailed: (a) Donors and NGOs; (b) Beyond Aid: 
Other Sources of Revenue and the Importance of Tourism; and (c) Media Spin. 
 
The overall analysis of the political economy of Avian Influenza in Cambodia reveals key 
challenges, obstacles and opportunities for responding to Avian Influenza—and potentially 
other global epidemics. For example, one of the reasons given for non-compensation revealed 
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 In what can only be considered art mimicking life, in late February 2005, the director of the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Julie Gerberding said ―A problem in a remote part of the world 
becomes a world problem overnight‖ (as quoted in Walsh 2005). 
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the tremendous amount of confusion there was about its effectiveness. How effective is 
compensation when used elsewhere, and more importantly, in countries neighbouring 
Cambodia? What we have learned about the bureaucratic politics of the country in light of Avian 
Influenza has been the need to increase the credibility of MAFF as a partner by building its 
technical capacity and financial management.
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 In some ways, MoH‖s ―success‖ has been path-
dependent. History determines the future in this sense because money has been directed at 
MoH and so good financial management begets more money. At the same time, the issue of 
livelihoods mainstreaming for AI policy was laid bare. Protecting livelihoods should not be 
assumed, but made explicit in the form of ―pro-poor HPAI risk reduction‖. Because 90 per cent of 
poultry is raised in backyard-villages, almost anything achieved with poultry (or livestock) can be 
considered pro-poor, but this, regrettably, is not necessarily enough to reduce HPAI risks in 
animals and humans, and thus not of particular interest do donors. 
 
HPAI H5N1 revealed that donors too are motivated by concerns other than protecting 
livelihoods, just as traditional aid activities are often dominated by the need to tie aid to donor 
countries, HPAI H5N1 activities have been overtly focused on detecting and preventing 
pandemic as a threat to the donor countries themselves. Indeed, complacency and lack of 
foresight both by donors and the authorities is evidenced by their myopic views on using 
grassroots approaches only for AI, but not for other diseases (such as Newcastle, fowl-pox, and 
cholera) that occur more frequently. However, ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of 
policies in Cambodia must rest with those in charge—the authorities themselves—and the lack 
of good governance and political will speaks for itself in the pervasive institutional failures that 
have plagued the Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Cambodia. These failures are by no 
means limited to AI alone, but exhibited themselves richly in the narratives explored. When 
actions speak louder than words, and authorities have been unable or unwilling to commit State 
resources, although they eagerly welcome donors‖ funds to keep AI and Pandemic Preparedness 
programs going into the near future.  
 
Finally, whether rightly or wrongly, Cambodians, and their government, perceive the risks posed 
by HPAI to be low. Except for a human case in December 2008, there had not been a single 
outbreak in either animals or humans since April 2007 (granted, this could be due in part 
because of pressure imposed by the July 2008 elections and the outcry by villagers whose birds 
would have to be culled). Cambodia‖s epidemic waves were mild and the numbers of human 
cases were few compared to neighbouring countries. In contrast, donors have committed $35 
million to Cambodia, placing it seventh among top 10 recipients of AI funding, fourth in terms of 
per case and per death from H5N1, and second in terms of per capita and per outbreak funding. 
 
The political economy of AI is complicated and nuanced. As with any changes, there are winners 
and losers. Machiavelli long ago posited: ―There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more 
doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the 
reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all 
                                                 
63
 Underscoring the weakness in Cambodia‖s statistical knowledgebase, participants of a Workshop on 
Avian Influenza Research Activities in Cambodia that took place 8-9 October 2008 in Sihanoukville 
underscored ―(i) the urgent need for a livestock / agricultural census to obtain current figures on livestock 
numbers and production in Cambodia; (ii) the lack of information authorities have on cross-border 
movements of poultry and poultry products and how these could be estimated through indirect 
assessments; and (iii) the need to ―benchmark‖ the sensitivity of the current surveillance activities and to 
test the surveillance and response system by conducting simulation exercises.‖ (Otte 2008) 
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those who would profit by the new order.‖64 As has been seen throughout Cambodia‖s 
experience, reforms can be influenced internally and externally, but only up to a point, and the 
process of domestic policymaking is filled with strengths as well as weaknesses. Much more 
needs to be done to improve institutions and their governance.  
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 Machiavelli (1996 translated by Sonnino: 49). 
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
Table 1.1: Informant List 
 
Note: The below titles have been generalised to prevent identification of informants. For 
example, several informants were heads of trade associations, which would make their identities 
obvious. Also, government officials do not have their ministries listed for the same reason. The 
number in parenthesis following that informant‖s title descriptor throughout the text now 
appears to the left of the below list and is randomly assigned. 
 
Informant 
1. Veterinarian and Consultant 
2. Veterinarian 
3. Economist 
4. IO Senior Officer 
5. AI Expert (E-mail) 
6. AI Expert 
7. IO Veterinarian 
8. Vice President, agribusiness 
9. IO Officers 
10. Livestock Expert 
11. AI Expert 
12. AI Expert 
13. AI Expert 
14. AI Expert 
15. NGO Doctor 
16. Donor Staff 
17. Donor Staff 
18. NGO and IO doctor 
19. IO Staff 
20. Wet Market Seller 
21. Embassy Staff 
22. Health Expert 
23. Education Expert 
24. AI Expert 
25. Health Expert 
26. Donor Management 
Informant 
27. Embassy Staff 
28. AI Expert 
29. NGO Management 
30. Livestock Expert 
31. Donor Staff 
32. Donor Staff and Doctor 
33. Government Official 
34. Provincial Vet 
35. Senior Government Official 
36. Livestock Expert 
37. NGO Staff 
38. AI Expert 
39. AI Expert 
40. Farmer 
41. Government Official 
42. NGO Representative 
43. NGO Representative 
44. Travel Agency Owner 
45. Member of Parliament 
46. Sister of Member of Parliament 
47. Entrepreneur and former Secretary 
of State 
48. Civil servant employee 
49. Adviser 
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Table 1.2: Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 
to 31 July 2003 (Based on data as of the 31 December 2003.) 
 
   
Cumulative number of 
cases  
                     
Areas  Female  Male  Total  
Median 
age 
(range)  
Number 
of 
deaths
a 
 
Case 
fatality 
ratio 
(%)  
Number of 
imported 
cases (%)  
Number 
of HCW 
affected 
(%)  
Date 
onset first 
probable 
case  
Date 
onset last 
probable 
case  
Australia  4  2  6  15 (1-45)  0    0    6 (100)  0 (0)  26-Feb-03  1-Apr-03  
Canada  151  100  251  49 (1-98)  43  17  5 (2)  109 (43)  23-Feb-03  12-Jun-03  
China  2674  2607  5327
b 
 
Not 
available  
349  7  
Not 
Applicable  
1002 (19)  16-Nov-02  3-Jun-03  
China, Hong 
Kong Special 
Administrative 
Region  
977  778  1755  
40 (0-
100)  
299  17  
Not 
Applicable  
386 (22)  15-Feb-03  31-May-03  
China, Macao 
Special 
Administrative 
Region  
0    1  1  28  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  5-May-03  5-May-03  
China, Taiwan  218  128  346
c 
 42 (0-93)  37  11  21 (6)  68 (20)  25-Feb-03  15-Jun-03  
France  1  6  7  
49 (26 - 
61)  
1  14  7 (100)  2 (29)
d 
 21-Mar-03  3-May-03  
Germany  4  5  9  44 (4-73)  0    0    9 (100)  1 (11)  9-Mar-03  6-May-03  
India  0    3  3  
25 (25-
30)  
0    0    3 (100)  0 (0)  25-Apr-03  6-May-03  
Indonesia  0    2  2  
56 (47-
65)  
0    0    2 (100)  0 (0)  6-Apr-03  17-Apr-03  
Italy  1  3  4  
30.5 (25-
54)  
0    0    4 (100)  0 (0)  12-Mar-03  20-Apr-03  
Kuwait  1  0    1  50  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  9-Apr-03  9-Apr-03  
Malaysia  1  4  5  
30 (26-
84)  
2  40  5 (100)  0 (0)  14-Mar-03  22-Apr-03  
Mongolia  8  1  9  
32 (17-
63)  
0    0    8 (89)  0 (0)  31-Mar-03  6-May-03  
New Zealand  1  0    1  67  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  20-Apr-03  20-Apr-03  
Philippines  8  6  14  
41 (29-
73)  
2  14  7 (50)  4 (29)  25-Feb-03  5-May-03  
Republic of 
Ireland  
0    1  1  56  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  27-Feb-03  27-Feb-03  
Republic of 
Korea  
0    3  3  
40 (20-
80)  
0    0    3 (100)  0 (0)  25-Apr-03  10-May-03  
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Romania  0    1  1  52  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  19-Mar-03  19-Mar-03  
Russian 
Federation  
0    1  1  25  0    0    
Not 
Available  
0 (0)  5-May-03  5-May-03  
Singapore  161  77  238  35 (1-90)  33  14  8 (3)  97 (41)  25-Feb-03  5-May-03  
South Africa  0    1  1  62  1  100  1 (100)  0 (0)  3-Apr-03  3-Apr-03  
Spain  0    1  1  33  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  26-Mar-03  26-Mar-03  
Sweden  3  2  5  
43 (33-
55)  
0    0    5 (100)  0 (0)  28-Mar-03  23-Apr-03  
Switzerland  0    1  1  35  0    0    1 (100)  0 (0)  9-Mar-03  9-Mar-03  
Thailand  5  4  9  42 (2-79)  2  22  9 (100)  1 (11)
d 
 11-Mar-03  27-May-03  
United Kingdom  2  2  4  
59 (28-
74)  
0    0    4 (100)  0 (0)  1-Mar-03  1-Apr-03  
United States  13  14  27  36 (0-83)  0    0    27 (100)  0 (0)  24-Feb-03  13-Jul-03
e 
 
Viet Nam  39  24  63  
43 (20-
76)  
5  8  1 (2)  36 (57)  23-Feb-03  14-Apr-03  
                     
Total        8096     774  9.6  142  1706        
 
a. Includes only cases whose death is attributed to SARS.  
b. Case classification by sex is unknown for 46 cases.  
c. Since 11 July 2003, 325 cases have been discarded in Taiwan, China  Laboratory information 
was insufficient or incomplete for 135 discarded cases, of which 101 died.  
d. Includes HCWs who acquired illness in other areas.  
e. Due to differences in case definitions, the United States has reported probable cases of SARS 
with onsets of illness after 5 July 2003.  
 
Source: WHO (2004) 
 
II. Timeline—Moments 
 
Stylized Timeline of Avian Influenza in Cambodia January 2004-March 2008 
 
01/13/04:  The Cambodian government temporarily bans the import of birds and poultry 
eggs from neighbouring Thailand and Vietnam (Xinhua 2004) 
 
01/23/04:  Cambodia detects its first outbreak of avian flu on a farm outside Phnom Penh. 
At least 3,000 chickens were reported to have died in at least three farms near 
Phnom Penh (AFP 2004)  
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01/26/04: 10,000 chickens are culled from the farm outside Phnom Penh where Cambodia 
had its first avian influenza outbreak (Japan Economic Newswire (JEN) 2004b) 
 
01/28/04: Asian governments, the U.S., E.U and international organizations agree to create 
an Asia-wide avian influenza veterinary surveillance network (JEN 2004a)  
 
01/30/05: A 25 year-old woman from Kampot province infected with avian influenza dies in 
neighbouring Vietnam. The woman, whose brother died of similar respiratory 
problems weeks before but was not tested, sought medical help in neighbouring 
Vietnam on January 27. She is Cambodia‖s first confirmed human case. 
 
02/10/05: Cambodia bans the import of live birds and poultry eggs from neighbouring 
Vietnam and Thailand (JEN 2005a)  
 
03/22/05: A 28 year-old man from Kampot province dies at a Phnom Penh hospital of avian 
influenza. The man developed symptoms on March 17 and was hospitalized in 
Phnom Penh on March 21. Health authorities confirm that the deceased man 
had contact with sick chicken in the area. This is Cambodia‖s second confirmed 
case (Associated Press 2005)  
 
03/31/05: The Japanese government donates 30 motorbikes and $50,226 in cash to assist 
Cambodia with its emergency avian flu projects (JEN 2005c)  
 
04/07/05:  An 8 year-old girl from Kampot province dies of Avian Influenza. The girl fell ill 
after having contact with sick poultry. She is Cambodia‖s third confirmed case 
JEN (2005d)  
 
04/19/05:  A 20 year-old woman from Kampot province dies of Avian Influenza. The woman 
was from the same district as Cambodia‖s first confirmed case. The woman, a 
secondary school student, sold chickens part-time (JEN 2005b)  
 
09/14/05: Launching of the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza. 
The Partnership aims to increase global awareness and preparation of avian 
influenza by bringing together key nations and international organisations 
(Department of State 2005c; Department of State 2005a)  
 
10/11/05: During his five-nation tour of Southeast Asia, Health and Human Services 
Secretary Michael Leavitt signs an agreement with Cambodia pledging $1.85 
million in assistance for avian influenza surveillance and capacity building in 
Cambodia (Department of State 2005b) 
 
01/17-18/06: China, the European Commission and the World Bank co-sponsor an avian 
influenza international donor conference in Beijing. More than 100 countries 
attend and $1.9 billion, including $1 billion in grants, is pledged, half of which will 
go to Asia (Japan Times 2006; World Bank 2006c) 
 
03/21/06:  A 3 year-old girl from Kampong Speu province died of avian influenza. The child 
fell ill on March 14 and was hospitalized on March 20
th
 in Phnom Penh. The child 
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was known to play with chicken and the ill residents had contact with sick birds 
or with caring for the child. This is Cambodia‖s fifth confirmed case (JEN 2006a) 
 
05/23/06:  Cambodia confirms its first outbreak of avian flu in poultry since December 
2004.  
 
03/28/06: Prime Minister Hun Sen asks Cambodian media to increase reports on bird flu to 
raise local awareness. Speaking at an inauguration of a technical medical school 
in Phnom Penh, the Prime Minister stated ―I would like to appeal to all media to 
launch a campaign of public awareness on bird flu.‖ (JEN 2006b)  
 
04/05/06:  A 12 year-old boy from Prey Veng province dies of Avian Influenza. The boy 
developed symptoms on March 29
th
 and was hospitalized at Calmette Hospital 
in Phnom Penh on April 4
th
. He dies the next day. A joint team from the Ministry 
of Health, WHO, and Pasteur Institute in Cambodia confirm that numerous 
chicken and ducks in the area died within several weeks of the boy‖s death. The 
boy gathered dead chickens for his village (USFN 2006)  
 
11/4-6/06: ‘Super Moan‖ a ―broad-breasted rooster with a familiar red cape and strong 
opinions about healthy behaviours‖ is introduced by the Academy for 
Educational Development at the National Water Festival in Phnom Penh. 
 
11/07/06: BBC Two broadcasts a scenario in which ―Eav Chhun‖, a fictional character who is 
a labourer, travels upcountry, picks-up H5N1 or a mutation thereof, and 
Cambodia is ground zero for the next global pandemic (BBC 2006) 
 
04/06/07:  Cambodian Ministry of Health announces that a 13 year-old girl from Ponhea 
Kreak district in Kampong Cham province dies of avian influenza. The girl 
developed symptoms on April 2
nd
 and was hospitalized on April 3
rd
. The girl is 
reported to have consumed a dead chicken before developing symptoms. This 
is the first confirmed case in Cambodia in 2007 and the last confirmed case as of 
date (JEN 2007)  
 
07/13/07: The Food and Agriculture Organization holds a series of three training courses in 
Phnom Penh to train Village Animal Health Workers from 24 provinces in 
Cambodia on surveillance of bird flu and outbreak response (Xinhua 2007b). A 
total of 4,703 out of 13,413 VAHWs are eventually trained through July 2007 
(Cereno 2008: 11) 
 
08/01/07: Australia announces it will provide up to $6 million for community awareness 
and surveillance projects in mainland Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, to 
combat avian influenza (Bernama 2007)  
 
09/27/07: MEDiCAM, with the support of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), organises a community forum in Mondulkiri near the 
border of Vietnam to educate rural and remote communities about avian 
influenza. The forum, the first of a series, is meant to provide avian influenza 
education to isolated communities with limited or zero access to television and 
radio (Xinhua 2007a)  
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09/27/07:  Cambodia and the U.S. government sign a bilateral agreement whereas the U.S., 
through USAID, will provide the Cambodian government with $5 million to 
combat avian influenza over the course of the following year (USFN 2007)  
 
10/17/07: The FAO announces that the U.S., via USAID, will contribute $38 million for FAO‖s 
global avian influenza control and prevention program, bringing the total U.S. 
contribution to the organisation‖s Avian influenza program to $63 million. $1.9 
million from the new grant is earmarked for Cambodia to support the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries to combat avian influenza in domestic 
poultry and waterfowl for the next two years. The money will be used primarily to 
augment the country‖s surveillance efforts (FAO 2007a)  
 
02/15/08 As of this date, Cereno (2008: 12) reports that 5,405 VAHWs and 578 Village 
Chiefs have been trained: ―Following informal communication between FAO and 
DAHP, it was agreed to train 8000 VAHWs. Therefore, as of now, 66 per cent of 
VAHWs and 4 per cent (570 out of 13,794) of VCs are trained.‖ 
 
03/27/08: World Bank Group approves a $6 million grant to support Cambodia‖s national 
avian influenza plan. The grant will finance the Avian and Human Influenza 
Control and Preparedness Emergency Project (AHICPEP), which was designed to 
support the country‖s Comprehensive Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) National 
Plan. In addition to this grant, Japan and the AHI facility, a multi-donor 
organisation consisting of the European Commission and eight other nations, 
provided $3 million and $2 million respectively (World Bank 2008a) The project 
aims to support the implementation of the Cambodia Comprehensive AHI 
National Plan, contributing to minimize the threat posed to humans and the 
poultry sector by an AHI infection in Cambodia, and to prepare for, control and 
respond (if necessary) to a human influenza pandemic. 
 
Table 1.3: Main Recipients by Rank (as of 10 September 2008) 
 
Country Commit
ments, 
US$ 
millions 
Rank  Pop*, 
millions 
Commit
ments 
per 
capita, $ 
Rank Poultry 
Outbreaks**  
Commitm
ents per 
outbreak, 
$ 
Rank 
Indonesia 128 1 226 0.57 6 261 490,421 5 
Vietnam 115 2 85 1.35 4 2,499 46,018 9 
Nigeria 58 3 148 0.39 7 65 892,308 3 
Turkey 46 4 74 0.62 5 219 210,046 7 
Romania 41 5 22 1.90 3 163 251,534 6 
India 37 6 1,123 0.03 8 50 740,000 4 
Cambodia 35 7 14 2.42 2 20 1,750,000 2 
Lao PDR 28 8 6 4.78 1 12 2,333,333 1 
Banglades
h 
25 9 
159 
0.16 10 
286 87,413 8 
Egypt 20 10 75 0.27 9 1,084 18,450 10 
 
Country Human 
Cases*** 
Commitments 
per human case, 
Rank Human 
Deaths*** 
Commitments 
per human 
Rank 
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$ death, $ 
Indonesia 137 934,307 7 122 1,049,180 6 
Vietnam 106 1,084,906 6 52 2,211,538 5 
Nigeria 1 58,000,000 1 1 58,000,000 1 
Turkey 12 3,833,333 5 4 11,500,000 3 
Romania 0 N/A 9 0 N/A 8 
India 0 N/A 10 0 N/A 9 
Cambodia 7 5,000,000 4 7 5,000,000 4 
Lao PDR 2 14,000,000 3 2 14,000,000 2 
Bangladesh 1 25,000,000 2 0 N/A 10 
Egypt 50 400,000 8 22 909,091 7 
 
Notes: Commitments from Jonas (2008: 13) 
* Population data from World Development Indicators Online 
** Outbreaks of Avian Influenza (subtype H5N1) in poultry from the end of 2003 to 15 October 
2008 as reported to OIE (2008) 
*** Cumulative number of confirmed human of and deaths from Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) as of 
10 September 2008 as reported to WHO (2008) 
N/A where denominator is zero, ranking based on nominator (commitments) 
 
Source: Author‖s calculations and rankings based on above sources. 
 
Table 1.4: NGOs and INGOs Involved in AI Control Activities As Shown in MEDiCAM’s 
Database 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations with 
activities in AI: 
1. 3SPN-Sesan Srepok, and Sekong 
Rivers Protection Network  
2. AARR-Alliance Association For Rural 
Restoration  
3. ABI-Association for Business 
Initiative  
4. ABiC-Agri Business Institute 
Cambodia  
5. ACWND-Amara Cambodia women`s 
Network for Development  
6. ADA-Agricultural Development 
Action  
7. ADHOC-Association For 
Development and Human Rights of 
Cambodia  
8. ADOVIR-Association for 
Development and Over Villager's 
Right  
9. AFEC-Association Avenir des 
Femmes et des Enfants du 
Cambodge  
10. AFH-Action For Health AFS 
AHI-Asian Health Institute AK 
AK-Anakot Kumar  
11. AOC-Asian Outreach Cambodia  
12. AS-Aphivat Strey  
13. ASPFD-Association Saving Poor 
Family For Development  
14. BD-Buddhism and Democracy  
15. BDASE-Buddhist Development 
Association and Supporting 
Environment  
16. BFD-Buddhism For Development  
17. BK-Bandos Komar  
18. BPS-Buddhism for a Progressive 
Society  
19. BSA-Buddhism Study Association 
BTB  
20. BWAP-Battambang Women AIDS 
project  
21. CAAFW-Cambodian Organisation for 
Assistance to Families and Widows  
22. CAMA Services  
23. CAMT-Community Assistant Mobile 
Team 
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24. CARDH-Cambodian Association for 
Rural Development and Health 
25. CASF-Cambodia art and Scholarship 
Foundation 
26. CATA-Cambodia Anti-Tuberculosis 
Association 
27. CBCDO-Cambodia Border 
Community Development 
Organization 
28. CC Home-Cambodia Children's 
Home 
29. CCC-Cooperation Committee For 
Cambodia 
30. CCFC-Christian Care for Cambodia 
31. CCI-Cambodia Corps. Inc. 
32. CCMHS-Cambodian Community 
Mental Health Services  
33. CCN-Community Cooperation 
Network 
34. CDA-Children Development 
Association 
35. CDFC-Communication 
Development for Children 
36. CDK-Christ for Development 
Kampuchea 
37. CDP-Cambodian Defenders Project 
38. CDP-Commune Development Plan 
39. CED-Commune Economic 
Development 
40. CEPA-Community Environment 
protection and Culture 
41. CFDS-Cambodia Family 
Development Services 
42. CFEDA-Cambodian Family 
Economic Development 
Association 
43. CFI-Community Forestry 
International 
44. CGA-Cambodian Global Action 
45. CHC-Cambodian Health Committee 
46. CHEC-Cambodian HIV/AIDS 
Education and Care 
47. CHED-Cambodian Health Education 
Development 
48. CHHRA-Cambodian Health and 
Human Rights Alliance 
49. CHRD-Cambodian Human Resource 
Development 
50. CIC-Community Information Center 
51. CIDO-Community-base Integrated 
Development Organization 
52. CMSSO-Cambodian Medical 
Services Support Organization 
53. CNGON-Cambodian NGO Network 
54. CODAC-Co-operative Development 
Agriculture Organization of 
Cambodia 
55. COHD-Cambodia Organization for 
Human and Development Concern 
56. CORE-Community Operation For 
Ribase Right Base Empowerment 
57. CPC-Cambodia Population 
Community 
58. CSCS-Cooperation for a Sustainable 
Cambodian Society 
59. CSDA-Cambodia Social Economic 
Development and Democracy 
Association 
60. CSID-Community Support improve 
Development 
61. CTR-CHET THOR 
62. CVD-Cambodian Vision in 
Development 
63. CWARS-CWARS 
64. CWPD-Cambodian Women for 
Peace and Development 
65. CYK-Caring For Young Khmer 
66. DDSP-Disability Development 
Services Pursat 
67. DEEP-Developpement & Education 
pour L'Eau Potable 
68. DFP-Development Family Program 
69. DOPD-Development Organization 
For Priority Domine 
70. DPA-Development and Partnership 
in Action 
71. DPKS-Development Program 
Khmer Student 
72. DSF-Douleurs Sans Frontieres 
73. DYMB-Dhammayietra Mongkol 
Borei 
74. EDCO-Economic Development 
Community Organization 
75. EPDO-Environmental Protection 
Development Organization 
76. ESTHER-Ensemble pour une 
solidarité Thérapeutique 
Hodpitalice en R'seau 
83 
 
77. FCOP-Four Square Children of 
Promis 
78. FLD-Farmer Leading Development 
79. HACC-HIV/AIDS Coordinating 
Committee 
80. HAD-Hope Association for 
Development 
81. Hi-Free-The Human Inborn 
Freedom 
82. HOSCD-Health Care Organization 
for Social and Community 
Development 
83. HRVC-Human Right Vigilance of 
Cambodia 
84. HU-Health Unlimited 
85. HURREDO-Human Resource and 
Rural Economic Development 
Organization 
86. ICC-International Cooperation 
Cambodia 
87. IDE-International Development 
Enterprise 
88. ILDO-Islamic local Development 
organization 
89. IRD-International Relief and 
Development 
90. IRIS-International Resource for the 
Improvement of Sight 
91. KAFDOC-KAFDOC 
92. KAWP-Kroum Aphiwatt Phume 
93. KFD-Khmer Farmer Development 
94. KHANA-Khmer HIV/AIDS NGO 
Alliance 
95. KHEN-Kien Kos Health Education 
Network 
96. KMR-Komar Rikreay Association 
97. KNCED-Khmer National Community 
Economic Development 
98. KNT-Kunathor Organization 
99. KNTO-Kumnith Thmey 
Organization 
KRDA-Khmer Rural Development 
Association 
100. LHA-The Life of Hope 
Association 
101. MC-MEDI CORPS 
102. MED-Mekong Eye Doctors 
103. MI-Malteser Internnational 
104. MPK-Meahto Phum Komah  
105. NH-New Humanity 
106. NOMAD-Nomad Researcher 
et Soutien International 
107. NTFP-Non-timber Forest 
Products Project 
108. NYEMO-Nyemo Cambodia 
NGO 
109. Ockenden Cambodia  
110. OEC-Operation Enfant du 
Cambodge 
111. PATH-Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health 
112. PK-Ponleur Komar 
113. PKO-Puthi Komar 
Organization 
114. PPS-Phare Ponleu Selpak 
115. PTD-Street Families Center 
"Pieateuk Dong" 
116. PVT-Prom Vihear Thor 
117. RACHA-Reproductive and 
Child Health Alliance 
118. RAHDO-Rural Animal Health 
Development Organization  
119. RCEDO-Rural Community 
and Environment Development 
Organisation 
120. RCEDO-Rural Community 
and Environment Development 
organization 
121. RDA-Rural Development 
Association 
122. RDCNRM-Ratanakiri 
Development and community 
Based Natural Resource 
Management 
123. RDPC-Rural Development 
Program of Cambodia 
124. READA-Rural Economic and 
Agriculture Development Agency 
125. RFCD-Rural Friend 
Community of Development  
126. RHB-Radana Handicrafts 
Battambang 
127. RNSP-Ratanakiri Network 
Support Project (a project at 
community Forestry International 
RWC-RainWater Cambodia  
128. Saboras 
129. SARF-Support Association 
For Rural Farmers. 
130. SC-Sustainable Cambodia 
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131. SCC-Salvation Centre 
Cambodia 
132. SCC-SR-Salvation Centre 
Cambodia - Siem Reap 
133. SDR-Social Development in 
Rural 
134. SEADO-Social Development 
Environment and Agriculture 
135. SEVA-Seva-Foundation 
Cambodia 
136. SHARE Cambodia-Service 
For the Health in Asian and African 
Regions – Cambodia 
137. SHCH-Sihanouk Hospital 
Center of Hope 
138. SKO-Sprouting Knowledge 
Orphan 
139. SKT-Samakithor 
140. SOS-Spirit Of Soccer 
141. SUMH-Supporters for 
Mental Health 
142. SVA-Shanti Volunteer 
Association 
143. SWDC-Stung Treng 
Women's Development Center 
144. TCF-Trauma Care 
Foundation Cambodia 
145. TDSP-Toek Dey Sovann 
Phuom Teuk Saat-Teuk Saat 
146. TNL-C-The New Life 
Cambodia 
147. TTA-Tean Thor Association 
148. VAPSD-Vocational Training 
for Alleviation of Poverty and Social 
Development 
149. VKP-Virakpheap Komar 
150. VODP-Volunteer 
Organization for Development of 
the Poor 
151. VPS-Vulnerable People 
Support  
152. VSG-Village Support Group  
153. VTH-Vulnerable Teenager 
for Help 
154. WACD-Women Association 
Community Development 
155. WCRD-Women Children 
Right Development 
156. WODAC-Women in 
Development And Community 
157. WOMEN-Women 
Organization Modern Economic and 
Sanitation 
158. WP-Watanac Pheap 
159. WYA-Women Youth And 
Action 
160. YCC-Youth Council 
Cambodia 
161. YWAM-Youth with A Mission 
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Table 1.5: Avian Influenza and Pandemic Preparedness Funding Matrix Cambodia 2008-2009 * 
 Animal health Human health Information, education, 
communication (IEC) ** 
Pandemic preparedness   
Implementing 
Partner/ 
Ministry 
Resources 
required 
Resources 
secured 
Finance 
gap 
Resources 
required 
Resources 
secured 
Finance 
gap 
Resources 
required 
Resources 
secured 
Finance 
gap 
Resources 
required 
Resources 
secured 
Finance 
gap 
Resources 
total 
Donor source(s) 
and timeframe 
ADPC 
Asia Disaster 
Preparedness 
Center 
      560 000 560 000 0    560 000 ADB Nov 07-Aug 
08 
AED 
Academy for 
Education 
and 
Development 
      1 575 000 1 575 000 0    1 575 000 USAID Sept 07-
Oct 08 
CARE 
CARE 
International 
Cambodia 
      776 200 776 200 0    776 200 AusAid Mar 07-
Jun 08 ($391 200) 
US-CDC Sep 07-
Sep 08 ($385 
000) 
CRC 
Cambodia Red 
Cross 
      419 876 419 876 0    419 876 IFRC+Finland RC 
Apr 07-Mar 08 Apr 
08-Mar 10 being 
negotiated 
FAO 
Food and 
Agriculture 
Organisation 
4 565 000 3 120 000 1 445 000          3 120 000 Germany Nov 07-
Mar 09 ($1 220 
000) 
USAID Oct 07-Sep 
08 ($1 900 000) 
MAFF*** 
Ministry for 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries 
5 800 000 5 800 000 0          5 800 000 WB Jul 08-Jul 11 
(TBC) 
MEDiCAM 
Organisation for 
health 
related NGO's 
              
MoH*** 
Ministry of 
Health 
   2 343 000 2 343 000 0       2 343 000 WB Jul 08-Jul 11 
($2 043 000) TBC 
US-CDC 07-08 
($300 000) 
NCDM*** 
National 
Committee for 
Disaster 
Management 
         1 700 000 1 700 000 0 1 700 000 WB Jul 08-Jul 11 
(TBC) 
Pasteur Institute    600 000 600 000 0       600 000 US-CDC 07-08 
($300 000) 
USCDC 
08-10 ($300 000) 
RHAC 
Reprod. Health 
Association 
Cambodia 
   265 000 265 000 0       265 000 USAID 08-09 
UNICEF 
United Nations 
Children's Fund 
      1 700 000 1 700 000 0    1 700 000 AusAid Apr 07-
Mar 08 ($1 200 
000) 
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Japan Apr 07-Mar 
08 ($500 000) 
US NAMRU 
US Naval 
Medical 
Research Unit 
   230 000 230 000 0       230 000 US-CDC 07-08 
WHO World 
Health 
Organisation 
   3 282 812 2 760 512 522 300    794 000 377 861 416139 3 138 373 Japan Jan 08-Dec 
08 ($665 000) 
USCDC 
Oct 07-Sep 08 
($764 472) 
AusAid May 07-
Apr 08 ($230 427) 
CIDA Oct 07-Sep 
08 ($21 474) 
WB Jul 08-Jul 11 
($1 457 000) TBC 
WCS Wildlife 
Conservative 
Society 
24 457 24 457 0          24 457 USAID 07-08 
Total 10 389 457 8 944 457 1 445 000 6 720 812 6 198 512 522 300 5 031 076 5 031 076 0 2 494 000 2 077 861 416139 22 251 906  
* Resources include ongoing programmes that started in 2006-2007. Resource does not include inkind contributions 
** Includes cross-sectoral research and cross-sectoral community based approaches 
***Parts of these funds will be implemented directly by UN agencies but agreements are not finalized
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ANNEX 2  
 
Table 2.1:  Content Analysis of Nearly 160 Avian Influenza Bulletins 
 
Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
05/10/05 1 FAO    
samples negative 
(unspecified number) 
1+ (died on April 
7, 2005)  
05/17/05 2 FAO     n/a n/a  
05/24/05 3 FAO    460- 
samples were 
negative  
05/31/05 4 FAO and WHO    n/a 2-  
06/06/05 5 FAO and WHO  3 to 4 per day  samples collected 3-  
06/14/05 6 FAO and WHO    137- 
350-, 2- (previous 
week)  
06/21/05 7 FAO and WHO 2   3-, 124- 1-  
06/28/05 8 FAO and WHO  3 to 4 per day  57- 
358- *2 positive 
for H3N2  
07/05/05 9 FAO and WHO     43-  
07/12/05 10 FAO and WHO  1 to 2 per day  
farmers resist collecting 
samples 
5 positive for 
H3N2  
07/19/05 11 FAO and WHO  0  
samples negative 
(unspecified number) 1-  
07/26/05 12 FAO and WHO    157- 2-  
08/02/05 13 FAO and WHO  6  
samples negative 
(unspecified number) 1-  
08/09/05 14 FAO and WHO  7  
340 (no definitive results 
posted) 
1- *did not meet 
case  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
08/16/05 15 FAO and WHO  1  51- 1-  
08/23/05 16 FAO and WHO    5+, 15- n/a  
08/30/05 17 FAO and WHO    3- n/a  
09/06/05 18 FAO and WHO  0  184* (28 sera + for HI)   
09/13/05 19 FAO and WHO  0  
29- (but 23 positive for 
antibodies for H1N1   
09/20/05 20 FAO and WHO       
09/27/05 21 FAO and WHO    3- 1-  
10/06/05 22 FAO and WHO       
10/13/05 23 FAO and WHO    267- 3-  
10/20/05 24 FAO and WHO    n/a n/a  
10/27/05 25 FAO and WHO    n/a n/a  
11/03/05 26 FAO and WHO  12  n/a 3-  
11/10/2005 27 FAO and WHO  unspecified #  4- 2-  
11/24/2005 28 FAO and WHO    3- 5-  
12/1/2005 29 FAO and WHO  unspecifed #  1- 1-  
12/8/2005 30 FAO and WHO    
25-, other samples negative 
but unspecified amount 2-  
12/15/2005 31 FAO and WHO  unspecifed #  30- 1-  
12/22/2005 32 FAO and WHO  unspecifed #  
39-, 50 (no definitive results 
posted) 2-  
12/29/2005 33 FAO and WHO  1  
170-, 18 (no definitive 
results posted)  2360 
1/5/2006 34 FAO and WHO  
unspecifed # * 
MoH notices 
decrease in 
calls  48- 1 pending  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
1/12/2006 35 FAO and WHO     1-  
1/19/2006 36 FAO and WHO    60-   
1/26/2006 37 FAO and WHO  0  75-   
2/2/2006 38 FAO and WHO 24 17  30- 
1 (no definitive 
results posted)  
2/9/2006 39 FAO and WHO 20 21  
30-, other samples negative 
but unspecified amount 2-  
2/16/2006 40 FAO and WHO    30-   
2/23/2006 41 FAO and WHO 8 9  270- 1-  
3/2/2006 42 FAO and WHO 6 15   1-  
3/9/2006 43 FAO and WHO 6 17  75- 13- 235 
3/23/2006 44 FAO and WHO  17  63- 4-  
3/30/2006 45 FAO and WHO 16 77  
3+, 15-, 95 (33 ducks had a 
positive serological result, 
and 1 duck and 1 chicken 
tested positive for H5N1 
virus), 30- 1+ (died), 66- 162 
4/10/2006 46 FAO and WHO 13 440   
1+ (died) *6th 
confirmed person 
with AI in 
Cambodia. 2nd 
case AI detected 
in Cambodia  
4/13/2006 47 FAO and WHO 15 340  
288-, *75 duck were 
serologically positive for AI, 
all swab samples were 
negative for H5N1 virus— 21-  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
suggesting that the ducks 
were exposed in the past 
but were not currently 
infected with the virus. 
 48        
 49        
5/4/2006 50 FAO and WHO 22 120  99- 
7-, *3 positive for 
H1N1  
5/11/2006 51 FAO and WHO 10 280  56- 
6- *1 tested 
positive for H1N1  
5/18/2006 52 FAO and WHO 7 160  5- 0-  
 53        
 54        
 55        
6/16/2006 56 
UN System in 
Cambodia 32 100  3- 4-  
6/22/2006 57 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 231  3- 3-  
6/30/2006 58 
UN System in 
Cambodia 28 70 60 2- 1-  
7/7/2006 59 
UN System in 
Cambodia 25 70  1- 0  
7/13/2006 60 
UN System in 
Cambodia 28 60  12- 1-  
7/21/2006 61 
UN System in 
Cambodia 32 55  31- 0  
7/29/2006 62 UN System in 37 70  28- 0  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
Cambodia 
8/4/2006 63 
UN System in 
Cambodia 45 90  61- 2-  
8/11/2006 64 
UN System in 
Cambodia 50 100  178- 1- *case excluded  
8/18/2006 65 
UN System in 
Cambodia  90   2- 398 
8/25/2006 66 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 130  18-, 9+, 121- 4- 813 
9/1/2006 67 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 130  
150 tests, 5 of 50 duck 
swabs were positive to 
Newcastle Disease 5-  
9/8/2006 68 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 105  
367 tests, Balaing Village 
5+, 3:12 duck organ+, 2:70 
duck sera + 7- 331 
9/15/2006 69 
UN System in 
Cambodia 8 90  249- 0  
9/21/2006 70 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 90  133- 3-, 21-  
9/28/2006 71 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 90  63- 3-  
10/6/2006 72 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 69  119- 
3- * did not meet 
clinical case, 1 
admitted to 
hospital but was 
not seen by 
medical staff  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
10/13/2006 73 
UN System in 
Cambodia 6 40  106- 0  
10/20/2006 74 
UN System in 
Cambodia 9 65  119- 2-  
10/27/2006 75 
UN System in 
Cambodia 19 59  201- 0  
11/3/2006 76 
UN System in 
Cambodia 16 53  12- 4-  
11/13/2006 77 
UN System in 
Cambodia 16 38  50- 0  
11/17/2006 78 
UN System in 
Cambodia 20 50 25 187- 0  
11/24/2006 79 
UN System in 
Cambodia 22 32 14 283- 0  
12/1/2006 80 
UN System in 
Cambodia 19 57  100- 2-  
12/8/2006 81 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 65  100- 1-, but flu A  
12/15/2006 82 
UN System in 
Cambodia 49 60  56- 0  
1/5/2007 83 
UN System in 
Cambodia 38 40  168- 
1- sought health 
in VN  
1/12/2007 84 
UN System in 
Cambodia 23 77  61- 1-  
1/19/2007 85 
UN System in 
Cambodia 21 67  122- 0  
1/26/2007 86 UN System in 25 70  123- 9-  
93 
 
Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
Cambodia 
2/2/2007 87 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 72  114- 3-  
2/9/2007 88 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 82  117- 2-  
2/16/2007 89 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 65 18  4-  
3/1/2007 90 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 35 18 112- 0  
3/9/2007 91 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 40 14 137- 0  
3/16/2007 92 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 77  61- 2-  
3/26/2007 93 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 85  118- 0  
4/2/2007 94 
UN System in 
Cambodia 23 52  127- 1-  
4/6/2007 95 
UN System in 
Cambodia 20 75  50- 
1+ *first death in 
2007, 1-  
4/12/2007 96 
UN System in 
Cambodia 22 80  5+, 35- 10- 784 
4/27/2007 97 
UN System in 
Cambodia 52 53  16- 0  
5/7/2007 98 
UN System in 
Cambodia 20 35  8- 1-  
5/17/2007 99 
UN System in 
Cambodia 23 49  7- 0  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
5/21/2007 100 
UN System in 
Cambodia 19 46  3- 0  
5/25/2007 101 
UN System in 
Cambodia 22 34  12- 0  
6/1/2007 102 
UN System in 
Cambodia 18 14  0 0  
6/8/2007 103 
UN System in 
Cambodia 16 25  5- 1-  
6/15/2007 104 
UN System in 
Cambodia 22 31  7- 5-  
6/22/2007 105 
UN System in 
Cambodia 13 35  8- 1-  
7/2/2007 106 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 35  18- 4-  
7/9/2007 107 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 31 12 7- 0  
7/16/2007 108 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 35, 38 out  33- 2-  
7/20/2007 109 
UN System in 
Cambodia 20 51, 70 out  4- 1-  
7/27/2007 110 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 33, 34 out  37-   
8/6/2007 111 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 30, 37 out  21- 1-  
8/10/2007 112 
UN System in 
Cambodia 17 
32, 43 out, 19 
missed 14 16- 1-  
8/17/2007 113 UN System in 13 27, 35 out  22 22- 0  
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Date 
Issue 
No.  Organisation 
Animal 
Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
Text 
Messages 
Samples Tested for AI in 
Animal 
Suspected AI 
Humans (with 
tests run at the 
Pasteur 
Institute 
Culled 
Poultry 
Cambodia 
2/24/2007 114 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 35, 38 out 17 20- 0  
8/31/2007 115 
UN System in 
Cambodia 19 36, 33 out  23- 0  
9/7/2007 116 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 45, 32 out  20- 2-  
9/14/2007 117 
UN System in 
Cambodia 13 37, 33 out  227- 1-  
9/21/2007 118 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 
with report 
119 57, 37 out  13- 0  
9/28/2007 119 
UN System in 
Cambodia 15 
with report 
118 57, 37 out  36- 1-  
10/5/2007 120 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 27, 35 out   30- 0  
10/22/2007 121 
UN System in 
Cambodia 40 22, 24 out  48- 2-  
10/26/2007 122 
UN System in 
Cambodia 28 27, 3 out  16- 0  
11/2/2007 123 
UN System in 
Cambodia 18 17, 34 out  9- 2-  
11/9/2007 124 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 19, 10 out  1- 0  
11/16/2007 125 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 22, 33 out  13- 4-  
11/22/2007 126 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 17, 22 out  7- 3-  
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No.  Organisation 
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Health: 
Hotline 
Calls 
Human 
Health: 
Hotline Calls 
*out = call 
back* 
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tests run at the 
Pasteur 
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Culled 
Poultry 
11/30/2007 127 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 24, 36 out  23- 0  
12/7/2007 128 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 17, 15 out  4- 2-  
12/14/2008 129 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 15, 20 out   2-  
12/21/2007 130 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 11, 16 out  5- 1- *case excluded  
12/28/2007 131 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 13, 16 out  6- 1-  
1/4/2008 132 
UN System in 
Cambodia 8 18, 19 out  5- 0  
1/11/2008 133 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 24, 18 out  0 1-  
1/18/2008 134 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 22, 16 out  3- 1-  
1/25/2008 135 
UN System in 
Cambodia 9 15, 17 out  14- 0  
2/1/2008 136 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 16, 18 out  6- 1-  
2/8/2008 137 
UN System in 
Cambodia 29 16, 18 out  3- 1-  
2/15/2008 138 
UN System in 
Cambodia 22 20, 15 out  4- 12-  
2/22/2008 139 
UN System in 
Cambodia 20 18, 15 out  20- 0  
2/29/2008 140 UN System in 12 13, 10 out  8- 1- *case excluded  
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3/7/2008 141 
UN System in 
Cambodia 14 22, 16 out  
samples negative 
(unspecified number) 0  
3/14/2008 142 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 19, 20 out  3- 0  
3/21/2008 143 
UN System in 
Cambodia 8 21, 19 out  3- 0  
3/28/2008 144 
UN System in 
Cambodia 16 12, 8 out  1- 0  
4/4/2008 145 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 20, 15 out  7- 0  
4/11/2008 146 
UN System in 
Cambodia 24 24, 16 out   2-  
4/18/2008 147 
UN System in 
Cambodia 
no 
reports 25, 20 out  no update this week 0  
4/25/2008 148 
UN System in 
Cambodia 27 35, 22 out  19- 0  
5/2/2008 149 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 28, 23 out  8- 1- *case excluded  
5/9/2008 150 
UN System in 
Cambodia 8 30, 20 out  8- 1-  
5/16/2008 151 
UN System in 
Cambodia 6 33, 13 out  10- 0  
5/23/2008 152 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 32, 16 out  7- 1-  
5/30/2008 153 
UN System in 
Cambodia 13 32, 18 out  4- 1-  
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6/6/2008 154 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 22, 20 out  10- 0  
6/13/2008 155 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 27, 15 out  9- 1-  
6/20/2008 156 
UN System in 
Cambodia 12 15, 12 out  5- 3-  
6/27/2008 157 
UN System in 
Cambodia 10 32, 25 out  9- 1-  
7/4/2008 158 
UN System in 
Cambodia 8 35, 28 out  4- 3-  
7/11/2008 159 
UN System in 
Cambodia 11 39, 33 out  9- 0  
7/18/2008 160 
UN System in 
Cambodia 7 40, 34 out  14- 1-  
Totals   1936* 5004*     
Average per 
issue   12.1** 31.275**     
 
Note: *At least given missing issues and imprecise data; **160 issues used as denominator. 
 
Source: Nearly 160 Avian Influenza Bulletins (10/05/05-18/07/08) were content analyzed by author; the ones missing in this period could not 
be found by the UN Resident Coordinator‖s Office. 
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Figure 2.1: WHO FAO UNICEF AD HOC MEETING, 14-16 March 2006: Summary and Recommendations of the Meeting 
 
 
 
 
Source: WHO FAO UNICEF meeting summary notes 
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Table 2.2: Data for Cambodia 
 
National facts 
and figs 
Total population * 14,350,860 (2006, WDI) 
Total land area (km2) * 176,520 (2006, WDI) 
First H5N1 outbreak * 01/12/04: Pong Peay / Last: 04/06/07: Kampong Cham (dom. poultry, wild birds) according 
ECTAD HPAI Situation Update February 22, 2008 | Issue No. 270 
First human death, nos to date * 01/30/2005, 7 (WHO 2008)  
Numbers of poultry * Circa 16 million (PowerPoint Presentation) More than 90% of poultries are backyard chickens 
and ducks. Around 2 millions village households raise backyard chickens. Estimation of 
backyard chickens in Cambodia is around 15 million heads. According last census (November 
2004), there are: 
- 52 layer commercial farms (total of 206,000 heads) 
- 92 broiler commercial farms (total of 422,000 heads) 
- 331 ducks commercial farms (total of 300,000 heads) / closely depending of the season. 
Poultry export value * None. Cambodia does not export poultry or poultry products. (FAO, TCP/RAS/3010) 
Structure of industry (1-4) Not entirely sure what 1-4 refers to, perhaps monopoly, etc… 
National GDP * $7,192,591,000 (current US$, 2006) 
Agriculture as % of GDP (poultry 
industry as % of agric GDP) * 
34.19% (2006); “Livestock account for approximately 20% of overall GDP and 35% of 
agricultural GDP in both Cambodia and Laos. The population of cattle and buffaloes is 
approximately 2.5 million in Cambodia and 2 million in Laos, with an annual increase of about 
5% for cattle and 0.75% for buffalo in Laos between 1980 and 2000 as the demand for meat is 
growing rapidly in south-east Asia. With the majority of large ruminant livestock in Cambodia 
and Laos held by small village producers and up to 25% of cattle currently exported, an 
opportunity to increase production and address rural poverty exists.” 
http://www.vetsci.usyd.edu.au/research/farmanimal_health/projects_other.shtml “Within 
the livestock sub-sector, poultry and swine production have each grown at just over 2 percent 
per annum, slightly higher than the rate of large ruminant production (1.7 percent). In value 
terms, poultry is still the smallest of these three livestock activities, and an outbreak of avian 
influenza is unlikely to exert a large negative impact on overall growth of the sub-sector, 
although a pandemic could exert a very negative impact on tourism.” 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/293755-
1139523419190/Chapter4.pdf 
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Aid dependency (% GDP) * In 2004, approximately US$ 555.4 million of ODA was disbursed, equivalent to 11% of gross 
domestic product (with an estimated nominal GDP of US$ 4.9 billion for 2004). While ODA has 
increased somewhat since then, GDP growth has been dramatic. Thus, the country is less aid 
dependent now if measured as % GDP than it was four years ago. 
Risk, 
uncertainty, 
perceptions 
Major hazards/disasters in last 
decade (dates) 
Cambodia: Drought - Aug 2002; Cambodia: Floods - Aug 2000; Cambodia: Floods - Aug 2001; 
Cambodia: Floods - Aug 2002 
Framing or risk/uncertainty in policy While the authorities have played along—mainly because bird flu means more aid money—
even they know that the risk has been overblown.  
Social constructions of risk and 
uncertainty by public 
Bird Flu is ignored in urban areas; seen as a rural (if at that) problem. Too few people have 
actually died from the disease to make it much of an issue. Dengue is widely known to cause 
more deaths 
Media coverage of avian influenza Heavy media coverage perceived actual may be different. 
Politics, 
governance 
and political 
culture 
Styles of decision-making in 
bureaucracy 
Ruling party decides; bureaucracy is ineffective 
Patronage politics and influence on 
policy 
Extremely strong patronage politics, policy meaningless at times 
Form of democracy – role of civil 
society 
Constitutional monarchy, where King reigns but does not rule – civil society is weak 
State structure – level of 
decentralisation 
Some local governance, but little financial decentralization 
Regulatory cultures/styles Top-down 
HPAI response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major donors/international agencies 
involved in avian influenza (rank?) 
FAO, WHO, UN/World Bank, OIE, USAID, Centers for Disease Control, US Department of 
Agriculture, Unicef, AusAID, International Organisation of Migration, MPAT TE 14 Exercise co-
hosted by the US Pacific Command and the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) on testing response capacity for 
natural disasters and pandemic influenza, Germany, APEC, ADB 
NGOs, civil society groups involved MEDiCAM (Membership Organization for NGOs Active in Cambodia‖s health sector), 
Agronomes et Vétérinaires sans frontières (AVSF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), AED, 
CARE Cambodia, IFRC, Asia Disaster Preparedness Center, Centre d‖Etude et de 
Développement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) 
Key interventions for HPAI control 
and response 
Inter-Sectoral Technical Working Group (ITWG) 
4,700 village animal health workers (VAHWs) 
102 
 
 - Do not take/use sick or dead poultry for eating. Eg. Chickens, ducks etc. 
- Do not touch sick or dead poultry. Eg. Chickens, ducks etc 
- All poultry meats should be well cooked before eaten. 
- All sick or dead poultry must be buried or burnt carefully 
- When anyone has such problem or have the following symptoms; high fever, cough 
or difficult breathing, please contact to the closest village chiefs or health center staff 
or through hotlines numbers: 012 488 981 and 012 836 868. 
The three AI Community Theatre groups reported on in the last bulletin will do 350 
performances before Khmer new years 
Areas of government responsible – 
coordination 
National Animal Health and Production Investigation Center (NAHPIC), Ministry of Health – 
Communicable Disease Control, Animal Health Provincial Office (AHPO) Department of Animal 
Health and Production (DAHP), Wildlife Protection Office (WPO) of Ministry of Health, Ministry 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, National Committee for 
Disaster Management. National Veterinary Research Institute (NaVRI), Institut Pasteur du 
Cambodge, Port Authority and the Ministry of Transport (CAMSAB: Cambodian Shipping 
Agency and Broker), Ministry of Cults and Religions 
 Vaccine/drug manufacturing 
capacity 
Little to non-existent 
 
Source: Author‖s own compilation. 
